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Fiscal Capacity and Dualism in Colonial States:  
The French Empire 1830-1962 
Denis Cogneau1, Yannick Dupraz2 and Sandrine Mesplé-Somps3 
 
Abstract. To provide comparative evidence on the states of the second French colonial 
empire (1830-1962), we build a new database, unprecedented in detail, and in geographical 
and historical scope. The data reveal that the French colonies had high extractive efficiency, 
but low productive efficiency. Colonial states taxed extensively, adapting fiscal tools to 
varying economic contexts and historical conditions, but they achieved little because public 
expenditures entailed high wage costs for expatriate civil servants, and exhibited a bias 
toward needs of French settlers and capitalists. Socioeconomic and political dualism emerges 
as a common colonial inheritance.  
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Fiscal Capacity and Dualism in Colonial States:  
The French Empire 1830-1962 
 
A government able to provide public goods and implement efficient policies is a major 
ingredient of economic development, if only for “late-starters” (e.g., Gerschenkron 1962; 
Adelman and Morris 1997; Amsden 2001). Yet, the history of state building is still under-
studied (Hoffman 2015), and the available evidence disproportionately represents the 
experience of Western Europe (Tilly 1990, Dincecco 2015) or of today’s industrialized 
countries (Lindert 2004). The recent literature on state capacity focuses on decisions made 
within formally independent countries (Besley and Persson 2011), while the majority of 
today’s states are direct successors of colonial administrations. 
The historical and political science literature views the colonial state, at the same time, 
as very powerful and very weak. Though Crawford Young (1995) emphasizes that the African 
colonial state lacked a few attributes of stateness (sovereignty, national doctrine and 
international existence), he nevertheless describes it as a Leviathan, displaying “the purest 
modern form of autonomous bureaucratic authority” (p. 160). In contrast, Jeffrey Herbst 
(2000) characterizes the African colonial state as “administration on the cheap” (p. 73) with 
“limited ambition” (p. 77) and an unwillingness and inability to extend its control. For 
Frederick Cooper (2002), African colonial states were “gate-keeper states” (p. 5), able to 
control the trade flows in and out, but unable to extend power inwards. Outside of Africa, 
Anne Booth (2007) credits the colonial states of South-East Asia for some effective 
developmental action. 
Postcolonial “successor states” retained a number of features of colonial states, notably 
because they were a coproduction of colonial rulers and autochthonous elites (Bayart 1993; 
Cooper 2014a). Herbst sees the persistence of “non-hegemonic rule”, and Cooper the 
persistence of the gate-keeper features. In contrast, Young sees a legacy of authoritarianism, 
and Mahmood Mamdani (1996) a legacy of “decentralized despotism” (pp. 37-61). 
For Cooper (1996, 2002 and 2014b) the period of “developmental colonialism” after 
World War II is crucial for understanding colonial legacies. However, quantitative studies of 
African colonial public finances focus on the period before World War II (Frankema 2011, 
Frankema and van Waijenburg 2014). One notable exception is Gardner’s (2012) work on 
British colonial Africa. Recent works usually focus on British colonies, and studies of the 
French empire are still rare (with the exception of van Waijenburg 2018, and Frankema and 
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van Waijenburg 2014). Further, colonial states are most often only approached from the side 
of taxation, while it is fruitful to also consider the side of expenditure. Indeed, effective states 
are not only characterized by their extractive efficiency, but also by their productive 
efficiency: they are not only able to tax, they are also able to use public funds efficiently 
(Dincecco 2015, Besley and Persson 2011).  
To provide comparative evidence on the states of the second French colonial empire, we 
built a new database, unprecedented in detail, geographical and historical scope. From 
administrative archives, we extracted exhaustive revenue and expenditure data, public 
employment data, and public investment outcomes. We cover the 21 French colonies of 
Northern and sub-Saharan Africa, and South-East Asia, from their conquest to their 
independence around 1960. To study the crucial period of transition to independence, we were 
able to extend some of these data to 1970. 
Colonial states of the French empire had high extractive efficiency, but low productive 
efficiency. They taxed a lot, but achieved little, because public expenditure displayed high 
unit costs, and concentrated in areas where French settlers lived and where French firms were 
active. In that sense, French colonial states were neither casual night watchmen, nor 
omnipotent leviathans. In 1925, using fiscal tools adapted to different local contexts, they 
were already extracting 9 percent of colonial GDP on average. Colonial administrations did 
not stop investing in fiscal capacity when independence became foreseeable in the 15 years 
following World War II. In the hope of preserving imperial dominance, they taxed more and 
spent more. In 1955, they were extracting 16 percent of colonial GDP on average. This 
impressive increase in fiscal capacity was accompanied by large overseas redistribution. 
While the colonies were largely self-financed during most of the colonial period (at least for 
their non-military expenditures), net civilian subsidies from France represented 2.7 percent of 
their GDP in the 1950s. In the same period, France started fighting against liberation 
movements in Indochina, Algeria and Cameroon, at a financial cost that far exceeded civilian 
subsidies. Independence, therefore, relieved the colonizer from a growing financial burden. 
Though fiscal capacity was comparatively high, and though external financing became 
more important in the late colonial period, productive efficiency was low. Public expenditure 
was biased – towards the needs of settlers – and displayed high unit costs, explained in part by 
the high wages paid to expatriate civil servants. In 1925, the average civil servant in the 
French empire was paid about nine times the colonial GDP per worker. Bias and high costs 
meant that despite substantial fiscal capacity the colonies were under-administered. Dualism, 
 4  
 
the existence of high-wage formal enclaves in poor and agricultural economies, was a salient 
feature of colonial states, and an important legacy.  
Independence did not bring any discontinuity. In 1970, new postcolonial states taxed the 
same share of their GDP as colonial states did in the 1950s, and they were still dependent on 
French aid for a significant share of their expenditure. 
In the rest of the paper, we first provide a short historical background, before presenting 
the data construction methodology. The third section focuses on tax extraction and 
distribution across space and time, the fourth section on external financing, and the fifth 
section on public expenditure and its cost. 
France’s second colonial empire: geography, economy, settlements and political 
representation 
We study France’s second colonial empire: colonies acquired after 1830 and located in 
Africa and East Asia (Figure 1).4 This section lays down some key elements for understanding 
the history of colonial states.5 Initial economic and demographic conditions determined what 
colonial governments could tax. Patterns of European settlements and the evolution of 
political representation of settlers and autochthons are important for understanding the 
political economy of taxation and spending in the empire.6 
France acquired its second colonial empire between 1830 and 1919. 1830 marked the 
beginning of the colonization of Algeria. Tunisia and Morocco were added as protectorates in 
1881 and 1912, respectively. Indochina and Africa south of the Sahara were colonized during 
the second half of the nineteenth century. The last additions to the empire were the former 
German colonies of Togo and Cameroon, ruled from 1919 as mandates of the League of 
Nations. In 1954, Indochinese colonies gained independence after a seven-year war of 
independence. Decolonization was then rapid: Tunisia and Morocco became independent in 
1956, Guinea in 1958, all other sub-Saharan colonies in 1960, and finally Algeria in 1962, 
again after a seven-year war. 
                                                 
4 A few short-lived or small-size colonies were not included in our data collection effort: the League of 
Nations mandates of Syria and Lebanon; Djibouti; the Comoros and Pacific Ocean islands. We also excluded the 
remains of the first colonial empire (acquired before 1830): the French West Indies and Guyana, the Réunion 
Island, and the five trade posts of India.   
5 Online Appendix III provides an extended bibliography on the history of French colonies.  
6 We use the words “autochthons” and “autochthonous” to refer to the local populations of colonies, as 
opposed to settlers. The word “indigenous” (indigène) was used in the French colonial context, and has a 
negative connotation. The word “native” was used in the British colonial context with a similar connotation. 
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Initial demographic and economic conditions 
The regions making the French colonial empire differed in their initial demographic and 
economic conditions. Table 1 gives estimates of population, urbanization and GDP in the 
empire at three key dates: 1850, 1925 and 1950. Except in Algeria, 1850 predates French 
colonization. In 1925, the French empire had reached its greatest extent. 1955 is the eve of 
independence; Indochina had then just become independent. 
Around 1850, what was to become the French colonial empire, including 40.6 million 
people, was only 12 percent more populated than Metropolitan France. In the following 
century, population more than doubled throughout the empire, but French population 
increased by less than 20 percent. In 1955, the empire was more than twice as populated as 
France was.7 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
We use urbanization rates as of 1850 to gauge differences in economic development. 
North Africa stood above the rest at 6.6 percent. Indochina and sub-Saharan Africa had 
urbanization rates below 3 percent, but within Indochina, Cochinchina was more urbanized 
(5.5 percent), while Madagascar stood above West and Central Africa at 2.2 percent against 
0.7 percent. These differences in initial urbanization are in line with what we know of the 
economic history of these regions and their history of political centralization. North Africa 
benefited from its very ancient integration into the Mediterranean economy, and from its 
connections with the Islamic world and the Ottoman Empire (Valensi 1969). In Indochina, 
Laos and Cambodia were centralized, though weakened kingdoms, and Vietnam had been 
unified under the imperial rule of the Nguyen dynasty. The Mekong Delta in the south 
benefitted from superior ecological conditions for rice cultivation and had already attracted a 
large Chinese immigrant population (Bassino, Giacometti and Odaka 2010). In the nineteenth 
century, the island of Madagascar had been almost entirely united by the kings of Imerina 
(Campbell 2005). West and Central Africa, in contrast, did not have a history of strong 
political centralization. In the regions conquered by the French, the three most salient political 
structures of the nineteenth century were the Kingdom of Dahomey in present-day Benin, the 
Toucouleur Empire of al-Hajj Umar Tal in Senegal and Mali, and the moving empire of 
Samori Ture from forest Guinea to Northern Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana (Reid 2012). 
                                                 
7 Here and in the remainder of the paper we use the word “France” for “Metropolitan France.” 
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
Our purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP per capita estimates for 1925 (see Data 
Appendix) give a picture of differences in economic development similar to the one obtained 
by comparing urbanization rates in 1850. North Africa was five times poorer than France, but 
three times richer than the rest of the Empire.8 Madagascar was 25 percent richer than 
Indochina and 43 percent richer than West and Central Africa.9 In 1955, after 20 years of 
contraction during the Great Depression and 10 years of high postwar growth, sub-Saharan 
Africa remained poorer than North Africa, despite some convergence. Indochina, where 
World War II preceded a decade-long independence war, had at that point become the poorest 
of all, with a GDP per capita representing only 75 percent of its 1925 level.  
European settlement 
While the French established settlement colonies in North Africa (Europeans 
represented 8.1 percent of the population in 1925), settlers never represented more than 1.5 
percent of population in the rest of the empire (Table 1). In Algeria, settlers from Spain, Italy, 
and France (the majority) started immigrating in numbers in the decades following 1830. In 
1850, they represented 3 percent of population, 5.5 percent in 1870, and more than 10 percent 
on the eve of World War I. Tunisia was also home to a large population of French and Italian 
settlers (7 percent of the population in 1913). In Morocco, European settlers never represented 
more than 5 percent of population. Outside of North Africa, European settlers were few. In 
Indochina, they represented 0.1 percent of population in 1925. Even in Cochinchina, where 
the majority lived, Europeans never represented more than 0.6 percent of population. In West 
and Central Africa, French settlers represented 0.1 percent of population in 1925 and 0.4 
percent in 1955. Madagascar welcomed more, in particular from the neighboring Réunion 
Island: Europeans represented 0.5 percent of total population in 1925 and 1.2 percent in 
1955.10 European settlement patterns were largely determined by proximity to France, as well 
as by economic opportunities. The colonies that received the largest number of settlers were 
also the ex-ante richest and most urbanized. This is true even setting North African colonies 
                                                 
8 The GDP per capita of North Africa during the colonial period was, of course, pulled up by the presence 
of a large European population with an average income close to that of France. (See online Appendix I.) 
9 South Vietnam (Cochinchina) is estimated to be twice as rich as the rest of Indochina. 
10 Madagascar was also home to a significant Indian minority. Asians, including a small Chinese 
minority, represented around 0.3 percent of total population in 1925.  
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aside: Cochinchina and Madagascar had a larger share of settlers than other colonies in 
Indochina or sub-Saharan Africa. They were also more urbanized in 1850. 
Political representation of settlers and Autochthons 
Whether inhabitants of the colonies had a say in taxation and public spending is a 
crucial element in understanding the politics of colonial public finances. Before 1946, 
autochthons in the French colonial empire had, with a few exceptions, no political 
representation. French settlers had more political rights, especially in Algeria, which France 
officially annexed in 1848. From 1848 to 1852, and after 1871, French settlers had 
representation in the French Parliament and Senate. In 1898, they obtained some autonomy in 
public finance when a local assembly, the “Délégations Financières”, was given power to 
vote the budget.11 In contrast, the French settlers of the Moroccan and Tunisian protectorates 
had no representation in the French Parliament.12 Starting in 1881, the French settlers of 
Cochinchina had one representative. Under the Third Republic, sub-Saharan Africa also had 
one, elected by the inhabitants of four Senegalese municipalities (les Quatre Communes: 
Dakar, Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque); French settlers could vote, as could the autochthonous 
natives of these municipalities who had acquired citizenship. Outside of this exception, access 
to citizenship was very limited. In 1871, the Crémieux Decree granted citizenship to all 
Algerian Jews. Algerian Muslims could apply for citizenship starting in 1865, but the 
procedure was cumbersome and seldom successful (Weil 2005). In the rest of the empire, 
only soldiers with military decorations could apply. Autochthonous inhabitants of the empire 
were “indigenous subjects” of France; they had no political rights, but they had obligations. 
Notably, they could be conscripted into the army; about half a million conscripts from the 
colonies fought for France during World War I (Frémeaux 2006). 
After World War II, autochthons in the empire progressively obtained more political 
rights. In 1946, the French Union (Union Française) replaced the French empire, and the 
status of “indigenous subject” was abolished. Autochthons obtained some representation in 
local assemblies, in the assembly of the French Union and at the French Parliament. Suffrage, 
however, remained restricted to a heterogeneous list of occupations and social positions 
(Cooper 2014b p. 137-138). Furthermore, French citizens and autochthons formed two 
                                                 
11 In this assembly, Muslim representatives were granted a minority of 21 seats among the full 69. These 
were mostly held by caids who collaborated with the French administration (Bouveresse 2008). 
12 They sent representatives to the first and second Constituent Assemblies of the Fourth Republic in 
1945-1946, but after that lost representation. 
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separate electoral colleges that elected the same number of representatives, so that settlers 
were vastly overrepresented. The protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco were not part of the 
new French Union. In Indochina, where the war for independence had already started, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos became “associated states” and did not send representatives to 
the French Parliament. 
In the following decade, increasing anti-colonial pressure from independence 
movements and from the international community led France to extend franchise. The 
Defferre reform act (“loi cadre”) of 1956 granted universal suffrage to male and female 
autochthons, put an end to the segregation of electoral colleges, and gave a larger autonomy to 
territorial assemblies. In Algeria, only with the Fifth Republic in 1958 did political 
representation of Muslims come closer to their population weight (Weil 2005, p. 108). 
Data construction 
Our analysis relies on the collection of firsthand data in French colonial archives. This 
section highlights the most important points. (The Data Appendix describes in detail the 
various sources used and the hypotheses made to clean, compile, and homogenize the data.)   
We designed collection methodology to obtain homogenously defined spending and tax 
headings. Our estimates do not depend on the level of decentralization in each region because 
we consider all public authorities responsible for revenue and expenditure in the colonies.  
These include the French government (which was responsible for military spending), federal 
governments, central colonial governments, provincial governments, and auxiliary budget 
authorities that handled loans, health care, posts, and telegraphs. We collected data yearly, 
except in federations (Afrique Occidentale Française or AOF, Afrique Equatoriale Française 
or AEF, and Indochina), where we collected data yearly for the federal government 
(Gouvernement général), but every three years only for colonial governments 
(Gouvernements locaux).  
Our main variables are Net Public Revenue (NPR), which is public revenue net of loans 
and subsidies from abroad, and Net Public Expenditure (NPE), public expenditure net of loans 
and subsidies abroad. These variables are consolidated to avoid double counts arising from 
transfers between different administrative layers. NPE excludes military expenditure, which 
was, with a few exceptions, undertaken by the French Ministry of War and Ministry of the 
Colonies. Public revenue is broken down into different types of fiscal instruments, and public 
expenditure is broken down into its sectoral allocations. The net deficit (difference between 
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NPR and NPE) is broken down into different financing instruments (loans, subsidies, transfers 
from reserve funds). We also collected data on public wages and employment for six years 
between 1913 and 1960. 
For a couple of variables, notably NPR and NPE, we extended the database past 
independence until 1970, using various sources. We also collected in statistical yearbooks 
development outcomes and policy variables such as school enrollment, health personnel, 
electricity output, roads or railway length, and international trade.  
To produce comparable figures of revenue and expenditure, we collected population data 
from various primary and secondary sources, as well as local price indices, and prices for the 
year 1937. We express all variables in 1937 PPP-adjusted francs. Finally, to put fiscal figures 
in economic context and express colonial public revenue as a share of colonial GDP – a 
standard measure of fiscal capacity – we dedicated a special effort to devise GDP estimates 
for France and each colonial territory. We combined national accounting exercises (starting in 
the 1950s) and historians’ estimations of GDP growth in volume (see Data Appendix). 
Though we produced data for (almost) all years of the colonial period, our presentation 
relies on the detailed analysis of two key years, 1925 and 1955. In 1925, France’s second 
colonial empire had reached its greatest extent. The French civilian administration had fully 
replaced the military, and could draw stable fiscal revenue from the colonial economies. 1955 
corresponds to the late colonial period: decolonization had just begun with the independence 
of Indochina in 1954. (Our figures for Indochina are from 1953/54.) Tunisia and Morocco 
were about to get their independence. Algeria’s liberation war had just started, and France had 
started running large development plans in the colonies. 
Fiscal extraction: high and rising 
In 1925, net public revenue represented 8.9 percent of GDP in the French colonial 
empire. It kept rising in the following decades, reaching 15.9 percent in 1955. French colonial 
states obtained these high levels of fiscal extraction with fiscal tools adapted to the local 
geographic, demographic, and economic context. In places where they could tax a large urban 
population, they used modern fiscal tools. In poorer regions of the empire, the French 
Republic resurrected Ancien Régime fiscal tools, such as monopoly revenue, head taxes, and 
corvée (forced labor).  
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A sizeable colonial state 
In 1925, the revenue to GDP figure of 8.9 percent is far from small. While the public 
revenue of Metropolitan France then represented 16.5 percent of French GDP, it was only 13 
percent 25 year before, in 1900. Another way to see this is to consider other parts of the world 
in the 1920s. Peres-Cajías (2017) provides figures for Latin America, but only for the tax 
revenue of the central government (excluding lower-level administrative divisions and non-
tax revenue). In the 1920s, the tax revenue of the central government in Madagascar (7 
percent) and Indochina (6 percent) was roughly the same as in Chile (7 percent) and larger 
than in Brazil (5 percent). In North Africa (3.9 percent) and West and Central Africa (4.5 
percent), it was larger than in Columbia, Bolivia and Peru (less than 4 percent).13 Colonies of 
the British empire are a natural comparison. Ewout Frankema and Marlous van Waijenburg 
(2014) show that, in Africa, colonizer identity was not an important determinant of the level 
of fiscal extraction. In a companion paper, we show that, in West Africa, geographical 
neighbors colonized by the British or the French had very similar levels of public revenue per 
capita throughout the colonial period (Cogneau, Dupraz and Mesplé-Somps 2018). Under the 
doctrine of self-financing that applied from 1900 to World War II, French colonies received 
practically no subsidies from France. They did not pay for military expenditure, and their debt 
service was limited. France spent some 3 percent of GDP in debt service and 4 percent on the 
army. As a result, when we consider net civilian public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 
we find the same figure of 8 percent for France and its colonies (Table 2, line 3). Because 
France was about 10 times richer than its colonial empire in 1925, the size of the state is about 
10 times higher in France when we express expenditures in 1937 francs per capita. The ratio 
is even higher if we also consider defense because military expenditure directly allocated to 
the colonies (including conscription) represented only a small share of French military 
expenditures.14 
Though net public revenue varied within the empire (last four columns of Table 2), the 
variance was relatively limited: 12.5 percent of GDP in Indochina, 9 percent in Madagascar, 
and 8.3 percent in North Africa. If settler colonies of North Africa had more than twice the 
levels of public expenditure per capita as Indochina or Madagascar, it was because they were 
                                                 
13 It was more than 10 percent only in Uruguay. Sokoloff and Zolt (2007) give 1930 figures of 7 percent 
for Argentina, 8 percent for Brazil, 6 percent for Mexico, and 9 percent for Venezuela. 
14 The high figure for North Africa in 1925 (107 francs) is due to the Moroccan Rif War. 
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richer, and not because of higher taxation.15 Net public revenue as a share of GDP was lower 
in West and Central Africa (5.4 percent), and particularly low in AEF (4.0 percent) and 
Cameroon (2.6 percent). However, the difference between these colonies and the rest of the 
empire is reduced when we take forced labor into account. In West and Central Africa, and in 
Madagascar, a labor tax, the prestation, required Africans to work a fixed number of days per 
year in local public works. In addition, some military conscripts worked on infrastructure 
projects (Fall 1993). Because labor payments are difficult to value, we do not consider them 
in our figures (except when they were rebought in cash). Using the valuations of van 
Waijenburg (2018), who uses unskilled labor minimum wages to value the prestation, 
increases the share of public revenue in GDP in West and Central Africa from 5.4 percent to 
6.8 percent. Including conscripted labor could bring the figure even closer to the rest of the 
empire. In Madagascar, including prestation labor increases the share of public revenue in 
GDP from 9 percent to 9.9 percent, bringing it closer to the high level of fiscal extraction of 
Indochina. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
In the 30 years following 1925, state size increased tremendously, both in France and in 
its colonial empire (second panel of Table 2). The only exception was Indochina, where the 
independence war immediately followed World War II. The last data point we have, in 1953, 
one year before independence, shows a decrease in GDP per capita (see Table 1) and in net 
public revenue (from 12.5 percent of GDP in 1925 to 9.5 percent). In France, public revenue 
rose from 16.5 percent of GDP in 1925 to 26.3 percent in 1955, or 33.4 percent if social 
security transfers, which increased a lot after World War II, are included.16 In the empire, 
public revenue increased from 8.9 percent in 1925 to 15.9 percent in 1955, or 17.1 percent if 
we include social security funds established after 1944 in North Africa. An examination of the 
tax revenue of the central government shows that the tax capacity of North Africa and West 
and Central Africa was, at 10 percent and 11.8 percent respectively, comparable to the tax 
capacity of Brazil (10.2 percent) and Chile (12.7 percent) in the 1950s, while the tax capacity 
of Bolivia, Columbia, Guatemala and Peru ranged between 4 percent and 8 percent (Peres-
                                                 
15 These results are in line with those of Frankema (2010), who shows that, among British colonies in the 
1911-1937 period, “partial settlement colonies” (such as South Africa and South Rhodesia) rank below the 
richest non-settler colonies (such as the Gold Coast or Kenya), but far above the very populated Nigeria. 
16 These social security transfers represented only 0.05 percent of GDP in 1925 France, and were then 
non-existent in the colonies. 
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Cajías 2017).17 Because the colonies started receiving large net transfers from France after 
World War II (see below), the increase in state size is even more striking if we consider 
public expenditure, which boomed from 8.0 percent of GDP in 1925 to 19.1 percent in 1955. 
Public revenue increased the most in West and Central Africa, rising from 5.5 percent of GDP 
in 1925 to 13.9 percent in 1955, partly because the initial figure does not take the monetary 
value of forced labor into account, and is therefore underestimated. 
To give a better view of historical trends, Figure 2 shows the year-to-year evolution of 
net public revenue as a share of GDP from 1890 to 1970 in each colony or federation. 
Contrary to Table 2, these series do not include the revenue of second-level administrative 
divisions (municipalities), because our series for them are patchy. This mainly affects Algeria, 
where municipalities represented 20-25 percent of public revenue (see Data Appendix). 
Overall, public revenue decreased during World War II as it had during World War I. Public 
revenue then peaked dramatically in the 1950s, both in North Africa and in West and Central 
Africa. Madagascar stands as an exception with a rather stationary profile. At the end of the 
decade, as colonies gradually cut ties with France, no marked change in public revenue 
occurred. In West and Central Africa, net public revenue fell in the years leading to 
independence in 1960, possibly because of administrative disorganization as the French 
prepared to leave and dismantled the federations. Nevertheless, public revenue quickly 
recovered, and, at the end of the 1960s, it was back to the level reached around 1955. 
Four decades later, in 2010, the independent states corresponding to the former French 
empire were collecting as much as 26 percent of GDP in public revenue (bottom panel of 
Table 2), 30 percent with social security contributions. If we exclude oil and mining from 
both revenue and GDP, the figure falls to 20.6 percent (without social security).18 By 2010, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (formerly Indochina) had double the level of fiscal extraction as 
in 1955. Elsewhere, excluding oil and mining, levels of fiscal extraction in 2010 were similar 
to those in 1955: 22.1 percent in 2010 compared to 19.1 percent (1955) in North Africa; 11.2 
percent compared to 14.6 percent in Madagascar, and 15.3 percent compared to  13.9 percent 
in West and Central Africa. 
                                                 
17 Sokoloff and Zolt (2007) give 1950 figures of 10 percent for Argentina, 9 for Mexico, and 18 for 
Venezuela.  
18 These sectors, which boomed after independence, are easy revenue-extraction sources, even for states 
with low administrative capacity, but revenue from these sectors is very volatile. 
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Fiscal adaptation 
To extract a high and increasing share of GDP, the French colonizers adapted the fiscal 
structure to different contexts and historical periods. We categorized fiscal instruments 
according to their implied degree of state capacity. This encompasses a broad range: from 
tools involving only light administrative management (such as the head tax or capitation) or 
monopolies on the sale of certain goods (such as alcohol or salt) or services (revenue of posts 
and telegraphs); to taxes on external trade that did not require government presence outside 
the port of entry; to intermediate taxes requiring larger administrative capacity; to modern 
taxation (such as income and turnover taxes) requiring the frequent collection or self-
declaration of detailed economic information on individuals and firms. (For a more detailed 
classification, see the Data Appendix).19  
The distinction between direct and indirect taxes that is often used as a measure of fiscal 
capacity is not suited to the colonial case. For example, the head tax (capitation), a lump-sum 
tax levied on every individual except children, the elderly and the physically impaired, was, in 
practice, not costly in terms of administrative management; village-level colonial 
administrators were not needed because local chiefs levied the tax (Zucarelli 1973).20 
Table 3 displays the share of different tax instruments in GDP in France and the four 
regions of the empire.21 In 1925 France, there was no capitation, trade taxes represented only 
0.8 percent of GDP and modern and intermediate taxes represented 11.3 percent of GDP – 80 
percent of net public revenue. 
In the empire, the fiscal structure of the North African colonies and protectorates was 
the closest to France. Capitation represented less than 0.1 percent of GDP, intermediate taxes 
about 2.5 percent and modern taxation already 1.2 percent (16 percent of net public revenue), 
while it remained marginal in the rest of the empire. Algeria, first, and Tunisia, second, had 
gradually replaced Ottoman taxes by copying French taxes, such as direct taxes on wages, 
benefits, and other types of incomes. A general income tax was introduced in 1919 in Algeria, 
and 1928 in Tunisia. In Tunisia, the revenues from taxes on income drawn from agricultural 
exports (appearing as intermediate taxes in our classification) gradually overtook the revenues 
of ancient taxes on agricultural inputs such as trees, land, and cattle (Nicolai, 1962, p. 443). In 
                                                 
19 Monopoly revenue does not include the receipts of public railway companies, but it does include their 
excess revenue when they are transferred to the government’s budget (see Data Appendix). 
20 The local chiefs received wage payments and a share of the amount collected. The lump-sum amount of 
the capitation varied, as well as the minimum age threshold. Civil servants and soldiers were exempted. 
21 Table 3 (like Figure 2) does not consider the revenue of municipalities. This is why the various tax 
instruments do not sum to the net public revenue of Table 2. 
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Morocco, the bulk of modern taxation was, before the 1940s, a tax on agricultural income 
called tertib.22 In North Africa, trade taxes, at 1.2 percent of GDP, were higher than those in 
France, but lower than those in the rest of the empire. They remained limited because Algeria 
and Tunisia formed a customs union with France so that, with a few exceptions, neither 
bilateral exports nor imports were taxed. Only dock dues (octroi de mer) applied, as they 
applied to trade with other countries. Trade taxes were higher in Morocco (2.3 percent of 
GDP), where the protectorate treaties prevented a customs union with France. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
Outside of North Africa, the colonial fiscal structure relied heavily on Ancien Régime 
tools such as capitation and monopoly revenue. In Indochina, capitation represented 1.6 
percent of GDP, but the striking figure was the weight of monopoly revenue — 4.2 percent of 
GDP in 1925. Revenue of the government monopoly on opium alone represented 1.4 percent 
of GDP. Because opium was purchased mainly by wealthy ethnic Chinese, this was 
“deliberately a Chinese tax” (Bassino 2000, p. 281). As in North Africa, the customs union 
with France limited taxation of trade, which accounted for only 1.5 percent of GDP. Modern 
taxation represented 0.2 percent of GDP – a much smaller percentage than in the settler 
colonies of North Africa. From 1920 onwards, European settlers in Indochina paid a wage tax 
and a minimal lump-sum tax on 12 income brackets. Between 1938 and 1941, a general 
income tax was introduced, and extended to the autochthonous population. Though European 
settlers in Indochina were taxed, and though they were much richer than the rest of the 
population, and richer than European settlers in North Africa, they were too few to generate 
large fiscal revenue.23 
Sub-Saharan African colonies relied heavily on capitation for public revenue. In West 
and Central Africa, it represented 1.5 percent of GDP. If we follow van Waijenburg (2018) 
and take the labor tax into account, we find that forced labor represented 1.4 percent of GDP, 
so that 2.9 percent of GDP (53 percent of net public revenue) was collected using regressive 
taxes weighing practically exclusively on autochthons. In Madagascar, capitation rates had 
been higher than in West and Central Africa since the beginning of the twentieth century 
(Jacob 1987). In 1925, capitation represented almost 3 percent of GDP. Using the estimates of 
                                                 
22 The tertib was originally introduced by the sultan Moulay Abdelaziz in 1901, and then withdrawn, 
before being revived by the French administration in 1915. 
23 See population and income shares in online Appendix 1.  
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van Waijenburg (2018), we find that forced labor represented 1 percent of GDP – a bit less 
than in West and Central Africa.24 Intermediate taxes and monopoly revenue were also higher 
in Madagascar than in West and Central Africa; these sources of revenue, along with higher 
capitation rates, explain the higher level of fiscal extraction. Modern taxation was inexistent 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and colonial governments relied more heavily on trade taxes. Such 
taxes represented 2.3 percent of GDP in Madagascar and 1.9 percent in West and Central 
Africa. Like Algeria and Indochina, Madagascar was in a customs union with France, so that 
import duties were limited. However, taxes applied to the consumption of a few imported 
goods, and to exports. In West and Central Africa, import tariffs could be fixed according to 
domestic conditions (Bernard 1913; Cornevin 1972, pp. 294-295). Within that region, the 
potential for trade taxes explains why public revenue was higher in West Africa (AOF and 
Togo) than in Central Africa (AEF and Cameroon); West Africa had been more outward 
oriented since the times of  “legitimate commerce” in the first half of the twentieth century 
(Law 1995).25  
Net public revenue increased everywhere between 1925 and 1955, and especially in the 
15 years following World War II. In France, new revenue mostly came from an increase in 
direct and indirect modern taxation, which climbed from 4.4 percent to 12.1 percent of GDP 
(bottom panel of Table 3). In the colonies, the contrast is again between the settler colonies of 
North Africa, where modern taxation was responsible for a large part of the increase in 
revenue, and the rest of Africa, where the colonizer relied on trade taxes, though the fiscal 
structure was also modernized. 
Our figures for Indochina are for the year 1953, one year before independence. The 
French grip had then become much weaker, the autonomous government of Vietnam had 
abolished capitation, and monopoly revenue and intermediate taxes had lost weight. Modern 
taxation had progressed, but only moderately. As the colonial state was losing ground, trade 
taxation had become the dominant source of revenue, now representing 3.6 percent of GDP. 
In North Africa, modern taxation was responsible for almost half of the increase in fiscal 
extraction over the period, increasing from 1.2 to 5.1 percent of GDP, while monopolies and 
intermediate resources also increased substantially. Import tariffs were raised in Tunisia and 
                                                 
24 The colonizer increased capitation rates in the beginning of the twentieth century to break with the 
unpopular forced labor practices of the precolonial Merina Kingdom (Jacob 1987, Campbell 2005). This could 
explain why forced labor was less important in Madagascar than in the rest of Africa. At the same time, 
conscription reservists were used intensively between 1928 and 1945 (Fremigacci 2014 p. 50); they are not 
counted in van Waijenburg’s estimates. 
25 The contrast between French West and Central Africa is similar to the contrast between British West 
and East Africa put forward by Frankema (2011) and Frankema and van Waijenburg (2012 and 2014). 
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Morocco during the Great Depression and World War II, and went down only slightly 
afterwards, but the overall increase in trade taxes was modest. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, the colonizer also modernized the tax structure, but primarily used 
trade taxes to increase public revenue. The capitation decreased modestly in Madagascar, and 
increased in West and Central Africa, from 1.5 to 2 percent of GDP. Modern taxation, in the 
form of income and turnover taxes, which were inexistent in 1925, increased to represent 
more than 1.5 percent of GDP. In the colony of Senegal, which was wealthier and welcomed 
more French settlers, the schedular taxes on profits and wages introduced in 1941 and the 
general income tax of 1930 raised, after 1946, more revenue than the capitation, and the 
turnover tax almost as much. Yet, the extent of this modernization was more limited than in 
North Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, trade taxes explained most of the increase in public 
revenue: their share in GDP more than doubled to represent about 5.5 percent of GDP. This 
was mainly the result of a rise in tax rates, in particular on imports. Though African trade 
boomed after World War II, GDP boomed as well, so that the boom in trade alone cannot 
explain the increase in the share of trade taxes in GDP.26 
Increasing progressivity in taxation?   
The construction of the welfare state in twentieth century Europe went with the gradual 
modernization of taxation, because the collection of up-to-date information on individuals or 
firms allowed more progressive tax schedules. Does it mean that taxation was more 
progressive in the settler colonies of North Africa as compared to the rest of the colonial 
empire? Does it mean that the progressivity of taxation increased in the last decades of 
colonization? An apparently more modern tax structure could actually reflect only colonial 
inequality and/or structural change in colonial societies. Where Europeans obtained a higher 
share of income, the share of revenue from modern taxes or from import duties was 
mechanically higher. Likewise, where or when more autochthons migrated to cities and 
obtained wage jobs, the tax structure looked more modern due to the same composition effect.  
Though our data do not allow us to conduct a precise incidence analysis, we use various 
sources, and in particular novel income tax tabulation data from Alvaredo, Cogneau and 
                                                 
26 In Madagascar, the share of imports and exports in GDP actually decreased from 56 percent in 1925 to 
32 percent in 1955. In West and Central Africa, it increased from 31 percent to 40 percent. Exports increased 
from 14 to 18 percent of GDP and imports from 17 to 22 percent. In 1925, the effective rate of taxation was 2.1 
percent on exports and 9.6 percent on imports. The increase in trade alone would then explain an increase in the 
share of trade taxes in GDP of only 0.021×0.04+0.096×0.05=0.56 percentage points. The effective tax rate on 
exports increased to 9.3 percent in 1955, the tax rate on imports to 18 percent. 
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Piketty (2017) to implement simple numerical simulations on the distribution of the tax 
burden. We consider three groups: Europeans, the autochthonous non-poor, and the 
autochthonous poor, for the years 1925 and 1955 and for Algeria, Tunisia and AOF. This is 
presented in detail in Online Appendix I, we only report here the conclusions obtained. 
In Algeria, progressivity had already improved before 1925 with the suppression in 1919 
of the so-called “Arab taxes” inherited from the Ottomans and their replacement by a general 
income tax. Both for Algeria and Tunisia, our simulations suggest that the tax system was at 
least neutral, if not mildly progressive in 1925. Between 1925 and 1955, tax progressivity 
unambiguously increased in Algeria and Tunisia, though this increase was perhaps modest. In 
AOF, the tax system was possibly regressive in 1925 (notably because of forced labor), but 
this possibility seems very unlikely in 1955. Yet, given the range of the confidence intervals 
obtained, the simulations do not allow us to assert for sure that tax progressivity increased in 
AOF. Likewise, it is very hard to assert for sure that Algeria and Tunisia had a more 
progressive tax system than AOF.  
To take stock, French colonial states managed from the start to extract significant fiscal 
resources, by taxing autochthonous populations sometimes heavily. As time went, and 
especially after World War II, they succeeded in doubling extraction while shifting to more 
modern tax systems with better distributive properties. While, during most of the period, 
colonial civilian expenditure was largely self-financed, the increase in fiscal capacity after 
World War II came with an increase in external financing in the form of grants from France. 
External financing: from self-financing to aid dependency 
Figure 3 displays net grants from France as a proportion of a colonial territory’s GDP. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century, for some colonies like Algeria, Madagascar or AEF, 
grants could represent 15 to 25 percent of expenditure, at a time when the fiscal apparatus was 
still under construction. Yet, as expenditure was also low, this temporary contribution never 
went above 3 percent of local GDP, and the cost to France was very limited. In Indochina, net 
grants from France were systematically negative from 1904 onward, which means that 
surpluses from Indochinese budgets were financing the French state.  
Between 1920 and 1944, the colonial empire was almost self-financed. The first 
exception was Morocco in the 1920s when the colonial state was still new. The second 
exception was Central Africa (AEF), where grants represented up to 0.8 percent of GDP over 
the period. Transfers to AEF peaked between 1920 and 1924, the period of Minister Sarraut’s 
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plan, taken by some as the first developmental attempt in the empire (Cornevin 1972 pp. 281-
290). In the 1930s, as the Great Depression was unfolding, state-guaranteed long-term loans 
financed large infrastructure projects. Colonial governments used these loans mainly for the 
completion of railway lines like the “Congo-Océan” in AEF or the “Fianarantsoa–Côte Est” in 
Madagascar. These loans were still being reimbursed in the late 1950s, but thanks to the large 
inflation of the 1940s that multiplied prices by 14, real interest rates on these loans ended up 
being negative, so that they represented a less visible subsidy to the colonies from French 
bondholders. 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
In 1946, the Economic and Social Development Investment Fund (FIDES) was created to 
finance large-scale infrastructure projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Though the colonies also 
contributed to this fund, the contribution of France was 70 percent of the total. As a result, as 
can be seen in Figure 3, after 1946 net grants from France as a share of GDP took off in 
Madagascar (2.4 percent of GDP on average for 1946-1960) and even more impressively in 
West and Central Africa (3.5 percent). During the same period, North African colonies 
financed developmental projects through loans under the Modernization and Equipment Fund 
(FME), renamed Economic and Social Development Fund (FDES) after 1955 (Saul 2016 p. 
47). Morocco and Tunisia received no direct subsidies before independence in 1956, yet 
ongoing research suggests that the post-independence governments did not reimburse some of 
the loans. Algeria started receiving large amounts of French aid in 1956, two years into the 
liberation war. This culminated in 1959-1962 under the “Constantine Plan”, aimed at 
industrializing the country, with a peak at 16.4 percent of Algerian GDP in 1961 (5.8 percent 
of GDP on average between 1946 and 1962).  
The colonial empire definitely turned more costly for France in the last 15 years of 
colonization. Yet, even during this period, France’s total financial contribution to colonial 
civilian expenditure reached 0.39 percent of its own cumulated GDP, below the aid target 
fixed today by the OECD for its members (0.7 percent). Then decolonization and the 
transformation of these subsidies into foreign aid allowed France to save money. The amount 
of French aid directed to Algeria decreased quickly after 1963 to represent only 2 percent of 
Algerian GDP in 1969, Madagascar also experienced a large downfall below 1 percent, while 
in West and Central Africa the share of French aid in GDP stabilized around 3 percent. 
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Figure 4 provides a synthetic view of all sources of public finance in the French empire, 
expressed as a percentage of the total empire’s GDP.27 Between 1900 and 1950, total civilian 
public expenditure in the empire was overwhelmingly financed by local public revenue. 
Financial transfers from France were large, but almost completely in the form of military 
expenditure, far larger than civilian subsidies. From 1833 to 1962, military expenditure in the 
empire represented on average 57.7 percent of civilian expenditure, 6.1 percent of the 
empire’s GDP and 0.8 percent of France’s GDP; the corresponding figures for civilian 
transfers were respectively 10.7, 1.1 and 0.14 percent. Military spending was high during the 
conquest of Algeria, peaked in the 1880s with the conquest of Tunisia and Indochina, and 
boomed again with the liberation wars of Indochina and of Algeria, while military presence 
was also increasing in other colonies of sub-Saharan Africa after 1946. Though France kept a 
few permanent military bases in its former empire, decolonization definitely decreased 
France’s military expenditure. Except for some expenditure in infrastructure and health, we 
never consider the military expenditure of France as an item of public expenditure for the 
colonies. Yet, once they became independent, the former colonies started developing a 
national defense budget, so that we could consider part of France’s colonial military spending 
as subsidizing their defense expenditure. Military expenditure in the domestic budget of 
independent Morocco (after 1957) weighed 13 percent of total expenditure, or 1.5 percent of 
domestic GDP.28 If we adopt this 1.5 percent ratio of GDP to define counterfactual military 
spending absent colonialism, then we find that the subsidization of defense expenditure by 
France represented a 0.18 percent transfer in terms of French GDP, bringing total subsidies to 
colonies to 0.14+0.18=0.32 percent over 1833-1962. Overall, French “aid” to its colonies was 
definitely modest. 
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
To take stock, though French aid to its colonies was limited if we consider the entire 
colonial period, it increased in the last two decades of colonization, in particular in sub-
Saharan Africa. In the same period, fiscal extraction, which was already substantial, increased 
                                                 
27 As the empire expanded over time, so does the geographical coverage of the GDP denominator; 
colonies enter as their first budget account becomes available (first Algeria in 1833, then Cochinchina in 1862, 
then Senegal in 1865, etc.), then come out when they get their independence. 
28 It was 11.7 billion francs; Roy. du Maroc, Tableaux économiques du Maroc 1915-1959, p. 261. In 
contrast, according to Amin’s estimates (1966 pp. 281-284), Algeria in 1963 had the largest army in Africa, and 
spent 70 billion francs on it, meaning 5.2% of GDP, not even counting the pensions of veteran moujahidins (30 
billion). 
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to unprecedented level. As a result, in 1955, net civilian public expenditure represented 
almost 20 percent of GDP in the French colonial empire. As the next section shows, the high 
and rising extractive efficiency of the colonial state, accompanied in the late colonial period 
by large external financing, was not accompanied by productive efficiency. 
Biased expenditure and high wage cost 
The true limitation of the colonial state was not its fiscal capacity, but its colonial 
nature. Its expenditure was biased, serving first the needs of French settlers and companies. It 
was also plagued with high unit costs, in particular because of high wages, partly explained by 
the presence of very well paid French civil servants. In the end, the legacy of the French 
colonial state was dualism, the coexistence of modern, formal-sector enclaves and a 
traditional, informal sector (Boeke 1953, Lewis 1954). One key aspect of the dualism created 
by French colonial states was the existence, in poor, agricultural economies, of a high-wage 
public sector providing public goods at European standards to urban enclaves. 
Biased expenditure 
The colonial state had to serve first the interest of French settlers and capitalists, by 
favoring costly investments in railways and harbors to connect mines and plantations, and by 
providing settlers, mainly agglomerated in cities, with public services (health, education, 
electricity) at the standards prevailing in France. Table 4 shows the sectoral allocation of 
public expenditure as well as a few development outcomes in France and the colonial empire 
in 1925 and 1955. Like for public revenue, we organized data collection, homogenization and 
aggregation to make expenditure headings comparable across space and time. 
In all colonies, a large share, between 32 and 50 percent, of public expenditure went to 
infrastructure and what we call “production support” — subsidies to private and public 
companies and expenditure on public services to enhance and support production, like posts, 
mining or agricultural research. In North Africa, colonial governments also directed public 
subsidies to the settlement of French farmers. A large fraction of production support 
expenditure went to railways, in the form of subsidies to private companies, in direct 
investments financed by loan or buying back the capital of private companies, or in subsidies 
to the operating national company. Only in post-1945 Indochina did this kind of expenditure 
represent a smaller share (24 percent in 1953), because the independence war prevented 
infrastructure projects. The share of infrastructure and production support in expenditure was 
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overall higher in the colonies than in France, but the years 1925 and 1955 are not 
representative of longer-term patterns, as the reconstruction effort after World War I and 
World War II were then absorbing a large part of French public spending. Before 1914 and 
between 1926 and 1939, the share of production and infrastructure expenditure was 10 to 20 
percentage points higher in the colonies than in France. Yet, despite some catch-up between 
1925 and 1955, the gap between France and its colonies in electricity output, roads and 
railways remained wide (Table 4). In 1955, kWh per capita were 30 times as high in France as 
in the colonies, road meters per capita 3 times as high, and railroad meters per capita 4.5 times 
as high (bottom panel of Table 4, lines 3-5). 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
North African colonies received more electricity than the rest of the empire: in 1955, the 
number of kWh per capita was 8 times higher than in Madagascar, 15 times higher than in 
West and Central Africa.29 However, electrification was limited to urban centers, where 
European settlers lived. If we consider instead public investments that could not easily be 
targeted only at cities, like road meters per capita, North Africa was not particularly better 
endowed in 1955. Agricultural investments remained concentrated in regions with high 
potential and a significant presence of European farmers or traders, like the groundnut basin 
in Senegal, the inner Niger delta for cotton and rice in Soudan, or the rice-producing Mekong 
delta in Cochinchina.30 Despite this concentration, and despite high investment and operating 
costs, colonial infrastructure was still transformative. In particular, railway lines and major 
roads stimulated autochthonous initiative in cash crops, and spurred the growth of cities 
(Jedwab and Moradi 2016). 
As for social spending, it was not a priority of colonial governments. In 1925, the 
education sector represented 7.3 percent of public expenditure and 13 percent of public 
employment in the colonies, versus 20.3 percent and 32 percent in France (top panel of Table 
4, line 5). In 1955, education expenditure had increased to 11.3 percent of expenditure and 18 
percent of employment in the colonies, while it had remained stable in France in employment 
                                                 
29 The average of Metropolitan France is perhaps not the best comparator, if only to assess the post-WW2 
infrastructure effort. If we instead take one of the most disadvantaged département in mainland France, the 
Creuse, the density of electricity was at par with Algeria in 1925, but twice the Algerian level in 1955, at 192.8 
kWh per capita. The island of Corsica had almost no electricity in 1925 (1.3 kWh p.c.), but stood above Algeria 
in 1955, at 130 kWh p.c. From this standpoint, the Corrèze (another relatively poor département next to the 
Creuse) was indeed preferred to the Zambèze, as urged by the famous motto of the “Cartierist” political 
movement in the 1950s (“La Corrèze plutôt que [rather than] le Zambèze!”). 
30 Dumont (1966) harshly criticizes this biasedness of post-WW2 investments under the FIDES. 
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share, and even decreased in expenditure share.31 Education was a more important item of 
expenditure in North Africa than in other colonies (Table 4, top and bottom panels, line 5). It 
was particularly true in Algeria, which spent 11-12 percent of public spending on education in 
both years, and where education personnel represented 36-37 percent of the civil service. Yet 
this educational effort was dramatically biased towards European settlers. In Algeria, budget 
accounts report a specific credit line for the European sub-sector, which received 78 percent 
of total education expenditure in 1925 and 82 percent in 1955. In 1925 Morocco, the 
corresponding figure was also 79 percent. In terms of expenditure per pupil, our calculations 
(not reported) show that European children in Algeria enjoyed the same level as children in 
France, while Algerian children received no more than in other parts of the empire.  
Among autochthons, primary school gross enrollment rates were extremely low in 1925: 
3.5 percent on average. In 1955, enrollment had increased, yet only to 14.5 percent. Some 
colonies were doing better than the rest: Tunisia, Madagascar and Cameroon displayed the 
highest rates, around 30 percent, followed by Togo (23 percent). In Tunisia, modernization 
attempts in the 19th century led to the foundation of the Sadiki high school in 1875 (Sraieb 
1993). Then under French rule, bilingual “Franco-Arab” and “modernized” koranic schools 
likely encouraged autochthonous enrollment. In contrast, in Algeria, schools only taught in 
French, and the local government of settlers explicitly rationed the provision of education to 
autochthons (Ageron 1979, pp. 152-167 and 532-536). Enrollment of Algerian children, 
however, accelerated in the 1950s so that at independence in 1962, the rate was 33 percent, 
double the level of 1955. In the highlands of Madagascar (Imerina), a few Protestant missions 
offered some schooling as early as in the 1820s, and were then placed under state control by 
king Radama I (Campbell 2005 pp.86-89). In Togo and Cameroon, mission schools came in 
under German rule, yet it is only after World War II that the secularist stance of the French 
Republic was relaxed enough to authorize and subsidize a larger number of mission schools 
(Cogneau and Moradi 2014; Dupraz 2019). In secondary education, only Tunisia, followed by 
Madagascar and Cameroon, lay significantly above the average, although at very low levels 
(respectively 3.4, 1.8 and 0.8 percent of 11-18 year-old indigenous children, while at the same 
time this gross rate reached 19.2 percent in France). At the end of the day, putting settlers 
apart, the educational performance of the settlement colonies of North Africa was far from 
impressive.  
                                                 
31 In France, the share of education in public expenditure dropped after WW2 to 13.5 percent, but not the 
share in employment (35 percent). The drop in the expenditure share is mainly explained by the temporary 
increase of public works for post-WW2 reconstruction. 
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For health, comparing public expenditure shares is not as informative as for education. In 
France, the provision of health assistance and medical services relied mainly on the private 
sector on the one hand, and on lower administrative levels on the other (départements and 
municipalities, which are not part of our estimates).32 It is only under the Fifth Republic (after 
1958) that a national and centralized public health system took off. In North Africa as well, 
health was financed by lower level administrative divisions and the private sector. The share 
of health in public expenditure was very similar in France and in the empire in 1925 (5.9 vs 
5.8 percent) and in 1955 (13.5 vs 11.3 percent). France had 10 times the number of public 
health personnel per capita in 1925, but the difference between the settler colonies of North 
Africa and the rest is not striking, with North Africa and Madagascar at the same level (top 
panel of Table 4, line 9). When we consider the total number of health professionals 
(physicians, pharmacists, dentists and midwives) per capita, including the private sector and 
lower level administrative divisions, France had 30 times more health personnel than the 
empire in 1925 (top panel of Table 4, line 10). Within the empire, North Africa had about 3 
times more health personnel than the rest of the empire, but there was some convergence 
between 1925 and 1955 (bottom panel of Table 4, line 10). 
Sovereignty expenditure in general administration, financial services, justice and security 
represented a third of colonial public expenditure and half of colonial public employment in 
1925 (top panel of Table 4, lines 11-12). These shares would be even higher if we were to 
include military spending funded by France. The share in employment lay way above the 
share in expenditure because security involved many low-pay autochthonous policemen, 
especially outside of North Africa. Policemen represented 59 percent of sovereignty 
employment on average. In 1955, sovereignty spending had lost its weight in Madagascar and 
in West and Central Africa, both in the budget and in the labor force. The number of 
policemen per capita did not increase much, but the police force was professionalized, and 
wages in this sector were significantly raised, especially after WWII.  
Overall, the ratio of education and health investments to “order” spending (Frankema 
2011, p. 144) had increased everywhere after 1945, signaling a more developmental 
orientation, and non-settler colonies had caught up with North Africa in this respect.33 Public 
                                                 
32 See footnote of table 4. We were able to recover expenditure shares of first level administrative 
divisions in the colonies, but not in Metropolitan France. Employment share are for the central government 
everywhere. 
33 Circa 1925, the structure of expenditure in French West and Central Africa is very similar to the one 
observed for British Africa by Frankema (2011, p. 142). Our own analysis in a companion paper suggests that in 
West Africa, British colonies went through the same evolutions as French colonies after WWII (Cogneau, 
Dupraz and Mesplé-Somps 2018). 
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expenditure remained significantly biased, but the bias had decreased, outside of the 
Indochinese wartime exception. The developmental turn of colonialism did not achieve much 
however, partly because of the low productive efficiency of colonial public expenditure. In 
particular, colonial civil service wages were high from the start and remained high after 
World War II as public employment increased. 
High wage costs 
The wage costs of colonial states were high, mainly because of the high emoluments and 
bonuses paid to European civil servants. Table 5 displays civilian expenditure per capita, 
public employment per 1,000 inhabitants and the annual average public wage in France and in 
the colonial empire in 1925 and 1955. We express monetary figures in 1937 francs adjusted 
for purchasing power parity, using a basket of consumption goods for deflation (see Data 
Appendix). Because of vast differences in GDP per capita and wages, this way of expressing 
public expenditure clearly overstates differences in the volume of public goods and services 
provided. In the absence of detailed information on the price of various government goods 
and services, building a specific public spending deflator is impossible, but we show the 
number of civil servants per 1,000 inhabitants. This indicator might understate differences in 
public services provision, as it does not consider the skill content of various occupations.  
In 1925, France raised 16.5 percent of GDP in public revenue versus 8.9 percent for the 
colonial empire, but the difference in the number of civil servants per capita was much more 
striking. France had 11.9 civil servants for 1,000 inhabitants, more than five times the average 
for the empire (2.2). Within the empire, though North Africa was the region where public 
expenditure per capita was the highest, it was not the region where public employment per 
capita was the highest (2.9 employees per 1,000 inhabitants). Madagascar, with a high fiscal 
extraction and the lowest civil service wages, had the highest public employment per capita, 
with 3.9 employees per 1,000 inhabitants (Table 5, line 2). 
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
If public wages were proportional to GDP per capita, differences in public employment 
would reflect differences in revenue as a percentage of GDP. This was not the case because 
differences in public wages were much smaller than differences in GDP per capita. In 1925, 
while GDP per capita was 10 times lower in the colonies than in France, the average annual 
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public wage was only 20 percent lower (Table 5, line 3). Indochina was 14 times poorer that 
France, but the average public wage was the same as in France (see Online Appendix II for a 
discussion of the high wages prevailing in Indochina in the 1920s). 
To measure wage dualism, here the existence of high public wages in a low-income 
economy, we compute the ratio of the average public wage to GDP per working age 
population, (15 years old and over). In 1925, it was 1.2 in France, versus 8.6 in the colonies 
(Table 5, line 4). This ratio was particularly high in Indochina (14.8) and in West and Central 
Africa (7.4), lower in North Africa (4.3) and Madagascar (4.5). Overall, civil service wages in 
the colonies were seven times higher than in France when expressed in terms of GDP per 
worker, and the number of civil servants per capita was almost six times lower than in France. 
Under the doctrine of colonial self-financing, the level of wages severely restricted the 
volume of public service.  
Of course, average public wages were high because of the presence of well-paid 
expatriate civil servants, as already noted by Huillery (2014) for AOF and by Frankema 
(2011) for British Africa. Before World War II, the colonial civil service had three wage 
schedules: 1) “European” or “Metropolitan”, 2) “federal” or “common”, and 3) “local”. These 
schedules referred to the capacity to exert functions in 1) all territories including France, 2) 
within a federation (AOF, AEF or Indochina), 3) in a given colonial territory only. Before 
World War II, the Metropolitan schedule was reserved for French citizens. For a given 
nominal position, the base wage could be 20 to 50 percent lower in the local schedule.34 It is 
hard to evaluate what were, in this wage gap, the respective shares of racial discrimination on 
the one hand, and differences in training and skills on the other hand. Indeed, positions 
carrying the same name (for example, “teacher 2nd class”) nonetheless implied different 
exams and degrees in each schedule. 
On top of the gap in base wages, French civil servants received bonuses meant to 
compensate for expatriation. These could be very high, from 25 to 70 percent of gross wage, 
depending on the territory and/or the period. To these bonuses were added a variety of 
allowances for remoteness, riskiness, housing, family charges and cost of living. In Algeria 
and after World War I in Tunisia, French settlers hired locally also received a 30 percent wage 
bonus (“tiers colonial”), even when they were born in Algeria and did not suffer from 
homesickness. 
                                                 
34 One example is provided for teachers in Togo by Gbikpi-Benissan, (2011, vol. 2, p. 203).  
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Though wage bonuses paid to French citizens were lower in the settlement colonies, their 
share in public employment was higher. In North Africa, autochthons made no more than 50 
percent of civil servants, concentrated in low-skill and low-rank positions.35 Among French 
civil servants, the share born in North Africa varied greatly depending on the territory and the 
date considered (higher in Algeria, lower in Morocco especially in the early years). In 
Indochina and Madagascar, whose budgets allow breaking down public employment by 
citizenship, the French represented respectively 12 and 11 percent of public employment in 
1925, and the shares were similar in 1943/46 (see Online Appendix II, Table A2.1). Available 
evidence suggests that the same proportion applied to West and Central Africa.36 
From a detailed analysis of public employment and wages by citizenship in Indochina 
and Madagascar (presented in Online Appendix II) it appears that bonuses were set to keep 
French public wages in line with the earnings of settlers in the private sector, in order to 
attract sufficiently skilled candidates. It also seems that the high wages paid to French civil 
servants were pulling the autochthonous wage schedule upwards, because increasing 
inequality in pay too much was politically difficult (see Appendix II). In skilled occupations 
like teachers, some allowances were extended to autochthons. 
Between 1925 and 1955, public expenditure measured in 1937 francs boomed, and public 
employment per 1,000 inhabitants roughly doubled everywhere. It increased from 11.8 to 21.6 
in France, and from 2.2 to 4.6 on average in the empire. Wage dualism, however, remained 
high. 
The official distinction between citizens and subjects was abolished in the 1940s. The 
three pre-war wage schedules mentioned above were renamed “general”, “superior” and 
“local”, to withdraw references to race, origin or place of recruitment that were now explicitly 
forbidden by law.37 Consequently, data on the composition of employment by citizenship is 
much more difficult to reconstruct. Despite the official end of discriminatory practices, the 
                                                 
35 In 1921 Tunisia, more than 5,000 European civil servants were enumerated in the population census, 
while in our data for 1925 total public employment is around 10,000 (Régence de Tunis, Statistique générale de 
la Tunisie 1925, pp.8-9). In 1925 Tunisia, 35% of teachers were from Metropolitan France, 44% were French 
settlers recruited locally, and only 21% were Autochthons (Min. des Aff. Etrangères. Rapport au president de la 
République sur la situation de la Tunisie en 1925, p. 47). In 1936 Algeria, according to the population census 
Europeans made 62% of workers in the civil service and the army (Gouv. Gal de l’Algérie, Annuaire Statistique 
de l’Algérie 1939-1947, p.26). 
36 In 1926 Togo, African primary school teachers and lower rank instructors made 88% of education 
personnel (68% if we restrict to teachers): Gbikpi-Benissan (2011, pp. 217-218). In 1938 Cameroon, 595 French 
men are enumerated in civil service, according to a census (Ministère de la France d’Outre-Mer, 1947. Annuaire 
Statistique du Cameroun 1938-1945, volume I. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, Tableau VIII p. 33). In our data, 
total public employment is 5,097, so that Autochthons again make 88% of total. 
37 See for instance: République Française, Loi n° 50-772 du 30 juin 1950. Of course in practice, even if 
not in law, these categories still correlated with race or origin.  
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figures we could gather suggest that the civil service barely Africanized, even in North Africa 
where the room for progress was the largest.38 
At the same time, wage bonuses decreased significantly. In Madagascar and in West and 
Central Africa after 1950, executives in the upper-tier, most often from France, saw their 70 
percent bonus reduce to 40 percent.39 This adjustment was made easier by the fact that a large 
part of the top administration had been faithful to Vichy France and was wiped out and 
replaced after 1944.40 
One might expect that the reduction in bonuses and the hiring of more autochthons 
decreased wage dualism, but this was not the case. Everywhere, public wages increased faster 
than GDP per working age population, and wage dualism increased.41 While average real 
public wages were multiplied by 1.8 in France, they were multiplied by 2.0 in North Africa, 
2.2 in Madagascar and almost tripled (2.8) in West and Central Africa. There, the increase in 
wage dualism was particularly striking, from 7.4 to 10.5 (Table 5). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, a minor part of this increase in wage dualism can be accounted for 
by the change in the sectoral composition of autochthonous employment (mentioned in the 
previous section) from low-skill, low-pay jobs in security toward higher-skill, higher-pay jobs 
in education or health.42 Apart from this, the introduction of a new currency largely accounts 
for the higher increase in real wages, especially in AOF. Before 1945, France and its African 
colonies shared the same currency, the franc. During World War II, inflation had been lower 
in West and Central Africa than in France (see the “Prices” section in the Data Appendix). 
This inflation differential motivated the creation of the CFA franc in December 1945. In all 
sub-Saharan African colonies, including Madagascar, the currency was renamed “CFA franc” 
and its exchange rate with the French franc fixed at 1.7 (1946-47) then 2.0 (starting in 
                                                 
38 For 1955, Amin (1966) reports 64,000 non-Muslim civil servants out of 95,000 in Algeria (p.153), 
18,000 over 30,000 in Tunisia (p. 161), and 41,000 over 68,000 in Morocco (p. 174), i.e. respectively 67, 60 and 
60%. In 1945 Morocco, 71% of primary school teachers were French, 59% in 1955 on the eve of independence 
(Roy. du Maroc, Tableaux économiques du Maroc 1915-1959, p. 37). In the school year 1962-63, just after 
Algeria’s independence and the departure of many French settlers, “foreigners” still made 41% of all teachers 
from primary to senior secondary level (Office National des Statistiques de l’Algérie, Rétrospective 1962-2011, 
p.121, Table 4, http://www.ons.dz/-Retrospective-1962-2011-.html). 
39 See, for instance, République Française, Décret n° 51-511 du 5 mai 1951. 
40 On the Vichy period, see Cantier and Jennings (2004, especially pp. 334-363 on the aftermath of 
Vichy). On the replacement of colonial governors, see Chambru and Viallet-Thévenin (2017). 
41 The decrease in the Empire’s average is only due to the fact that data are missing for Indochina in 1955. 
42 When using the breakdown of public employment by administrative sector, the Fisher index of wages 
(geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes) increases slightly less than the average wage, pointing to 
more frequent recruitment in high-pay sectors; correspondingly the Fisher index of employment increases more 
than total public employment. This is especially true in AEF and Cameroon, and secondarily in Madagascar. 
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1948).43 In 1948, the new exchange rate compensated for the differences in price levels. One 
exception was Madagascar, where inflation during the war had been high. This was still true 
in 1955 AOF and Togo, less true in AEF and Cameroon where inflation was higher in 1949-
1955.  When the new currency was introduced, nominal wages were not changed, but they 
were now paid in CFA francs rather than in French francs, so that wages in French francs 
suddenly increased. Between 1948 and 1955 public wages were subject to the same 
proportional increases in nominal terms as in France. Such measures were meant to increase 
real wages after they had been eroded by World War II inflation (Piketty 2018 pp. 191-194). 
Between 1937 and 1955, the inflation differential alone generated large gains in real wages in 
sub-Saharan Africa, around 57 percent in AOF and Togo, 25 percent in AEF and Cameroon, 
but not much in Madagascar. Furthermore, the creation and appreciation of the CFA franc 
preserved the purchasing power of these wages in France or in terms of French imports.44 
As bonuses for French citizens decreased, as the skill-composition of autochthonous 
employment improved, and as African trade unions demanded more equality in pay (Cooper, 
1996, pp. 277-322 and pp. 407-431), one could expect to see a compression of the public 
wage distribution, but this is hard to see in the absence of detailed data.45 This kind of 
compression is observed in 1945 Indochina and Madagascar (compared to 1925), between 
average French wages and average autochthons’ wages (see Online Appendix II).  
Overall, public wages remained high in the French colonies after World War II, and they 
remained high when the colonies obtained their independence around 1960. Authors including 
Samir Amin (1966) on North Africa and René Dumont (1962) on sub-Saharan Africa 
underlined, in the early 1960s, the high level of public wages in newly independent states. 
Both criticized the one-to-one replacement of French civil servants at the same wage.46 It is 
not to say that paying civil servants well was necessarily a bad thing, as we cannot analyze the 
correlation of wages with productivity. Yet, the colonial legacy of wage dualism very much 
                                                 
43 North African colonies kept the franc until their independence, like Indochina with the piaster. Guinea 
left the franc zone in 1960; Mali left only for the period between 1962 and 1984; and Madagascar left in 1973. 
The exchange rate of CFAF remained constant until its devaluation by 50% in 1994.  
44 During the war, inflation was higher in North Africa than in France. As of 1955, the difference in CPI 
had been erased in Algeria, but preserved in Tunisia and Morocco, where real wages therefore remained more 
depressed, by 19 percent to 26 percent, according to our coarse estimates (see Data Appendix).  
45 We collected for each territory the wages of lowest- and highest-paid teachers and nurses, at six dates 
between 1913 and 1955. These series are particularly noisy, and from them we cannot identify any time trend on 
the range of variation of wages in those two occupations.  
46 The extent to which wage dualism persisted in independent countries is not the object of this paper. 
Present-day estimates suggest that wage dualism is still high in former French Africa, even after the CFA franc 
devaluation of 1994 (Bossuroy and Cogneau 2013). Our research on British and French colonies of West Africa 
(Cogneau, Dupraz and Mesplé-Somps 2018) suggests that average public wages remained high in former French 
West Africa but were allowed to decrease in former British West Africa.  
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determined the features of socioeconomic and political inequalities in the young independent 
countries. In their first two decades of existence, an administrative bourgeoisie emerged, a 
“bourgeoisie of the civil service” in the words of Franz Fanon (1961) — see also Simson 
(2017, 2018). The combined economic affluence and political influence of this group led to 
the entrenchment of patron-client relationships with the rest of society. Just after 
independence, the legitimacy of this new social class was high. However, its initial political 
capital depreciated and its authority was undermined because socioeconomic and political 
dualism persisted, and because development was not shared.  
Conclusion 
Colonial states of the French empire had high extractive efficiency, but low productive 
efficiency. Largely self-financed before 1945, they taxed a lot, adapting their fiscal tools to 
different socioeconomic contexts and varying historical conditions, but they were not very 
productive in service provision, notably because of the very high wage costs coming with the 
employment of expatriated French civil servants. Their public expenditure was also biased 
toward the interests of a small enclave of French settlers and French firms. Their low 
productive efficiency meant they were not omnipotent leviathans; their high extractive 
efficiency means they were not casual night watchmen either. 
After World War II, as the legitimacy of French rule was increasingly questioned, 
colonial governments did not tax and spend less; on the contrary, they taxed and spent more. 
In the hope of preserving their imperial dominance, they accelerated their modernization 
project and became more developmental. They increased their social spending, notably in 
education. They gave some political rights to local populations, extending voting franchise to 
those under their rule who had been excluded. They adopted somewhat more progressive 
taxes, and conceded some wage equality claims. The self-financing doctrine was relaxed, and 
net grants from Metropolitan France started representing a larger share of the colonies’ GDP. 
Wage costs, however, remained high. Wage dualism, measured as the ratio of average public 
wage to GDP per working population, increased between 1925 and 1955. Given these high 
unit costs, accelerating development would probably have required an even bigger push in 
French grants 
Independent states inherited the structures of colonial states. In particular, they inherited 
dualism: dualistic societies and economies, with the existence of formal, France-like enclaves 
benefitting from high-quality public services in a largely informal and traditional society 
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starting to demand more equality in service provision; and dualistic wage structures, with 
public wages set at very high standards in comparison to domestic income levels. The 
departure of settlers and colonial administrators paved the way for their replacement by a 
bourgeoisie of the civil service. Not all countries followed the same paths or had the same 
speed or characteristics in terms of reforms that veered between radical breaks and neo-
colonial continuities. Some preserved high wages and elitist infrastructure. Others opted 
instead to extend public employment and decentralize at lower costs. Further research is 
warranted to analyze these postcolonial evolutions. 
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Figure 1 — Colonial territories present in our data 
 
 
Table 1 – Population, urbanization and GDP in France and its empire, 1850, 1925 and 1955 
   
France 
 
NA Indochina Madag. WCA 
         
Population in 
millions 
1850 
 
36.2 
 
9.0 14.2 2.2 15.2 
1925 
 
40.5 
 
13.7 26.1 3.6 21.3 
1955 
 
43.4 
 
22.4 34.6 4.9 34.0 
 
        
Share of 
Europeans (%) 
1850 
   
1.6 ε  ε  ε 
1925 
   
8.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
1955 
   
7.0 0.0 1.2 0.4 
 
        
Urbanisation 
1850 
 
25.5% 
 
6.6% 1.4% 2.2% 0.7% 
1925 
 
48.8% 
 
16.4% 2.1% 4.7% 1.4% 
1955 
 
56.0% 
 
24.3% 12.0%  9.0% 12.1% 
 
        
GDP per capita 
(1937 FF PPP) 
1925 
 
8,776 
 
1,811 623 782 546 
1955 
 
13,879 
 
2,383 469 1,137 902 
         Notes: NA: North Africa; WCA: West and Central Africa. Sources: see Data Appendix and also Appendix I on 
urbanization. 
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Table 2 – Fiscal extraction and state size across the French empire in 1925, 1955 and 2010 
         
 
France 
 
Empire 
 
NA Indoch. Madag. WCA 
Year 1925 
      
  
 
Net  Public  Revenue / GDP (%) 16.5 
 
8.9 
 
8.3 12.5 9.0 5.4 
Central gov. Tax Revenue / GDP (%) 11.1 
 
4.8 
 
3.9 6.0 7.3 4.5 
Net Public Exp. (civilian) / GDP (%) 8.0 
 
8.0 
 
7.9 10.9 7.5 4.4 
NPE (civilian) per capita (1937 FF) 703 
 
69 
 
143 68 59 24 
French military exp. per cap. (1937 FF) 334 
 
28 
 
107 7 13 6 
         
Year 1955 
        
Net Public Revenue / GDP (%) 26.3 
 
15.9 
 
19.1 9.5 14.6 13.9 
with social security transfers 33.4 
 
17.1 
 
21.5 9.5 14.6 13.9 
Central gov. Tax Revenue / GDP (%) 19.0 
 
9.6 
 
10.0 5.4 6.7 11.8 
Net Public Exp. (civilian)/ GDP (%) 23.1 
 
19.1 
 
24.1 7.6 18.5 16.6 
NPE (civilian) per capita (1937 FF) 3,210 
 
211 
 
575 36 210 150 
French military exp. per cap. (1937 FF) 1,034 
 
145 
 
170 257 63 26 
         
Year 2010 
        
Net Public Revenue / GDP (%) 25.2 
 
26.3 
 
31.8 22.7 11.2 18.8 
with social security transfers 43.3 
 
30.1 
 
37.2 26.9 11.2 19.2 
NPR / GDP, non-mineral (%) 25.2 
 
20.6 
 
22.1 21.7 11.2 15.3 
Tax Revenue / GDP, non-mineral (%) 25.2 
 
18.0 
 
19.6 19.3 9.2 13.8 
                  
Notes: NA: North Africa; WCA: West and Central Africa.  North Africa 1925: data for Morocco is from 1926. 
Indochina 1955: data from 1953 (1954 for the PMS region). Madagascar 1955: data from 1956. WCA 1955: data 
for AEF is from 1954, data for Togo from 1956. 2010: authors' calculations from WDI data 
(https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators), IMF Article 4 Consultations 
(https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/aiv/index.aspx?listby=c) and ILO Social Security Inquiry database 
(https://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home). In 1925, there was no social security in the colonies, and social 
security transfers represented 0.05% of GDP only in Metropolitan France. 
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Figure 2 — Net public revenue as share of GDP from 1890 to 1970 
 
Notes. The revenue of first-level administrative divisions (provinces, départements, régions) is included and 
consolidated, but not the revenue of second-level administrative divisions (municipalities). See Data Appendix. 
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Table 3 – Share of different tax instruments in GDP (%), 1925 and 1955 
         
 
France 
 
Empire 
 
NA Indoch. Madag. WCA 
Year 1925 
        
Capitation 0.00 
 
0.97 
 
0.08 1.62 2.91 1.52 
Monopolies 1.85 
 
2.41 
 
2.21 4.22 1.40 0.55 
Intermediate & Other  6.91 
 
2.97 
 
2.53 4.86 2.39 1.40 
Trade 0.77 
 
1.50 
 
1.22 1.49 2.28 1.95 
Modern direct & indirect 4.38 
 
0.58 
 
1.18 0.19 0.00 0.00 
Total 13.92 
 
8.44 
 
7.21 12.37 8.97 5.43 
         
Year 1955 
        
Capitation 0.00 
 
0.71 
 
0.01 0.04 2.56 1.96 
Monopolies 1.70 
 
2.98 
 
4.22 1.99 2.13 1.50 
Intermediate & Other  6.94 
 
3.92 
 
4.84 2.68 2.67 3.21 
Trade 1.84 
 
3.26 
 
1.53 3.59 5.42 5.72 
Modern direct & indirect 12.05 
 
3.25 
 
5.13 0.90 1.79 1.50 
Total 22.53 
 
14.14 
 
15.73 9.21 14.57 13.89 
  
       Notes: NA: North Africa; WCA: West and Central Africa. See Data Appendix for the precise definition of each 
tax instrument. North Africa 1925: data for Morocco is from 1926. Indochina 1955: data is from 1953 (1954 for 
the PMS region). Madagascar 1955: data is from 1956. WCA 1955: data for AEF is from 1954, data for Togo is 
from 1956. The sum of all tax instruments does not sum to net public revenue / GDP as presented in table 2 
because Table 2 takes revenue of municipalities into account, while this table considers only the revenue of the 
central government and first level administrative divisions. 
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Figure 3 — Net grants from France as a share of GDP, 1890-1970 
 
Notes. These are net grants from France, negative numbers mean the grants from the colony to France are larger 
than the grants from France to the colony (for instance Indochina 1905-1937). French military expenditure is not 
counted, except expenditure in infrastructure and health. See Data Appendix. 
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Figure 4 — Public revenue, loans, grants and military expenditure as percentage of the 
Empire’s GDP 
 
Notes. Sources are detailed in the Data Appendix. Civilian net grants include military expenditure in 
infrastructure and health. Military expenditure includes personnel and operating expenses of troops, and 
expenditure other than in infrastructure and health. French military expenditure in the colonies during World 
War II is missing. The military costs of the Indochinese and Algerian wars are rough estimates, likely to be 
underestimated in the case of Algeria. In federations, loans and grants were mostly managed by the federal 
budget, for which we have annual series; for net public revenue, our series are less frequent (see Data 
Appendix); missing years were extrapolated linearly. The boundaries of the colonial Empire change: for 
example, the last two years correspond to Algeria only. Years 1961 and 1962 are out of range, and should 
anyway be regarded with caution due to many data uncertainties linked to the Algerian crisis. 
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Table 4 – Public expenditure and development outcomes in 1925 and 1955 
 
France  
 
Empire 
 
NA Indoch. Madag. WCA 
Year 1925 
  
  
     
Infrastructure & production support 
        
   Share in expenditure (%) 41.8 
 
43.4 
 
49.8 37.6 32.4 46.3 
   kWh per inhabitant 318.5 
 
n.a. 
 
6.5a n.a. n.a. n.a. 
   Roads meters per 1000 inhabitants 19.2 
 
n.a. 
 
1.0 0.9 n.a. n.a. 
   Railroads meters per 1000 inhabitants 1.1 
 
n.a. 
 
0.6 0.1 n.a. 0.2b 
Education 
        
   Share in expenditure (%) 20.3 
 
7.3 
 
9.1 6.7 6.4 3.6 
   Gross primary enrollment, autochthons (%) 135.3 
 
3.5 
 
4.1 4.7 n.a. 1.7c 
         Government schools only (%) 108.4 
 
n.a. 
 
3.8 4.2 n.a. n.a. 
Health 
        
   Share in expenditure (%) 5.9 
 
5.9 
 
6.7 4.4 11.6 5.9 
   Public health personnel per 1000 inhabitants 1.4 
 
0.14 
 
0.31a 0.08 0.26 0.09 
   Medical staff per 1000 inhabitants 1.27 
 
0.04 
 
0.15a 0.02 0.08 0.03c 
Administration, Finance, Justice and Security 
        
   Share in expenditure (%) 31.9 
 
32.7 
 
24.7 41.6 27.8 30.6 
   Share in employment (%) 25.0 
 
56.2 
 
46.1 63.5 55.1 58.9 
         
Year 1955 
        
Infrastructure & support to production 
        
   Share in expenditure (%) 54.9 
 
47.9 
 
47.4 29.9 45.3 53.4 
   kWh per inhabitant 1,148 
 
39.5 
 
91.0 n.a. 11.8 5.9 
   Roads meters per 1000 inhabitants 15 
 
4.7 
 
5.0 n.a. 5.9 4.4 
   Railroads meters per 1000 inhabitants 0.9 
 
0.2 
 
0.3 n.a. 0.2 0.1 
Education 
        
   Share in expenditure (%) 13.5 
 
11.3 
 
13.4 10.8 7.1 7.7 
   Gross primary enrollment, autochthons (%) 109.8 
 
14.5 
 
17.6 n.a. 32.2 12.4 
         Government schools only (%) 92.9 
 
10.7 
 
17.1 n.a. 20.9 6.4 
Health 
        
   Share in expenditure (%) 11.6 
 
7.9 
 
7.7 6.9 8.2 8.6 
   Public health personnel per 1000 inhabitants n.a. 
 
0.58 
 
0.65d n.a. 0.82 0.54 
   Medical staff per 1000 inhabitants 1.97 
 
0.30 
 
0.29 n.a. 0.50 0.27 
Administration, Finance, Justice and Security 
       
   Share in expenditure (%) 15.8 
 
23.2 
 
24.6 41.6 16.4 17.4 
   Share in employment (%) 25.9 
 
42.6 
 
47.4 n.a. n.a. 38.5 
                  
Notes: NA: North Africa; WCA: West and Central Africa. Expenditure shares: excluding the military, central 
government only in Metropolitan France, central government and first level administrative divisions in the 
colonies; NA 1925: Moroccan data from 1926; Indoch. 1955: data from 1953; Madag. 1955: data from 1956; 
WCA 1955: AEF data from 1954. Employment shares: excluding the military, for the central government only 
everywhere; NA 1925: Tunisian data from 1924; WCA 1925: Togolese data from 1926. Gross primary 
enrollment rates= number of primary school pupils divided by the 6-13 year old population. They count only 
public and government-authorized private schools, not unofficial Koranic schools (which gathered 36,000 pupils 
in 1932 Algeria and 100,000 pupils in 1950 Algeria (Kateb, 2004), nor municipal schools in Indochina. In 
Tunisia and Morocco, Jewish children, who already enjoyed universal primary schooling like Europeans in 1925, 
are counted apart. a: Algeria and Morocco only. b: AOF only. c: AOF, Togo and Cameroon only. d: Tunisia 
only. 
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Table 5 – Public Employment and Wages in 1925 and 1955 
 
France 
 
Empire 
 
NA Indoch. Madag. WCA 
Year 1925   
 
  
 
        
NPE (civilian) per capita (1937 FF) 470 
 
64 
 
124 67 59 24 
Public employment per 1.000 inhab.  11.9 
 
2.0 
 
2.9 1.7 3.9 1.3 
Annual average public wage (1937 FF) 15,241 
 
11,194 
 
12,016 15,612 5,420 6,189 
    in units of GDP per 15+ pop. 1.2 
 
8.6 
 
4.3 14.8 4.5 7.4 
Year 1955 
        
NPE (civilian) per capita (1937 FF) 2,773 
 
190 
 
490 34 210 150 
Public employment per 1.000 inhab. 21.6 
 
4.5 
 
6.8 n.a. 5.0 3.1 
Annual average public wage (1937 FF) 27,447 
 
20,195 
 
23,660 n.a . 11,959 17,593 
    in units of GDP per 15+ pop. 1.3 
 
7.6 
 
5.5 n.a 5.8 10.5 
         
Notes: NA: North Africa; WCA: West and Central Africa. Public employment in the central government only, 
excluding the military. In 1955 Madagascar, following the 1946 decentralization reform, provinces represented a 
large share of total public employment; hence, we extrapolated it from personnel expenditure, assuming that 
provincial employment was paid the same average wage as central government employment.. France 1925: 
employment from 1922 and wage bill from 1923.  NA 1925: Tunisian employment and wages from 1924. 
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Appendix I – Income distribution in French colonies and estimates of the fiscal burden 
on Europeans and autochthons 
We attempt to estimate the distribution of the fiscal burden in the French empire, not 
only between Europeans and autochthons, but also, within autochthons, between the poor, 
mostly subsistence farmers, and the non-poor, those who took part in the formal sector and 
were therefore more likely to contribute to modern taxation like the income tax or taxes on 
sales revenue. To obtain the fiscal contribution of each group (Europeans, the autochthonous 
non-poor, and the autochthonous poor), we first estimate their income share in total income. 
We then make assumptions on the incidence of the different tax instruments on each group. 
The exercise remains speculative, as available data are patchy and many assumptions are 
needed. Estimates for 1955 are more reliable than for 1925. 
Income shares of Europeans and autochthons in 1955 
We first estimate the share of European settlers in national income. Data availability 
makes this estimation easier for 1955 than for 1925. 
In North Africa, the social tables we use to estimate income shares include Jews in the 
group of European settlers (in Algeria, Jews were granted French citizenship in 1870). For 
comparability, we also include the Chinese and Indian minorities in Madagascar in the group 
of European settlers. In Indochina, the Chinese population, far more numerous than the 
European population, is treated as autochthonous. 
For the year 1955, Samir Amin gives estimates of the income shares of European 
settlers (and Jews) in Algeria (47%), Morocco (37%), and Tunisia (43%), drawing from 
household consumption surveys, studies on agricultural incomes and estimates of savings 
(Amin 1966, pp.114-117). Using these figures and our estimates of GDP per capita and 
population shares, we estimate the income per capita of Europeans in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia at respectively 11,850, 10,300 and 12,000 francs (all figures in 1937 PPP terms). This 
is to be compared with a GDP per capita of 13,900 in Metropolitan France. It seems plausible 
that average incomes in Metropolitan France and of Europeans/Jews in North African 
colonies were close, as the occupational structure of Europeans/Jews in North Africa was 
similar to the French occupational structure (Amin 1966, pp. 156-158, 167-168, 177). 
In the cases of Tunisia and Algeria, we can check the consistency of these figures with 
income tax tabulations collected by Alvaredo, Cogneau and Piketty (2017). In 1955 Tunisia, 
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they give the average income of those eligible to pay the income tax, who represented the 
39% richest of the group of Europeans (excluding Jews). To recover the income per capita of 
the whole group, including those who did not pay the income tax, we assume that the income 
distribution of Europeans in Tunisia was the same as in Metropolitan France (taken from the 
WID.world database1).We find an average income per capita of 10,700, not far from the 
above estimate of 12,000 using Amin’s share. In 1955 Algeria, income tax tabulations do not 
distinguish Europeans, or non-Muslims, from Muslims. Yet, we can assume that almost all of 
those rich enough to pay the income tax were Europeans or Jews — in 1955 Tunisia, non-
Europeans represented just 26% of those eligible to pay the income tax, and it is not 
impossible that a majority of them were Jews. Then, assuming again that income distribution 
among Europeans/Jews was the same as in Metropolitan France, we obtain an income per 
capita of 12,300, very close to our 11,850 figure. 
For other colonies, we start from Amin’s estimates of income by group in 1959 Senegal 
and 1950 Côte d’Ivoire (Amin 1971, pp. 48, 62, 96-98); the income of Europeans is estimated 
as the total of wages, benefits of medium and small-size firms and housing rents in the foreign 
sector (“secteur étranger”). Europeans earned on average 25,250 francs in Senegal (20% of 
total income for 1.5% of population) and 49,800 francs in Côte d’Ivoire (19% of total income 
for 0.5% of population). European settlers in Senegal represented the majority of Europeans 
in AOF (53%), and they were on average less skilled than in the rest of the federation. Côte 
d’Ivoire was also the second wealthiest colony in AOF after Senegal. Europeans living in 
other colonies of AOF were likely more similar to those in Côte d’Ivoire than to those in 
Senegal; yet they also likely earned less, so that we estimate their average income per capita 
by applying the same ratio (41) to average GDP per capita as in Côte d’Ivoire. We obtain, for 
the whole AOF, an average European income of 30,228 francs and a European income share 
of 12% (for less than 0.4% of population). In other African colonies we assume that the 
average income per capita of Europeans was the same as in AOF in nominal terms and only 
adjust for differences in price levels. We estimate European income shares at respectively 4, 
14 and 9% in Togo, AEF and Cameroon, which gives for the whole of West and Central 
Africa an income share of 12%, and an average European income of 28,349 francs, twice the 
GDP per capita of Metropolitan France (Table A.1). In Madagascar where Europeans/Asians 
represented a much larger share of the population (1.5%, with Asians representing less than a 
                                                 
1 https://wid.world 
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third), we estimate that they earned 27% of total income, with an average income of 19,000 
francs. 
Income shares of Europeans and autochthons in 1925 
In 1925 Indochina, income tax tabulations from Alvaredo, Cogneau and Piketty (2017) 
cover almost all Europeans and provide us with a direct estimate of their income share: 9%, 
for 0.13% of the population, corresponding to a very high income per capita of 44,500 francs 
(all figures in 1937 PPP terms). Note that a similar calculation for 1945 indicates a decrease in 
income per capita to 16,000 francs, as the economy was collapsing during the war, and a 
lower income share of 7%.  
In the other colonies, we lack data on the distribution of income in 1925. To obtain 
European income shares, we assume that the income per capita of Europeans grew at the same 
rate as local GDP per capita between 1925 and 1955; in other terms, we assume that the 
income share of Europeans moved in line with their population share. We tried more 
sophisticated calculations isolating the public sector, and making use of our public wage and 
employment data. However, everywhere civil servants never represented more than 30% of 
total European employment and most often no more than 15%2; furthermore, the growth in 
real public wages was not entirely at odds with that of GDP per capita. As we have no 
additional information on private incomes to bring in, we prefer to stick with the simplest 
assumption. We obtain income shares of respectively 66, 17 and 49% for Europeans in 1925 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Income tax tabulations for 1932 Algeria provide us with a 
check; assuming that all eligible taxpayers were Europeans/Jews (the top 19% richest) and 
that the income distribution was the same as in 1925 France, we obtain the same income share 
(65%) as with our estimation procedure. In contrast with 1955, European income in Algeria 
                                                 
2 In North Africa, the share of Europeans in public employment is estimated at 60% in 1925 and in 1955. This 
figure is consistent with Amin’s for 1955 (pp.153, 161 & 174: 67% in Algeria, 60% in Tunisia & Morocco), and 
with a 62% figure from the 1936 population census of Algeria. Yet only a small minority of Europeans worked 
in the public sector, the maximum share being 12% in 1955 Morocco. For 1925 Madagascar, we know the share 
of Europeans in total public employment: 11.5% (table A2.1, Appendix II), and even in each administrative 
subsector. For 1955, we estimate the number of French civil servants by applying the 1925 shares (the 1946 
shares are very similar) to the 195 distribution of employment by subsector; we find that Europeans made 12.9% 
of total employment (11.7% in 1946, table A2.1). Yet, as the population share of Europeans nearly doubled, the 
weight of the public sector in European employment went down from 10 in 1925 to 5% in 1955. For the colonies 
of West and Central Africa, we apply the same procedure and estimate that Europeans represented 9% of public 
employment in 1925, and 12% in 1955. The share of the public sector in European employment is then estimated 
at 28% in 1925 WCA, and again goes down to 18% in 1955 with migration inflows to the private sector; our 
estimate for 1955 Cameroon fits with the share of civil servant households according to a European census in 
1938.  
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lay above French GDP per capita (10,200 vs. 8,800), close to it in Tunisia (9,700) and below 
in Morocco (6,700). In 1925 Madagascar, we estimate a European income share of 14.1% for 
0.81% of the population, corresponding to an average income per capita of 13,300 francs 
(Table A.1). Last, for 1925 West and Central Africa, we estimate an income share of 2.7% for 
0.08% of the population, and an average income of 17,200. Hence, according to these very 
tentative estimates, French settlers in Sub-Saharan Africa were richer than the French 
average, by 40 to 80%, but it was only in Indochina that settlers were extremely rich, earning 
five times the French GDP per capita. 
Table A1.1 — Income distribution estimates for the years 1925 and 1955 
 NA Indochina Madag. WCA 
Year 1925     
Europeans: Population share (%) 9.19 0.13 0.81 0.08 
      Income share (%) 49.2 8.8 14.1 2.7 
      Average income per capita (FF 1937 PPP) 9,638 44,528 13,324 17,222 
Non-Europeans Average income (FF 1937 PPP) 1,009 578 666 518 
 
Year 1955  Year 1945   
Europeans: Population share (%) 8.37 0.16 1.54 0.36 
      Income share (%) 41.5 7.4 26.7 11.7 
      Average income per capita (FF 1937 PPP) 11,409 16,105 19,019 28,349 
Non-Europeans Average income (FF 1937 PPP) 1,471 333 817 781 
     Source: Social tables from Samir Amin (1966 and 1971), income tax tabulation data from Alvaredo, Cogneau 
and Piketty (2017). Notes: Europeans include Jews in NA, and Indians and Chinese in Madagascar.  
Income and population shares of the autochthonous poor and non-poor 
In a second step, we endeavor to break down the autochthonous population in two social 
classes: the “non-poor” and the “poor”. The autochthonous non-poor will be assumed to pay 
what we call modern taxes, whereas the poor, mostly subsistence farmers, will be assumed to 
pay none. As data are even scarcer for this second step, we restrict ourselves to Algeria, 
Tunisia, and AOF. 
For 1955 North Africa, Samir Amin provides population and income shares for rural 
and urban Muslims in each colony (Amin 1966, pp. 114-117).3 He also provides a three-class 
population and income breakdown of the rural and urban societies (pp. 130, 136, 141, 155-
156 and 166). Our “non-poor” group is composed of the two richest classes of the urban 
                                                 
3 We checked that Amin’s figures are consistent with data from the population census of Algeria in 1954 
and of Tunisia in 1956: Muslims in municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants make respectively 16.5% 
and 15.2% of total population. In Tunisia, Muslims in the 10,000-20,000 range make an additional 6.4%. 
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Muslim population and the richest class of the rural Muslim population (wealthy farmers). 
Our “poor” group is composed of the two poorest classes of the Muslim rural population and 
the poorest class of the Muslim urban population (servants and unskilled laborers). We obtain 
that the autochthonous non-poor make 16% of the population and earn 24% of income in 
Algeria. They make 20% of the population and earn 30% of income in Tunisia. Their average 
income is about a third of the average European income and four times as high as the average 
income of the poor (Table A.2).  
Amin also provides estimates of the share of urban Africans in population and income 
for 1959 Senegal and 1950 Côte d’Ivoire. In absence of a more detailed breakdown, we use 
the urban share to estimate the share of the non-poor. We treat Côte d’Ivoire as representative 
of other AOF colonies and take a population weighted average of the shares. From this we 
estimate that the African non-poor in AOF made around 11% of total population and 36% of 
total income in 1955. It means they earned about the same income as the Muslim non-poor in 
North Africa, ten times less than the tiny minority of European settlers, and five times more 
than the African poor (Table A.2).  
Building estimates for 1925 is quite a heroic task. In North Africa, to estimate the 
population share of the non-poor, we estimate the urbanization rate of the Muslim population 
and assume the same share of rural non-poor and of urban poor as in 1955.4 In AOF, we use 
the urbanization rate computed from Africapolis to estimate the share of the African non-poor 
(see also data Appendix on urban population figures).5  
Finally, to break down the estimated income share of the autochthonous population into 
the shares of the non-poor and the poor, we make the simple assumption that the income per 
capita of the non-poor grew at the same rate as the income per capita of all autochthons; in 
other terms, we assume that the income share of the non-poor moved in line with their 
population share among autochthons. To check that we obtain plausible estimates of average 
income, we compare the figures of Table A1.2 with the price of a yearly ration of 1,600 kcal 
of wheat (584 francs in Algeria, 575 in Tunisia, 474 in AOF). In Algeria and Tunisia the 
average income of the poor lies 20% above the price of a yearly ration. In AOF, it lies 7% 
below. According to the estimates presented in Table A1.2, Income inequality increased 
                                                 
4 The 1926 Algerian population census indicates that only 11% of the Muslim population live in the 46 
biggest cities. The 1921 Tunisian population census reports the number of Muslims for the five biggest cities 
only. We assume the ratio of Muslims to non-Muslims in the 24 smallest cities to be the same as in the four 
biggest cities outside of Tunis. We obtain that 10% of the Muslim population lives in the 29 largest cities. 
5 http://africapolis.org. We thank Eric Denis for sharing unpublished data on AOF before 1950. We 
interpolate Africapolis estimates between 1920 and 1930. We obtain an urbanization rate of 1.7%, vs. 1.3% if we 
take Eggiman’s figures (Eggiman 1999). 
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sharply in AOF between 1925 and 1955, in parallel with the urbanization boom. In the two 
North-African colonies, the evolution is more ambiguous: while the income gap between 
Europeans and autochthons narrowed, it seems than inequality among autochthons increased. 
Table A1.2 — Income distribution estimates for the years 1925 and 1955 
 Algeria Tunisia AOF 
Year 1925    
Europeans: Population share (%) 14.41 9.49 0.09 
      Income share (%) 65.8 49.4 3.2 
      Average income per capita (FF 1937 PPP) 10,214 9,655 17,975 
Autochthonous non-poor: Pop. (%) 10.9 17.4 1.7 
      Income share (%) 10.8 23.3 6.0 
      Average income per capita (FF 1937 PPP) 2,208 2,480 1,951 
Autochthonous poor: Population (%) 74.7 73.1 98.3 
      Income share (%) 23.4 27.3 90.8 
      Average income per capita (FF 1937 PPP) 700 693 497 
Year 1955    
Europeans: Population share (%) 10.24 8.23 0.36 
      Income share (%) 46.8 42.9 12.1 
      Average income per capita (FF 1937 PPP) 11,854 12,005 30,228 
Autochthonous non-poor: Pop. (%) 16.3 20.2 10.9 
      Income share (%) 24.0 30.1 35.9 
      Average income per capita (FF 1937 PPP) 3,806 3,435 2,985 
Autochthonous poor: Population (%) 73.4 71.6 88.8 
      Income share (%) 29.2 27.1 52.0 
      Average income per capita (FF 1937 PPP) 1,033 873 530 
   
 
Source: Social tables from Samir Amin (1966,1971), income tax tabulation data from Alvaredo, Cogneau and 
Piketty (2017), and urbanization data from various sources (see text). Notes: Europeans include Jews in North 
Africa.  
Tax rates 
In the settlement colonies of Algeria and Tunisia, the European and Jewish population 
paid a disproportionate share of the direct taxes; for example in 1955 Tunisia, Europeans 
represented 74% of income tax payers (78% of taxable income), and the remaining 26% were 
perhaps overwhelmingly Jews (Alvaredo, Cogneau and Piketty 2017).6 They also paid quite a 
lot of the taxes on imported consumer goods, alcoholic drinks in particular. Generally 
speaking, most of the modernized taxation apparatus applied to a formal sector built around 
the settlers’ enclave, so that Europeans also paid a large share of turnover taxes and of 
                                                 
6 See also Nicolaï (1962, pp. 447-450). 
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registration fees.7 Yet their income share was also very high, always above 40%, and even as 
high as 66% in 1925 Algeria, according to our estimates (Tables A1.1 and A1.2 above).  
In the rest of the colonial empire, where settlers were few, autochthons had to pay the 
bulk of the tax bill. Though European settlers were richer than their counterparts in North 
Africa, and much richer than autochthons (Table A1.1), they were not enough to generate 
large revenue.8 Before World War II, direct taxation of income was limited.9 In AOF, the 
Metropolitan general income tax had been gradually introduced after 1930, and schedular 
taxes on wages, profits and investment income appeared in 1942 (Doublet 1952, pp.109-112). 
The “prestations” system of forced labor taxation was abolished in 1946. Head tax rates were 
already different between districts, depending on urbanization and affluence; at the beginning 
of the 1950s they started to be fixed according to individual occupation or income, hence 
becoming mildly progressive (Doublet 1952).10 Yet, the rates were also significantly raised: 
between 1925 and 1955 the revenue per capita from capitation more than doubled in AOF 
(from 9 to 21 francs in 1937 PPP).  
In North Africa like in Sub-Saharan Africa, between 1925 and 1955 the weight of modern 
taxes in total revenue increased, and the weight of the most archaic tax, capitation, decreased 
(see Table 3 in the main text). Modern taxes being the most progressive and capitation the 
most regressive of all taxes, one could expect that tax systems turned more progressive 
overall. Yet, the apparent modernization of the tax structure could very well only reflect 
colonial inequality and/or the structural change of colonial societies. Where Europeans 
obtained a higher share of income, the share of revenue from modern taxes or from import 
duties was mechanically higher. Likewise, where or when more autochthons migrated to cities 
and obtained wage jobs, the tax structure looked more modern due to the same composition 
                                                 
7 For 1956 Tunisia, Nicolaï estimates that indirect taxes paid by Europeans could be more than 50% of 
total indirect tax revenue (Nicolaï 1962, p. 453). 
8 Even under upper bound assumptions for their contribution (see below), Europeans contribute to only a 
tiny share of total tax revenue in AOF, both in 1925 (11%) and in 1955 (18%). 
9 In Indochina 1920-1937, Europeans only paid a minimal lump-sum tax on income based on twelve 
brackets. The land tax weighed disproportionately on autochthons, while trading licenses were shared more or 
less equally: see Gouv. Gal de l’Indochine, 1931. Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, deuxième volume, 1923-
1929, Hanoi : Imprimerie d’Extrême Orient, pp. 311 (Annam) & 327 (Tonkin). In 1938, a general income tax 
was introduced, that also extended to rich Chinese and Indochinese. 
10 For instance in 1950 Côte d’Ivoire, four categories of occupations were distinguished, going from high-
rank civil servants, large landowners and big traders to unskilled wage earners or  petty traders, with head tax 
rates ranging from 1,000 francs to 4,500 francs. A fifth class gathered the rest of the population above 15 years 
of age, including all the smallholders and all the women without occupation. The latter class represented more 
than 97% of the total population of tax payers and paid a capitation ranging from 95 to 280 francs, depending on 
the district of residence (Doublet 1952, pp.71-80).  Dahomey, Guinea and Niger had similar schedules, and Togo 
distinguished taxpayers according to three brackets of income. Despite the discrepancy in rates, the progressivity 
was attenuated by the fact that even rich men would pay the base rate for their wife or their children above 15 
year-old (and actually 0 for schooled teenagers). 
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effect. This is why we need to combine our estimates of population and income shares of the 
three social groups with the incidence of taxes on each of them, to disentangle actual 
increases in progressivity from composition effects stemming from structural change. 
To estimate the fiscal burden weighing on each of the three groups, we lack the 
statistical basis (social accounting matrices) and a well-founded general equilibrium model to 
perform a proper tax incidence analysis. We instead make a couple of simple extreme 
assumptions to obtain lower and upper bound estimates of tax progressivity.  
To obtain lower bound estimates, we make three assumptions regarding the head tax 
(capitation) and forced labor, the taxes that we categorized as “modern”, and the remaining 
sources of revenue (monopolies, trade taxes, “intermediate” taxes, and other). 
(1) Head tax payments are allocated in proportion of the population older than 15. Only 
the autochthonous poor contribute to forced labor, and we adopt the monetary 
equivalents proposed by van Waijenburg (2018) for AOF in 1925 (forced labor was 
abolished in 1946). 
(2) The poor pay none of the modern taxes. Europeans and the autochthonous non-poor 
pay the same percentage of their income in modern taxes.  
(3) For all other sources of revenue (monopolies, intermediate internal taxes and trade 
taxes), the three groups contribute in the same proportion of their income. 
All these assumptions understate progressivity. The first one neglects the transition to a 
less regressive head tax in AOF after World War II. Regarding the second, Europeans must 
have faced higher rates, given the higher level and the higher formality/visibility of their 
earnings.11 As for the third assumption, the propensity to consume imports, goods produced 
by the formal sector, or monopoly goods (alcohol, sugar, tobacco) likely increased with 
income. We thus consider that this set of three extreme assumptions provides us with a lower 
bound of tax progressivity in each year.  
Under these lower bound assumptions (1)-(3), Table A1.3 gives the tax rates on the 
income of each group in 1925 and 1955, as well as two progressivity indicators: the ratio of 
the after/before tax ratios of autochthons and Europeans, and the ratio of the after/before tax 
ratios of the autochthonous poor and non-poor — indicators larger than 1 are the sign of a 
progressive tax system. The tax system of 1925 Algeria appears mildly progressive, thanks to 
                                                 
11 In 1945 Cameroon, some 1,300 Europeans paid the general income tax and schedular taxes on wages 
and profits, while 10,000 autochthons earning more than 6,000 francs (i.e. around four times the GDP per capita) 
paid a tax on income with a flat rate of 4%; 1,400,000 other poor autochthons were subject to standard 
capitation. Revenues collected amounted respectively to 37, 2 and 59 million. Our calculations suggest that 
Europeans paid 6.7% of their income on these taxes, against 1.2% for autochthons. Min. de la France d’Outre-
Mer, 1947. Annuaire Statistique du Cameroun, vol. 1 1938-1945, Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, pp. 128-129. 
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the absence of capitation, and as the modern taxes exempting the poor already represented 
20% of revenue.12 The tax system of 1925 Tunisia is just neutral: capitation still represents 
4% of total revenue and modern taxes are not as developed (5% only). Last, the lower bound 
of progressivity in 1925 AOF is below 1, indicating a regressive tax system, given the weight 
of capitation and forced labor (41% of total revenue) and the absence of progressive modern 
taxes.  
Table A1.3 — Lower bound estimates of progressivity 
 Algeria Tunisia AOF 
Year 1925    
Estimated tax rates on income (%):    
   Europeans  6.6 6.9 4.7 
   autochthons 5.5 7.1 8.0 
       autochthonous non-poor 6.6 7.1 5.2 
       autochthonous poor 5.0 7.2 8.2 
Progressivity indicators (ratios):    
      autochthons vs Europeans 1.01 1.00 0.97 
      poor vs non-poor 1.02 1.00 0.97 
Year 1955    
Estimated tax rates on income (%):    
   Europeans  20.1 21.0 13.9 
   autochthons 14.6 17.2 14.7 
       autochthonous non-poor 20.1 21.0 14.6 
       autochthonous poor 10.1 12.8 14.8 
Progressivity indicators (ratios):    
      autochthons vs Europeans 1.07 1.05 0.99 
      poor vs non-poor 1.13 1.10 1.00 
Sources: See text.   
Notes: Europeans include Jews in NA. The first progressivity indicator is (1-ta)/(1-te), where ta is the average tax 
rate on autochthons (second line of each panel), and te the tax rate on Europeans (first line). The second 
progressivity indicator is (1-tp)/(1-tnp), where tp is the tax rate on the autochthonous poor (fourth line) and tnp the 
tax rate on the autochthonous non-poor (third line). 
Under the same lower bound assumptions, the year 1955 looks more progressive in the 
three colonies, yet it is in AOF that the change appears the least pronounced. In Algeria the 
weight of modern taxes reached 41% of total revenue in 1955. In Tunisia, capitation had 
disappeared and modern taxes weighed 32%.  In these two countries, according to our 
estimates the income share of those paying modern taxes (Europeans and the autochthonous 
non-poor), if anything, decreased slightly (Table A1.2), so that the apparent modernization of 
the tax system reflected a true increase in progressivity. Indeed, under our assumption, the 
                                                 
12 For Algeria, Ageron (1990, p. 66) estimates that Europeans paid 53% of the total tax bill before World 
War I and 73% after the suppression of “Arab taxes” in 1919 and the introduction of the income tax. Although 
he does not explain his method, his figure is close the one corresponding too our lower bound for 1925 (70%). 
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modern tax rates on the income of the two non-poor groups increase from 1.6 to 10.0% in 
Algeria, and from 0.5 to 8.3% in Tunisia. In AOF, thanks in particular to the abolition of 
forced labor, the share of archaic taxes (capitation and corvée labor) drops from 41 to 16%; in 
parallel, the share of modern taxes goes from 0 to 10%. Yet, our estimate of the income share 
of the non-poor jumps from 9 to 48%, and this boom of the tax base probably explains most 
of the modernization of the tax structure.13 According to our estimates, modern tax rates on 
the non-poor (Europeans and autochthons) rose from 0.1 to 3.0% only, while the archaic tax 
rate on the poor also increased from 3.5 to 4%; recall however that under assumption (1) the 
reforms of capitation, making it less regressive, are not taken into account here.  
In Algeria and Tunisia, the tax system of 1955 is unambiguously progressive between 
our three groups, primarily along the poor/non-poor line among autochthons (the 
progressivity indicator reaching 1.13 in Algeria, and 1.10 in Tunisia), and secondarily along 
the racial line (1.07 and 1.05 in Tunisia). In AOF, under lower bounds assumptions it reaches 
neutrality; in contrast with 1925, we can at least exclude that is was regressive. 
Can we robustly conclude that progressivity unambiguously increased between 1925 
and 1955? The main concern is our assumption (3) that the three groups contributed in the 
same proportion of their income to all sources of revenue other than the head tax and modern 
taxes. In fact, this could have changed between 1925 and 1955 as the autochthons, especially 
the non-poor, became more involved in the formal economy, as tax enforcement improved, 
and as consumption patterns changed towards more imported goods or monopoly goods. To 
have a significant impact on our estimates of progressivity dynamics, these evolutions should 
affect taxes other than modern taxes, as modern taxes were not very developed in 1925 (see 
above). 
We alternatively compute a much more progressive estimate of the distribution of taxes 
by replacing assumptions (1) to (3) by the following ones:  
(1’) Europeans’ average head tax rate (per capita) is twice the non-poor’s, and 10 times 
the poor’s (only for 1955); 
(2’) Europeans face a modern tax rate (on income) that is twice the non-poor’s; 
(3’) Half of the revenue from other taxes is only collected on the non-poor (Europeans 
and autochthons), like modern taxes, with the same tax rate (on income) for the two groups. 
We believe this alternative set of assumptions provides us with an upper bound of tax 
progressivity. Of course, a more extreme upper bound would have all taxes except capitation 
                                                 
13 The income share of Europeans increases from 3 to 12%, and the share of non-poor autochthons from 6 
to 36%. 
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paid by the non-poor (or even by the Europeans only). Yet such an extreme assumption 
generates tax rates on the non-poor groups as high as 50% in 1925 AOF, which seems quite 
unrealistic.  
Table A1.4 reports the results of the numerical simulations under assumptions (1’)-(3’). 
Table A1.4 — Upper bound estimates of progressivity 
 Algeria Tunisia AOF 
Year 1925    
Estimated tax rates on income (%):    
   Europeans  7.5 8.2 27.7 
   autochthons 3.8 5.9 7.2 
       autochthonous non-poor 6.6 8.1 28.0 
       autochthonous poor 2.5 4.0 5.9 
Progressivity indicators (ratios):    
      autochthons vs Europeans 1.04 1.04 1.28 
      poor vs non-poor 1.04 1.03 1.31 
Year 1955    
Estimated tax rates on income (%):    
   Europeans  24.3 25.5 22.2 
   autochthons 11.0 13.8 13.6 
       autochthonous non-poor 18.3 20.3 20.3 
       autochthonous poor 5.1 6.5 8.9 
Progressivity indicators (ratios):    
      autochthons vs Europeans 1.18 1.16 1.11 
      poor vs non-poor 1.16 1.17 1.14 
Sources: See text.   
Notes: See Table A1.3. 
To obtain a lower bound for the evolution of progressivity between 1925 and 1955, we 
can compare the upper bound of progressivity for 1925 from Table A1.4 top panel with the 
lower bound for 1955 from Table A1.3 bottom panel. In Algeria and Tunisia, the 
progressivity indicator still increases, from 1.04 to 1.05-1.07 along racial lines and from 1.03-
1.04 to 1.10-1.13 along the poor/non-poor line among autochthons. Along the racial line, the 
conclusion of an increase in progressivity even survives assuming a zero tax rate on the poor 
in 1925, i.e. a very extreme version of assumption (3’). 
In AOF, the same comparison indicates a large decrease in progressivity, while the 
reverse one (lower bound of 1925 to upper bound of 1955) points to a large increase. It is 
therefore impossible to draw any robust conclusion. Similarly, when we try to compare AOF 
with the two North African colonies, the “confidence interval” for AOF encompasses the one 
for Algeria or Tunisia in 1925, and they overlap over a large range in 1955. Though the 
importance of the head tax and the underdevelopment of modern taxes make it likely that the 
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tax system in AOF was more regressive than in North Africa, this conclusion hinges on the 
fact that other taxes were not more progressive in AOF, which is not granted.14 
A second uncertainty and concern is that the income share of the autochthonous non-
poor in 1925 was extrapolated under a strong assumption. We also explored the sensitivity of 
our comparisons to this parameter. In Algeria and Tunisia, halving this income share, that is 
assuming that the tax base of modern taxes was narrower, barely increases progressivity in 
1925 because modern taxation was still limited. Our conclusion of a progressivity increase 
again survives.15 In AOF, halving or doubling the income share does not reduce ambiguity. 
We conclude that despite the uncertainties attached to the income distribution and to the 
sharing of the tax burden in each year and especially in 1925, it is likely that tax progressivity 
increased in Algeria and Tunisia, even if the improvement was perhaps modest. Further, our 
lower bound estimates make implausible that the colonial tax system was purely regressive 
along racial lines, even in 1925, yet its progressivity could also have been very limited. In the 
case of AOF, the importance of capitation and forced labor means it is possible the tax system 
was regressive in 1925, but the confidence intervals are too large to draw any robust 
conclusion on progressivity comparisons, across time or across space. 
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Appendix II — Public wages in Indochina and Madagascar 1925-1946 
Dualism decomposed: public wages of French and autochthons in civil service 
A systematic breakdown of public employment and wages by citizenship is possible for 
Madagascar and Indochina in the 1920s and 1940s. As shown in Table A2.1 (first and second 
rows), while in both colonies French civil servants represented 12% of total employment in 
1925, they made up 52 to 56% of the wage bill. Similar data for 1943-1946 show that the 
autochthons’ share in public employment remained stable over two decades.1  
Table A2.1 – French and autochthons in civil service 1925 & 1945, Indochina and 
Madagascar 
 Indochina Madagascar 
 French autochthons French autochthons 
Year 1925     
Share in total employment (%) 12 88 12 88 
Share in wage bill (%) 52 48 56 44 
Average annual public wage (1937 FF) 62,509 7,879 34,653 3,609 
   in units of GDP per 15+ pop. 59.3 7.5 28.7 3.0 
   in units of GDP per 15+ of each groupa 0.9 8.2 1.0 3.5 
Years 1943-1946     
Share in total employment (%) 10 90 12 88 
Share in wage bill (%) 42 58 49 51 
Average annual public wage (1937 FF) 27,697 4,189 25,326 3,512 
   in units of GDP per 15+ pop. 47.9 7.2 21.5 3.0 
   in units of GDP per 15+ of each groupa 1.0 7.8 1.2 3.8 
          
Notes. In Madagascar, 1925 is the average of 1921 and 1929 (the distribution of employment and wages by 
citizenship is not given in 1925); data for the 1940s is 1946. Figures for Indochina in the 1940s do not comprise 
the federal government, only the local budgets of Cochinchina (1944), Annam (1945), Tonkin (1945), 
Cambodge (1945) and Laos (1943). In 1925, wages are higher by 80% for autochthons at the federal level, yet 
employment is only 9% of total, so that not including the federal budget is innocuous. a: using estimates of 
average income of French and autochthons, see Online Appendix Table A1.1 (the estimate for Indochina uses 
income tax data from 1942). 
Not only were French wages much higher on average than autochthonous wages (7 times 
higher in Indochina and 10 times in Madagascar), they were, in 1925, higher than the average 
public wage in Metropolitan France. In Madagascar, the French public wage of 35,000 francs 
was 2.2 times higher than the average public wage in Metropolitan France (15,000). In 
Indochina, it was more than 4 times as high (62,500).  
                                                 
1 Data for 1912-13 Indochina suggest that the share of French was just a bit higher, at 13%. Whereas it 
had expanded by more than 40% from 1913 to 1925, public employment did not increase between 1925 and 
1937, and fell by around 15% during WWII.   
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The second section of this appendix gives a more detailed account of the rise in public 
wages in Indochina after World War I. In a nutshell, the colonial government of Indochina set 
up a specific schedule of bonuses for French public wages to retain their purchasing power 
and stay in line with private earnings. A version of the schedule of bonuses used to 
compensate French civil servants in Indochina was also used to increase the wage of 
autochthonous civil servants. Increasing inequalities in pay within the colonial civil service 
even further was politically infeasible — colonial administrators mention the “necessary 
parallelism” between French and Indochinese civil servants. It is therefore likely that the very 
high wages paid to French civil servants were pulling the autochthonous wage schedule 
upwards. Though bonuses were originally reserved for French citizens, in skilled occupations 
like teachers, some allowances could be extended to autochthons.2 Measures of wage dualism 
from Table 5, however, are very much decreased when we consider only the wages of 
autochthons. In 1925 Madagascar, wage dualism goes from 4.5 to 3.0 (3.5 when we exclude 
Europeans from GDP per working age population). In 1925 Indochina, it goes from 14.8 to 
7.2 (7.8). 
The rise and fall of Indochinese public wages from World War I to World War II 
As already mentioned, average public wages were particularly high in 1925 Indochina. 
The average French public wage was 80% higher than the average French public wage in 
Madagascar, and more than twice the average French public wage in 1945 Indochina. 
Autochthonous public wages were very high as well, again about twice higher than in 
Madagascar or 1945 Indochina. We lay down here the particular sequence of policies that led 
to these extremely high real wages. 
At the top of the hierarchy, the general governor was paid 1937 PPP FF 406,000 in 1925 
Indochina vs. 280,000 in Madagascar — a 45% difference. The base nominal wage in current 
francs was in fact different by 25% only (50,000 vs. 40,000). Both governors received the 
same large bonuses, about 2.8 times the base wage (at the 1925 exchange rate of the 
Indochinese currency, the piaster), comprising not only the “colonial supplement” but also 
travel and entertainment expenses. The rest of the difference then stemmed from the price 
level, 18% lower in Indochina according to our estimates. However, in 1925 Indochina the 
                                                 
2 For instance, West African teachers exerting outside of their colony of origin, i.e. in the intermediate 
“federal” schedule, benefited from a remoteness allowance (“indemnité de dépaysement”) equal to 4/10 of base 
wage. Further, from 1925 to 1935 all African teachers in Togo were granted a special bonus (“indemnité spéciale 
du Togo”), first equal to 6/10, then 7/10 in 1927, and gradually diminished to 3/10 in 1933 before being 
cancelled due to financial restrictions. Gbikpi-Benissan (2011, vol. 2, p. 205).  
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same level of bonuses applied to all French civil servants, more than tripling the base wage in 
francs. In Madagascar, like in other colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa, bonuses and allowances 
only reached 70% of base wages. 
The story of these very high Indochinese wages is the following. At the start of World 
War I, France had suspended the convertibility of the French franc into gold. France financed 
the war by monetary expansion, resulting in high inflation. In Indochina, the piaster remained 
silver based and inflation was low throughout the war and in the 1920s. As a result, the piaster 
appreciated from 2.5 francs for one piaster in 1913 to 17 francs for one piaster in 1926. The 
exchange rate stabilized around 12 under the Poincaré government, before being pegged at 10 
after 1930 (Brocheux & Hémery, pp. 134-135; Giacometti, 1998). 
From 1913 to 1917 in Metropolitan France, nominal wages of civil servants had stayed 
fixed and had lost a lot of purchasing power. Nominal wages were gradually increased from 
1918 to the end of the 1930s, starting with the lowest wages of postmen, teachers, etc. By 
1925, the top wages of university professors or administration executives were still lower by 
40% than their 1913 level (Piketty 2018 pp. 182-191 & pp. 833-834). For expatriate French 
civil servants, the wage schedule of Metropolitan France applied directly to all colonies, so 
that in Indochina base wages in francs were converted in piasters.  
In Indochina, the colonial government decided to set up a specific schedule of colonial 
supplements in piasters to compensate for inflation in Metropolitan France (Dareste et al. 
N°4, Oct.-Dec. pp. 1080-1083). The schedule was progressive, in that wages at the bottom of 
the scale received proportionally higher supplements. It was revised each year all along the 
1920s. The Indochinese supplement fixed in piaster ended up representing the bulk of the pay: 
in 1925, it ranged between 2 to 4 times the base wages, when going down the scale from the 
top (governor) to the bottom. In contrast with Metropolitan France, the average wage of 
French civil servants in Indochina even increased between 1913 and 1925, from 1937 PPP FF 
52,649 to 62,509 (i.e. by 19%).3  
According to a September 1920 decree, the “colonial supplement” had to be six tenth of 
the base wage in francs in Madagascar, and seven tenth in Indochina (Dareste et al. N°1, Jan.-
Mar. pp. 89-98). Our data indicate that in Madagascar the applied supplement was actually 
seven tenth.4 In Indochina, the specific supplement schedule did not fit the seven tenth rule 
                                                 
3 The general governor and the governors of four territories (not Cochinchina) make one exception, but it 
is that their base nominal wages in francs were lowered between 1913 and 1925. 
4 The colonial supplement was supposed to be seven tenth in AOF and nine tenth in AEF. Our data rather 
suggest it was seven tenth in all Sub-Saharan Africa colonies until the end of WW2. Before WW1, it seems to 
have doubled the base wage in SSA and Indochina. 
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and was more advantageous, especially for low wages. For example, a French civil servant 
paid at the Madagascar 1925 average wage of around 9,325 francs, corresponding to a middle 
rank executive or to a second class teacher, received a 6,527 francs supplement in 
Madagascar, but 3,990 piasters in Indochina, worth 31,290 francs at the 1925 exchange rate. 
The bulk of the gap in French public wages between Madagascar and Indochina in 1925 can 
be attributed to the specific schedule of bonuses in Indochina.  
Why did the government of Indochina adopt such a generous bonus schedule? Strikingly 
enough, our estimates of the average income of Europeans (Table A1.1 in Appendix I), when 
expressed in per worker terms, stand at par with average wages in the civil service in both 
colonies (Table A2.1, last row of each panel).5  Then, everything is as if the large bonuses 
paid to civil servants in Indochina were meant to offset a high reservation wage, as Europeans 
in the private sector were much richer and in lower numbers than in Madagascar, where many 
relatively poor French men from neighboring Réunion island had immigrated. Hence, the 
rationale for the Indochinese exception must have been the wish to attract skilled civil 
servants in the most profitable and strategic, yet remote, colony. 
It is only at the end of 1930s that the difference between the arbitrary piaster supplement 
and the seven tenth bonus turned small, at all base wages. Nominal wages in francs had 
recovered, so that the special supplement schedule had gradually lost its motivation. 
Furthermore, the bankruptcies of the Great Depression had also diminished private benefits, 
hence the civil servants’ reservation wage (Brocheux and Hémery 1994, pp. 260-269). World 
War II finished pulling down public wages in Indochina, back to the same levels as in 
Madagascar. According to Bassino’s estimates, the once buoyant Indochinese economy 
collapsed under the Japanese occupation — GDP per capita was halved between 1940 and 
1945. Between 1937 and 1945, inflation was extremely high in both colonies — prices were 
multiplied by 5.8 in Indochina and 6.7 in Madagascar, but nominal wages did not follow in 
Indochina. In both colonies, between 1925 and 1943/46, French public wages kept up with 
Europeans’ average earnings, which fell by 60% in Indochina, but only by 25% in 
Madagascar (in Madagascar the average earnings of Europeans fell mostly because of the 
arrival of new, less affluent settlers in the 1930s).  
The setting of French wages also influenced the wages of autochthons. In 1925, the 
average French civil servant was paid 8 to 10 times what the average autochthon received in 
both colonies (Table A2.1, third row). This means that autochthonous civil servants were paid 
                                                 
5 At least for Indochina, these are rather precisely measured thanks to income tax data collected by 
Alvaredo, Cogneau & Piketty (2017). 
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twice more in Indochina. It is quite surprising, as Indochinese civil servants were not paid the 
colonial supplement, reserved for French citizens. Sources indicate that some “parallelism” 
was sought between the French and local wage schedules. During the period of the 
depreciation of the franc (1918-1930), a generous and progressive exchange rate was applied 
to translate wages from francs into piasters. In 1926 for instance, when the actual exchange 
rate was around 10 francs per piaster, an exchange rate 3 to 3.5 (depending on base wage 
level) was applied, meaning a bonus of 10/3-1=2.33 in terms of the base wage in francs.6 The 
wages of subaltern personnel, which had no correspondence in francs, were presumably also 
pulled upward. Overall, the real wages of autochthonous civil servants also went up between 
1913 and 1925, from 1937 PPP FF 4,219 to 7,086 — a 87% increase.7  
This “parallelism” between Europeans’ and autochthons’ wage schedules then explains 
why our measure of wage dualism is so high in 1925 Indochina compared to Madagascar. In 
Indochina, the average autochthon in civil service earned 7.5 times the GDP per worker, while 
the same ratio was only 3.0 in Madagascar (Table A2.1, fourth row). 
In 1946, the autochthons’ average wage had improved significantly in Madagascar. It was 
now 7.2 times lower than the French average wage, versus 9.6 times in 1925. In Indochina, 
the autochthons once generous schedule was, like the French schedule, shifted down 
drastically. Average public autochthonous wages were 6.6 times lower than French wages in 
1943/46, versus 7.9 times in 1925. 
                                                 
6 See for instance, where the term “parallelism” is used: Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine, 1931. 
Recueil général de la législation et de la réglementation de l’Indochine, Supplément de 1926-1927, Deuxième 
partie (Arrêtés, décisions et circulaires du gouverneur général et des chefs d’administration locale) et Troisième 
partie (Ordonnances des souverains de l’Annam, du Cambodge et de Luang-Prabang), pp. 154-156. [National 
Library of Vietnam]. “Un taux d’abondement dégressif a dû être adopté pour conserver le parallélisme 
nécessaire entre les deux traitements.” 
7 Employment increased more in administrative sectors paying initially higher wages, like education and 
health, yet the composition effect was limited.  
6 
 
References 
Alvaredo, Facundo, Denis Cogneau and Thomas Piketty. “Income Inequality under Colonial 
Rule. Evidence from French Algeria, Cameroon, Indochina and Tunisia, 1920-1960”, PSE 
working paper, 2017. 
Brocheux, Pierre and Daniel Hémery. Indochine, la colonisation ambigüe 1868-1954, Paris: La 
Découverte, 1994 [2nd ed. 2001]. 
Dareste P., G. Appert, L. Rotureau-Delaunay et A. Marcille (dir.), Recueil de législation, de 
doctrine et de jurisprudence coloniale, 24ème année, Paris: G. Godde. 
Giacometti, Jean-Dominique. « La bataille de la piastre 1918-1928.  Réalités économiques et 
perceptions politiques dans l'Empire colonial Français. » Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 
Philosophische Fakultät III, Institut für Asien und Afrikawissenschaften, working paper No. 9, 
Berlin, 1998. 
Gbikpi-Benissan, François. Le système scolaire au Togo sous mandat français, 2 volumes, 
Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011. 
 
 
Appendix III 
General historical references on the “Second” French Colonial Empire 
General History 
French Empire 
Ageron, Charles-Robert. La décolonisation française. Paris: Armand Colin, 1991. 
Binoche-Guedra, Jacques. “Le rôle de l'Algérie et des colonies au Parlement sous la Troisième 
République (1871-1940)”. Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer, 75, n° 280 (1988): 309-346. 
Bouche, Denise. Histoire de la colonisation française, Tome second : Flux et reflux (1815-
1962). Paris: Fayard, 1991. 
Brunschwig, Henri. Mythes et réalités de l’impérialisme colonial français, Paris: Armand 
Colin, 1960. 
Cantier, Jacques and Eric Jennings (dir.). L’Empire colonial sous Vichy, Paris: Odile Jacob, 
2004. 
Clayton, Anthony. France, Soldiers and Africa. Brassey’s Defense Publishers Ltd, 1988. 
_____. Histoire de l’armée française en Afrique 1830-1962, Paris: Albin Michel, 2014. 
Frémeaux, Jacques. Les colonies dans la Grande Guerre, Paris: Editions 14-18, 2006. 
_______________. De quoi fut fait l’Empire. Les guerres coloniales au XIXe siècle. Paris: 
CNRS Editions, 2010. 
Jennings, Eric. Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain’s National Revolution in Madagascar, 
Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944, Stanford University Press, 2001. 
Thobie, Jacques, Gilbert Meynier, Catherine Coquerey-Vidrovith and Charles-Robert Ageron. 
Histoire de la France coloniale 1914-1990, Paris: Armand Colin, 1990. 
North Africa 
Ageron, Charles-Robert. Histoire de l’Algérie Contemporaine. Tome II : De l’insurrection de 
1871  au déclenchement de la guerre de libération. Paris: PUF, 1979. 
Ageron, Charles-Robert. Histoire de l’Algérie Contemporaine, Paris: PUF, collection QSJ, 
1990. 
Bouchène, Abderrahmane, Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, Ouanassa Siari, Tengour and Sylvie 
Thénault (eds). Histoire de l’Algérie à la période coloniale (1830-1962), Alger: Barzach & 
Paris: La Découverte, 2012.  
Chouikha, Larbi and Eric Gobe. Histoire de la Tunisie depuis l’indépendance, Paris: La 
Découverte, coll. Repères, 2015. 
Collot, Claude. Les institutions de l'Algérie durant la période coloniale (1830-1962). Paris: 
CNRS & Alger: Office des publications universitaires, 1987. 
Connelly, Matthew. A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the 
Origins of the Post–Cold War Era. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.  
Germouni, Mohamed. Le protectorat français au Maroc, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2015. 
Grangaud, Isabelle and M’hamed Oualdi. “Tout est-il colonial dans le Maghreb ? Ce que les 
travaux des historiens modernistes peuvent apporter”, L’Année du Maghreb 10 (2014): 233-
254. 
Julien, Charles-André. Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine. Tome I : La conquête et les débuts 
de la colonisation. Paris: PUF, 1964. 
Katan Bensamoun, Yvette. Le Maghreb : De l'empire ottoman à la fin de la colonisation 
française, Paris: Belin, 2007.  
Martin, Jean-Philippe. Histoire de la Tunisie contemporaine. De Ferry à Bourguiba. Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2003. 
Masri, Safwan M. Tunisia. An Arab Anomaly. Columbia University Press, 2017. 
McDougall, James. A History of Algeria. Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
Rivet, Daniel. Le Maghreb à l’épreuve de la colonisation, Paris: Hachette, coll. Pluriel, 2002. 
________. Histoire du Maroc de Moulay Idris à Mohamed VI, Paris: Fayard, 2012. 
Stora, Benjamin. Histoire de l’Algérie coloniale (1830-1954). Paris: La Découverte, 1991. 
________. Histoire de la guerre d’Algérie (1954-1962). Paris: La Découverte, 1992. 
Valensi, Lucette. Le Maghreb d’avant la prise d’Alger. Paris: Flammarion, 1969. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
Almeida-Topor, Hélène. L’Afrique au XXè siècle. Paris: Armand Colin, 1999. 
Cooper, Fredrick. Decolonization and African Society. The labor question in French and 
British Africa, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
________. Citizenship between Empire and Nation. Remaking France and French Africa 
1945-1960, Princeton University Press, 2014. French edition: Français et Africains? Etre 
citoyen au temps de la décolonisation, Paris: Payot. 
Guillemin, Philippe. “Les élus d'Afrique noire à l'Assemblée nationale sous la Quatrième 
République”, Revue française de science politique, 8, n°4 (1958): 861-877. 
Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine and Henri Moniot. L’Afrique Noire, de 1800 à nos jours. Paris: 
PUF, 1974. 
Manning, Patrick. Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Randrianja, Solofo and Stephen Ellis. Madagascar. A Short History. London: Hurst & 
Company, 2009. 
Reid, Richard J. A History of Modern Africa, 1800 to Present. Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. 
M’Bokolo, Elikia. Afrique Noire, Histoire et civilisations du XIXè siècle à nos jours, Paris: 
Hatier, 1992. 
 
Economic History 
Almeida-Topor, Hélène. Histoire économique du Dahomey (Bénin), 1890-1920, vol. 1 & 2. 
Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995. 
Amin, Samir. L’économie du Maghreb. La colonisation et la décolonisation. Paris: Editions de 
Minuit, 1966. 
Amin, Samir. L’Afrique de l’Ouest bloquée. L’économie politique de la colonisation 1880-
1970, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1971. 
Andersson, Jens. “State Capacity and Development in Francophone West Africa”, Lund 
Studies in Economic History No 86, University of Lund, 2018. 
Barbe, Adam. When France Used the Public Debt to Colonise Morocco, Orient XXI (2017). 
http://orientxxi.info/magazine/when-france-used-the-public-debt-to-colonise-morocco,1719 
Bassino, Jean-Pascal, Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka (eds). Quantitative 
Economic History of Vietnam 1900-1990. An International Workshop, Nishi-Futsu Kaikan 
/Maison Franco-Japonaise, Tokyo, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, 
2000. 
Berthélemy Jean-Claude. “L'économie de l'Afrique occidentale française et du Togo, 1946-
1960”, Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer, 67, n° 248-249, 1980: 301-337. 
Bonzom, Lucien. Du régime fiscal en Algérie. Ses conséquences sur la situation et le 
développement économique de cette colonie. Thèse pour le doctorat ès Sciences politiques et 
économiques, Université de Paris, Faculté de droit, Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1899. 
Brocheux, Pierre and Daniel Hémery. Indochine, la colonisation ambigüe 1868-1954, Paris: La 
Découverte, 1994 [2nd ed. 2001]. 
Brocheux, Pierre. Une histoire économique du Vietnam 1850-2007. La palanche et le camion. 
Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2009. 
Cooper, Frederick. Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
______________. Africa in the World. Capitalism. Empire. Nation-State, Harvard University 
Press, 2014. 
Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine. Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires, 
Paris: EHESS, 1972 [2nd edition 2011].   
Douël, Martial. Un siècle de finances coloniales, Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1930. 
Fall, Babacar. Le travail forcé en Afrique occidentale française (1900-1946). Paris: Karthala, 
1993. 
Fremigacci, Jean. Etat, économie et société coloniale à Madagascar (De la fin du XIXè siècle 
aux années 1940). Paris: Karthala, 2014. 
Frankema, Ewout and Marlous van Waijenburg. “Metropolitan Blueprints of Colonial 
Taxation? Lessons from Fiscal Capacity Building in British and French Africa, 1880-1940.” 
Journal of African History, 55, n° 3 (2014): 371-400. 
Huillery, Elise. “The Black Man’s Burden: The Cost of Colonization of French West Africa”, 
Journal of Economic History, 74, n° 1 (2014): 1-38. 
Hopkins, Anthony G. An Economic History of West Africa, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1973. 
Marseille, Jacques. Empire colonial et capitalisme français. Histoire d’un divorce. Paris: Albin 
Michel, 1984 [2nd edition 2005] 
Nicolaï, André. “Tunisie : fiscalité et développement”, Tiers-Monde, 3, n° 11 (1962): 429-478. 
Nouschi, André. “En Algérie : portrait social de la colonisation”, Annales, Économies, 
Sociétés, Civilisations, 20, n° 6 (1965): 1242-1252. 
Polanyi, Karl. Dahomey and the Slave Trade. Seattle & London: University of Washington 
Press, 1966. 
Saul, Samir. Intérêts économiques français et décolonisation de l’Afrique du Nord (1945-
1962), Genève: Librairie Droz, 2016. 
Suret-Canale, Jean. Afrique Noire, l’ère coloniale 1900-1945, Paris: Editions Sociales, coll. 
Terrains, 1962. 
Tertrais, Hugues. La piastre et le fusil : le coût de la guerre d’Indochine, 1945-1954, 
Vincennes: Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique, 2002. 
Todd, David. “The impôts arabes: French Imperialism and Land Taxation in Colonial Algeria, 
1830-1919”. In Tiley, John (ed.), Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 3, edited by John 
Tiley, 113-138. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009. 
1 
 
Fiscal Capacity and Dualism in Colonial States:  
The French Empire 1830-1962 
Data appendix 
 
This version: June 2019 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Extent of the public finance database ............................................................................. 2 
Geographical and historical range .............................................................................. 2 
Budget accounts considered and sources used ........................................................... 4 
Missing data .............................................................................................................. 13 
Personnel data ............................................................................................................... 17 
Population, prices, and GDP ........................................................................................ 20 
Population ................................................................................................................. 20 
Prices ........................................................................................................................ 25 
Gross domestic product ............................................................................................ 29 
Development outcomes ................................................................................................ 32 
Variable dictionary ....................................................................................................... 32 
Public finance database ............................................................................................ 32 
Personnel database .................................................................................................... 40 
List of sources ............................................................................................................... 41 
Public finances .......................................................................................................... 42 
Population ................................................................................................................. 53 
Prices ........................................................................................................................ 55 
Gross domestic product ............................................................................................ 58 
Development outcomes, imports and exports .......................................................... 58 
References .................................................................................................................... 59 
2 
 
 
EXTENT OF THE PUBLIC FINANCE DATABASE 
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL RANGE 
Geographical range. Our database covers almost the entire second French colonial 
empire, corresponding to the second wave of European colonisation from the middle of the 
19th century. Except the Indochinese Union, most colonies are in Africa: Algeria, Tunisia and 
Morocco, the federations of French West Africa (Afrique occidentale française, AOF) and 
French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Française, AEF), Togo, Cameroon, and 
Madagascar (see map on figure 1). Our database does not encompass smaller colonial 
territories such as the remains of the first colonial empire (Guadeloupe and Martinique in the 
West Indies, French Guyana, the Reunion Island and the five trade posts of India), New 
Caledonia, colonized by France in 1853, and the port of Djibouti, colonized in 1884. Lebanon 
and Syria, under French rule between the two world wars, are not included in the present 
database either. In total, the former French colonies that are part of our database correspond to 
21 contemporary countries: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in North Africa, Benin, Burkina- 
 
Figure 1: Geographical extent of the dataset 
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Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South-East Asia. 
 
Table 1: Historical range of the dataset 
            
Region Range of colonial data # observations 
 
Range of Franc 
Zone data # observations 
      Algeria 1833-1958 96 
 
1959-1969 11 
Morocco 1915-1956 41 
 
1957-1969 13 
Tunisia 1891-1955 61 
 
1956-1969 13 
Indochina 1871-1953 40 
   West Africa(a) 1905-1958 18 
 
1959-1967 9 
Equatorial Africa(b) 1904-1954 22 
 
1958-1970 13 
Cameroon 1922-1957 28 
 
1958-1970 13 
Madagascar 1901-1956 52 
 
1958-1970 13 
Togo 1920-1956 14  1958-1970 13 
            
(a) The West African federation includes Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (present Benin), Guinea, Haute-Volta 
(present Burkina-Faso), Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Soudan (present Mali).  
(b) Equatorial Africa includes Chad, Congo (present Congo-Brazzaville), Gabon, Oubangui-Chari 
(present Central African Republic)  
 
Historical range. For each territory, the starting date depends on the specific history 
of colonization in the region and on the date at which colonial authorities started producing 
systematics records of public finances. The first region to be colonized was Algeria, whose 
conquest began in 1830, the last were Togo and Cameroon, who were given to France as 
League of Nation mandates after WWI. The end date also depends on the specific history of 
each region. In Indochina, our database stops in 1953, one year before independence. For 
African colonies, which became independent between 1956 (independence of Morocco) and 
1962 (independence of Algeria after an eight year war), we are able to extend the database to 
the end of the 1960s, using the reports of the Franc Zone, the monetary union between France 
and some of its former colonies. Since the 1950s, the Banque the France in charge of the 
monetary policy of the Franc Zone has been publishing reports containing some information 
on the public finances of its member countries. These reports offer a picture of public revenue 
and expenditure less detailed and complete than the one built using budget accounts directly. 
Table 1 sums up, for each of the 9 regions considered, the historical range of our public 
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finance data, distinguishing between the “colonial” dataset, built primarily from budget 
accounts, and the “Franc Zone” dataset, built primarily from the reports of the Franc Zone. 
BUDGET ACCOUNTS CONSIDERED AND SOURCES USED 
This section presents the budget accounts considered and the sources used to build the 
public finance database, as well as the main assumptions made, especially when dealing with 
missing data. The complete list of sources is displayed in the “Public finances” section of the 
“List of sources” below. In order to produce figures comparable across time and across 
regions, we did not only consider the central colonial governments, but tried to collect data for 
all public authorities responsible for revenue and expenditure in the colonies. This requires 
detailed knowledge of the administrative structure of the Empire. We collected data from 
various budget accounts: metropolitan (French), colonial, federal in colonies organised in 
federations, auxiliary (loan budget accounts, development funds, etc.), as well as the accounts 
of lower level administrative divisions. For each year and each region of the Empire, these 
budgets are consolidated, meaning that the various transfers between them (subsidies, loans, 
interests and reimbursements) are cancelled out to avoid double counting of revenue and 
expenditure items. 
Metropolitan budget accounts. In Metropolitan France, two ministries were 
responsible for most of the spending in the colonies: The Ministry of the Navy and the 
Colonies (Ministère de la Marine et des Colonies), and the Ministry of War (Ministère de la 
Guerre). Military expenditure in the colonial Empire were the responsibility of these 
ministries (the ministry of war dealt with North Africa, the ministry of the colonies with the 
rest of the Empire). Military expenditure therefore never appear in the colonial budget 
accounts, except in Algeria between 1830 and 1900 (and between 1904 and 1937 for the 
Southern Territories only), in Morocco until 1937, and again in 1956 in preparation for 
independence, and in Indochina in 1953.1 It is not obvious whether colonial military 
expenditure of metropolitan budget accounts should be considered an item of expenditure for 
the colonies. On the one hand, countries started developing a national defense budget once 
they became independent, and colonial military expenditure could be partly considered as 
France mutualizing the cost of national defense. On the other hand, the military conquest and 
                                                 
1 More precisely, in the national budgets of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and in the regional budget of 
North Vietnam (Tonkin). Total security expenditure is not broken down between civilian and military, but 
personnel expenditure is. We use the share of military in personnel expenditure to infer total military expenditure 
from total security expenditure.  
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domination of a colonial empire should be considered mainly an item of expenditure for 
France, the colonizing power. Additionally, military expenditure of the Ministry of Colonies 
includes the payment of colonial troops who contributed to France’s national defense by 
fighting in Europe during WWI and WWII. In the end, we exclude military expenditure from 
our public expenditure aggregate, and make colonial military expenditure available separately 
(see “Variable dictionary” below). However, our public expenditure aggregates do comprise 
expenditure of the Ministries of War and Colonies that can be thought of as civilian in nature, 
namely subsidies to private companies, and infrastructure and health expenditure. Only during 
the period of conquest, and in Indochina, did this Metropolitan expenditure represent more 
than a couple of percentage points of our aggregate civilian expenditure figure (see figures 2 
and 3). Only part of this Metropolitan civilian expenditure can be allocated to a given region 
of the empire. We allocated the rest in proportion of the share of each region in allocated 
 
Note: the quasi-absence of auxiliary budgets in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) reflects the fact 
that, in these colonies, auxiliary and colonial budgets were often presented alongside each other and were 
merged during data collection. 
Figure 2: Share of various budgets in civilian public expenditure  
(North Africa and Indochina) 
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expenditure.2 On the revenue side, we consider this as direct subsidies from France to its 
colonies. 
 
From 1958 to 1962, there was a ministry in France in charge of the Sahara region 
(Ministère du Sahara). Its expenditure was added to the Algerian public expenditure available 
                                                 
2 The share of each region in allocated expenditure was computed over 10-year periods. In the budget 
accounts of the Ministry of the Colonies, regional allocation is not known at all between 1932 and 1959. We use 
allocated expenditure using the regional allocation of the 1920s. In the budget accounts of the Ministry of War, 
figures are aggregated for Tunisia and Algeria in 1915, 1921, 1928-1929 and 1933-1937: we allocate between 
Tunisia and Algeria using average allocation in the 1920s. In 1938 and 1939, figures are given for the whole of 
North Africa. We allocate between Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco using average allocation in the 1920s. 
Figure 3: Share of various budgets in civilian public expenditure  
(Sub-Saharan Africa) 
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in the Franc Zone Reports and, on the revenue side, counted as a subsidy of Metropolitan 
France to Algeria. Other ministries were in charge of Morocco and Tunisia (Ministère des 
affaires marocaines et tunisiennes, 1955-1959) and of Algeria (Secrétariat d’Etat aux affaires 
algériennes, 1958-1963), but their expenditure already appears in the colonial budget 
accounts and the Franc Zone reports. 
Federal structure. Three regions of the empire, Indochina, French West Africa 
(Afrique Occidentale Française, AOF) and French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale 
Française, AEF), were organized in federations. The AOF federation was created in 1895. In 
1922, it included eight colonies: Senegal, Soudan (present-day Mali), Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Dahomey (present-day Benin), Mauritania, Haute-Volta (present-day Burkina Faso) and 
Niger.3 Between 1932 and 1946, the Haute-Volta colony disappeared and its territory was 
divided between Côte d’Ivoire and Niger. The AEF federation was created in 1910 and 
included four colonies: Congo, Gabon, Chad, and Oubangui-Chari (present-day Central 
African Republic). The Indochinese Union was created in 1887 and included Cochinchina 
(South Vietnam), Annam (Central Vietnam), Tonkin (North Vietnam) and Cambodia. Laos 
was added in 1899. The Indochinese Union became the Indochinese Federation in 1946 and 
was dissolved in 1949. The AOF and AEF were dissolved in 1958-59.4 
These federations were organized in a pyramidal structure, with colonial governments 
(Gouvernements locaux) in each colony, responsible for local revenue and expenditure, and a 
federal government (Gouvernement général) responsible for general interest spending (mostly 
in infrastructure and administration) and financed mostly by custom duties and rents on 
government monopolies. Within a federation, there were many financial transfers (loans, 
advances, subsidies) between the different colonies and the federal government. Federal 
revenue and expenditure represented a large share of total revenue and expenditure (see 
figures 2 and 3 for the expenditure side). For that reason, we consider these federations as a 
whole and do not attempt to reallocate federal revenue and expenditure to the different 
colonies that were to become autonomous republics or independent countries. In a given 
federation in a given year, consolidated expenditure (revenue) is obtained by summing 
expenditure (revenue) in the federal budgets and the various colonial budgets, cancelling the 
                                                 
3 New colonies were added progressively as the French were conquering more and more territories. The 
borders of colonies also kept evolving. Before World War I, Soudan, Niger and Haute-Volta were forming the 
colony of “Haut-Sénégal-Niger.” 
4 Indochina was divided in three “Associated States” (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam). Colonies of AOF 
and AEF became autonomous Republics belonging to the French Community, a political association of France 
and its former African colonies, except Guinea which became independent in 1958. The French Community was 
dissolved in 1960 when all French colonies south of the Sahara gained independence. 
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transfers within the federation.5 Though the federations of AOF and AEF were dissolved in 
1958, there was residual expenditure and revenue until 1959, recorded in the Franc Zone 
report for 1959 (France, Comité monétaire de la zone franc, 1959). In the same report we 
found the revenue and expenditure of the short-lived Mali Federation, which united Mali and 
Senegal between 1959 and 1960. 
Auxiliary budgets. Infrastructure projects financed by loans were often registered on 
separate auxiliary budgets. Ports, railways, and the health sector also sometimes saw their 
expenditure and revenue recorded in a separate budget. Because railway companies were not 
always public, we did not collect data from the auxiliary budgets of railways. In the case of a 
public railway company, excess revenue was transferred to the colonial budget and is taken 
into account in our data (in the category “Monopoly revenue”, see “Variable dictionary” 
below), subsidies to the railway company were also recorded in the colonial budget and are 
taken into account in our data (in the category “Production support”). Capital expenditure for 
the construction of railway lines was mostly financed publicly and appears in the colonial 
budgets rather than the railway budgets. Posts and telegraphs, which were always public, are 
fully taken into account in our aggregates: their receipts are in the variable “Monopoly 
revenue”, and their expenditure in the variable “Production support”.6 As for the various 
development plans established in the 1950s, their accounts sometimes appear directly in the 
colonial budget, as is the case for the Constantine plan in Algeria, and are sometimes recorded 
in special budgets managed directly by France, as is the case for the special development fund 
created for Sub-Saharan Africa, the FIDES (Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement 
Economique et Social). The expenditure of the FIDES in each year and each colony was 
found in a retrospective document published by IEDES (1964). On the revenue side, because 
the FIDES was financed only by contributions from France and from the colonies, we were 
able to reconstitute the French subsidy by subtracting the colonies’ contributions from the 
total expenditure.7 
First and second-level administrative divisions. Below the colony (corresponding to 
present-day countries), we consider first-level (districts) and second-level (municipalities) 
administrative divisions. The level of decentralization of public expenditure varied within the 
                                                 
5 Each colony of a federation had its own colonial budget, except in AEF between 1935 and 1945, 
where all revenue and expenditure items were written in the federal budget. 
6 The receipts and expenditure of the posts and telegraphs are usually recorded in the colonial budget, 
but in Algeria from 1925, they are recorded in a separate budget, available at the Bibliothèque nationale de 
France between 1925 and 1939. We rely on the summary provided in the statistical yearbooks afterwards (see 
“List of sources”). 
7 The French contributions are also recorded in the French budgets, but in a less systematic way. 
9 
 
French colonial Empire. It was very low in West and Equatorial Africa, and more important in 
North Africa, Madagascar, and Indochina. 
Our figures always take into account first-level administrative divisions. Algerian 
départements (district) started having distinct budgets in 1859, Malagasy provinces in 1931, 
and Moroccan régions in 1939. In Indochina, we use the provincial budget accounts of 
Cochinchina from 1910 on, and all provincial budgets starting in 1931, when a number of 
items of revenue and expenditure were decentralized from colonial to provincial budgets. In 
Tunisia, AOF, AEF, Togo, and Cameroon, first-level administrative divisions (districts) did 
not have budgets of their own. We can see on figure 2 and 3 that the share of first-level 
administrative divisions in total expenditure was significant only in Algeria, Indochina, and 
Madagascar. In Madagascar, the contribution of provincial budgets to total public expenditure 
became particularly important after the decentralization reform of 1946, reaching 50% in 
some years. 
      Table 2: Share of municipalities in total net expenditure and revenue 
      
 
1925 
 
1955 
      
 
Share in 
expenditure 
Share in 
revenue  
Share in 
expenditure 
Share in 
revenue 
           
      Algeria 23.6% 20.5%  21.2% 24.4% 
Morocco n.a. n.a.  7.8% 11.4% 
Tunisia 9.1% 13.7%  6.3% 7.5% 
W. Africa 4.9% 0.2%  n.a. n.a. 
Indochina 1.1% 1.0%  n.a. n.a. 
      France 33.1% n.a. 
 
13.6% n.a. 
            
Sources for France: André et Delorme (1983), INSEE (1966) 
       
Second-level administrative divisions (municipalities) had distinct budgets in North-
Africa and Indochina. In Sub-Saharan Africa, no municipality was empowered to raise 
revenue and allocate expenditure before 1955, with the exception of the four Senegalese 
communes which obtained the same status as metropolitan municipalities: Saint-Louis and 
Gorée (in 1872), Rufisque (in 1880), and Dakar (in 1887). In 1955, 44 new municipalities 
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were created in AOF, AEF, Madagascar, Cameroon and Togo.8 We found some budget 
accounts for second-level administrative divisions, but our series are patchy and incomplete. 
They are therefore not included in our main aggregates, though we make them available in a 
separate variable (see “Variable dictionary”). Table 2 displays the share of municipalities in 
total public expenditure and revenue for North Africa, West Africa, Indochina, and France. 
Municipalities were particularly important in North Africa. In 1955 for instance, they 
represented 7.5% of revenue in Tunisia, 11.4% in Morocco, and 24.4% in Algeria. In the rest 
of the Empire, municipalities did not weigh as much. In 1925, they represented 0.2% of 
revenue and less than 5% of expenditure in West Africa, and about 1% of expenditure and 
revenue in Indochina (we could not find data for 1955). 
Definitive and provisional accounts. Several types of documents were produced 
during the budget process: provisional accounts (usually called “Budgets”) were previsions 
produced in advance of the fiscal year, while definitive accounts (usually called “Comptes 
défnitifs”) were published after the end of the fiscal year and recorded the actual amounts 
collected and spent. Whenever possible, we rely on definitive accounts, but use provisional 
accounts in a few years when definitive accounts are missing. Provisional accounts are 
typically much more detailed, and notably contain information on wages and the number of 
employees, which is why we also use them to collect information on average public sector 
wages and the size of the civil service (see “Personnel data” below). For the 97 colony-years 
in common between the two datasets, we can check the discrepancy between provisional and 
definitive accounts: provisional accounts underestimate final expenditure by 4% on average 
and final revenue by 14% on average (figure 4). When provisional or definitive accounts are 
                                                 
8 France. Journal official de la République française du 19 novembre 1955. Paris: Imprimerie des 
Journaux officiels,  1955, p. 11274. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?id=JORFTEXT000000313008  
Figure 4: Distribution of revenue and expenditure in excess of provision 
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not available, we sometimes use Statistical Yearbooks (Annuaires Statistiques) or other 
official publications, which present definitive figures (see the “list of sources” below). 
Social security. Though social security transfers are not part of our main aggregates, 
we provide separate figures for social security contributions and benefits. There was no social 
security in the French colonial Empire before 1945. After 1945, social security funds were 
introduced in the settler colonies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, but not in the colonies of 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia.9 The accounts of various social security funds were 
found in the statistical abstracts of the relevant colonies.  
Postcolonial data. To extend the dataset to the postcolonial period, we use mainly the 
reports of the Monetary Committee of the Franc Zone (Comité Monétaire de la Zone Franc, 
various dates), and the OECD development assistance committee (OECD-DAC) data (OECD, 
2017). The information contained in the Franc Zone reports is not as detailed as the 
information contained in the budget accounts of various colonies. In consequence, after 
independence, aggregate revenue net of subsidies and loans cannot systematically be broken 
down into different tax instruments, and aggregate expenditure net of subsidies and loans 
cannot systematically be broken down into different sectors. Guinea gained its independence 
from France in 1958 and cut ties with the former colonizer, refusing to be part of the 
monetary union headed by France. As a result, Guinean public finances are not recorded in 
the Franc Zone reports, and we use the figures given in Amin (1971) instead. 
 
Table 3: Development expenditure in the 1960, comparison of different 
sources 
(current FCFA billions) Development plan(1) Franc zone report(2) 
   Senegal  (1969) 10.92 4.66 
Haute-Volta(1967-1970) 19.76 3.30 
Madagascar (1964-1966) 39.38 21.52 
   
(1) Sources: Haute-Volta, Direction du plan et des études de développement (1971);  
Madagascar, Commissariat général au plan (1965-69); Sénégal, Secrétariat d'Etat au 
plan (1972). 
(2) Sources : Comité monétaire de la Zone Franc (various dates) 
 
One other important limitation of the Franc Zone reports is that they do not 
systematically take into account the budgets of various development funds. This is not a 
                                                 
9 Algeria had a family allowance fund (Caisse d’allocations familiales) and a social security fund 
(Caisse de sécurité sociale). Morocco had a help fund (Caisse d’aides) later renamed social security fund 
(Caisse de sécurité sociale). Tunisia had a family allowance fund (Caisse d’allocations familiales).  
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problem to estimate fiscal revenue, as these funds were typically financed by loans and aid, 
but this is a problem to estimate net expenditure. Table 3 compares development (capital) 
expenditure in the few development plans budget accounts we were able to find with 
development expenditure in the Franc Zone reports in the corresponding years. Franc Zone 
reports appear to systematically miss a large share of development expenditure, about half in 
Senegal (1969) and Madagascar (1964-1966), more than 80% in Haute-Volta (present-day 
Burkina Faso) between 1967 and 1970. 
To approximate development expenditure in the 1960s, we assume that they were 
mostly financed by international aid (grants and loans) and complement the Zone Franc 
reports with the OECD-DAC dataset. Net public expenditure in a given country after 1960 is 
computed as total expenditure minus debt service as recorded in Franc Zone reports, minus all 
external loans and subsidies received by the country recorded in the Franc Zone report (except 
when we know these emanate from a private source or a non-OECD country), plus net OECD 
ODA (loans and grants) received by the country.10 This does not affect our measure of net 
revenue, which is simply the sum of fiscal revenue and revenue of industrial operations, 
domains and monopolies recorded in the Franc Zone reports.11 
There are other discrepancies between the series built using colonial budget accounts 
and the postcolonial series. Franc Zone reports to not record the auxiliary accounts of 
parastatal sectors such as posts and telecommunications. In Tunisia between 1961 and 1966, 
we were able to take into account the expenditure and revenue of the posts and 
telecommunications service recorded in the statistical yearbook of Tunisia 1964-1965 
(Tunisia, Secrétariat d’Etat au plan et aux finances, 1964-1965). Franc Zone reports do not 
always take into account the revenue and expenditure of first-level administrative divisions. It 
is an important concern for Madagascar only, where the share of provinces in total public 
expenditure and revenue was quite high in the 1950s (see figure 3, panel 4). Malagasy 
provincial accounts are recorded in the Franc Zone reports until 1960. Between 1963 and 
1966, we find them in Madagascar, Commissariat général au plan (1965-1969). Other years 
are extrapolated (see “Missing data” below). 
                                                 
10 On top of aid to individual countries, the OECD-DAC dataset records regional aid allocated to world 
regions such as “Africa, South of Sahara” or “Africa, North of Sahara.” We allocate regional aid to each 
individual country in proportion of its share in total allocated aid. Before 1964, French aid to Sub-Saharan Africa 
is not broken down by individual countries at all. We allocate it to each individual country in proportion of its 
share in 1964 total allocated French aid to Sub-Saharan African countries. 
11 As Franc Zone reports become less precise in the end of the 1960s, the revenue of industrial 
operations, domains and monopolies often becomes missing (fiscal revenue is always given). To avoid a break in 
the series, we extrapolate the revenue of industrial operations, domains and monopolies using their share in total 
net revenue the last year it was available. 
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Comparison with Metropolitan France. For comparisons with Metropolitan France, 
we use the series on the expenditure of the central government and local governments 
(départements and communes) in André and Delorme (1983). For the years 1925 and 1955, 
we add the expenditure of posts and telegraphs from annual reports (see “list of sources” 
below). André and Delorme (1983) give the sectoral allocation of expenditure for the central 
government only. Their categorization is slightly different from ours, except for education. 
We allocate “public authorities” to general administration, “social action” to health, 
“transport” and “housing” to infrastructure, and “agriculture” and “trade and manufacturing” 
to production support, to which we add the expenditure of posts and telegraphs. We separate 
civilian expenditure from military expenditure (“defense” and “veterans”). We remove debt 
service to get as close as possible to our definition of Net (civilian) Public expenditure (see 
“variable dictionary” below). We assume that debt service represented 10% of the expenditure 
of local governments in 1925 and 5% in 1955 (André and Delorme 1983, p. 75). André and 
Delorme (1983) also give figures for social security benefits. On the revenue side, we assume 
that social security contributions are equal to social security benefits.  
Net public revenue and the fiscal structure of the central government in 1925 and 1955 
is taken from INSEE (1966, p. 486-87) and from the annual reports of posts and telegraphs. 
Revenue of départements and communes is found in INSEE (1966, pp. 504-505, year 1923 for 
communes). 
MISSING DATA 
This section details the different assumptions and extrapolations made in order to 
consolidate various data and avoid breaks in statistical series when particular budget accounts 
could not be found. 
Colonial budget accounts. For Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Indochina, Madagascar 
and Cameroon, we set up the goal of collecting data at an annual frequency, though we 
sometimes could not find budget accounts for a particular year. For the two African 
federations (AOF and AEF), we collected federal budget accounts (budgets généraux) every 
year, but colonial budget accounts (budgets locaux) every three years only. We also collected 
data on Togo every three years only. Aggregating expenditure and revenue at the level of the 
federation (AOF, AEF, and Indochinese Union) requires having the budget accounts of all the 
colonies of the federation in a given year. When we could not find the budget account of a 
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colony, we used the account of an adjacent year.12 In rare cases, we could not find adjacent 
years: budget accounts of the colony of French Soudan (AOF, present day Mali) are missing 
between 1922 and 1928 and in 1946, the budget accounts of Gabon (AEF) are missing in 
1947 and 1949, and the one of Oubangui-Chari (AEF) is missing in 1954. In these cases, we 
make an educated guess for the revenue and expenditure of the missing colony using its share 
in the total revenue and expenditure of the federation in a close enough year.13 For French 
Soudan in 1946, we know total revenue and expenditure (recapitulated in the 1949 budget), 
and we break them down into different items of revenue and expenditure using the 
distribution of 1949. We could not find the budget accounts of Haute-Volta in 1958, but we 
use the information recorded in the Franc Zone report for that year. We infer the sectoral 
allocation of expenditure, not given in the Franc Zone report, using the allocation of 1956. 
There is some missing information in Morocco’s special budget (“Budget spécial”, an 
investment budget accounting for an average 7% of total expenditure). Between 1926 and 
1931, and in 1953, our source gives only revenue, and not expenditure. We set expenditure 
equal to revenue. Between 1932 and 1937, our source gives only the total expenditure of the 
special budget, and the sectoral allocation is not given. Between 1926 and 1937, we use the 
sectoral allocation of 1938. In 1953, we use the sectoral allocation of 1952.  
Metropolitan budget accounts. In Metropolitan budget accounts (Ministry of the 
Colonies and Ministry of War) we collected, for each colonial territory, military expenditure, 
subsidies to private companies, infrastructure expenditure, and health expenditure. Residual 
expenditure was allocated to each category in proportion of its weight in allocated expenditure 
in the same year. Expenditure that was not allocated to a specific territory was allocated to 
each territory in proportion of its weight in geographically allocated expenditure.14 In years 
                                                 
12 In AOF, affected years and budget accounts are: Cote d’Ivoire (1917 instead of 1916 and 1926 
instead of 1925), Dahomey (1944 instead of 1943 and 1957 instead of 1958), Haute Volta (1920 instead of 1919, 
1929 instead of 1928, and 1954 instead of 1955), Niger (1942 instead of 1943), Senegal (1959 instead of 1958), 
French Soudan (1932 instead of 1931). In AEF: budget général (1903 instead of 1904), Gabon (1953 instead of 
1954), Oubangui-Chari (1912 instead of 1913), Tchad (1912 instead of 1913). In Indochina: Annam (1945 
instead of 1946), Cambodia (1945 instead of 1946), Cochinchina (1906 instead of 1907), Laos (1897 instead of 
1896 and 1902 instead of 1901, 1945 instead of 1946), Tonkin (1945 instead of 1946), PMS region (1954 instead 
of 1953), municipalities (1942 instead of 1943). 
13 We use the shares of 1919 for French Soudan 1922 and 1925, the shares of 1931 for French Soudan 
1928, the shares of 1955 for Togo and Haute Volta 1958, and the shares of 1952 for Gabon 1947 and 1949, and 
Oubangui-Chari 1954. 
14 For strictly military expenditure, the bulk of expenditure, we followed the geographical allocation of 
the same year. For subsidies to private companies, infrastructure and health expenditure, which are more volatile, 
we followed the average geographical allocation of the decade. 
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were expenditure was not allocated geographically at all, we followed the geographical 
allocation of a close enough year.15 
We collected Metropolitan budget accounts every year systematically from 1870 
onwards. Before this date, we collected data every 3 years for the Ministry of War, and every 
10 years for the Ministry of the Colonies. Budget accounts are also missing for a handful of 
years after 1870. In order to have consistent estimates, we filled in the missing years using 
linear interpolation.16 After 1939, budget accounts of the Ministry of War are missing for all 
years except 1946. We do not try to fill in the gap during World War II (1940-1945), when 
the North Africa was a battleground of the fight between Vichy France and Free France.17 We 
found the military expenditure of Metropolitan France in 1954, 1957 and 1961 Algeria in 
Amin (1966), and interpolated interim years using the number of soldiers present in Algeria 
(including conscripts, using Mahieu 2001). French military expenditure in 1953 Tunisia are 
also from Amin (1966), and we kept this figure constant in real terms until 1956. French 
military expenditure in 1951 Morocco are from Amin (1966). Between 1952 and 1956, we 
use balance of payments data (Morocco, 1960), assuming that 90% of the public expenditure 
paid by Metropolitan France were for the military. Though France fought the Cameroonian 
independentists starting in 1955 (Domergue et al. 2011), the cost of this “hidden war” does 
not appear isolately in the accounts of the Ministry of the Colonies. Because Cameroon was a 
trust territory of the U.N., France was in theory not allowed to undertake military expenditure 
there. We do not know whether the cost of the Cameroonian war is included in the total 
French colonial military expenditure. 
As can be seen in figures 2 and 3, the direct, non-military expenditure of Metropolitan 
ministries was only important in the early colonial period (especially in Algeria), and 
gradually lost importance over time. Subsidies to colonial government were more important, 
                                                 
15 In the budget accounts of the Ministry of the Colonies, the geographical allocation of expenditure is 
not given between 1932 and 1959 (except for Indochina 1950-54 and AOF 1950-51). We allocated military 
expenditure using the geographical allocation of 1931. For non-military expenditure (subsidies, health and 
infrastructure), we followed the geographical allocation of the period 1920-1931. In the budget accounts of the 
Ministry of War, the geographical allocation does not distinguish between Algeria and Tunisia in 1915, 1920-21, 
and 1928-1937. We allocated between the two territories using the proportions of 1914. In 1938 and 1939, the 
accounts of the Ministry of War give expenditure for the whole of North Africa. We allocated between Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia using the proportions of 1937. Finally, in 1946, the accounts of the Ministry of War give 
one figure for North Africa and the Middle East. We allocated between the different colonies using the 
proportions of 1939. 
16 Missing years are, for the Ministry of the Colonies, 1884, 1886 (AEF only), 1888, 1889, 1892, 1893, 
1896 (Madagascar only), 1900 and 1945, and, for the Ministry of War, 1877-1879, 1889, 1892, 1902 (except 
Indochina), 1906, 1914 (Morocco only), 1916-1919, 1930, 1931. 
17 For the Ministry of the Colonies, responsible for military expenditure outside North Africa, our 
source (the statistical yearbook of the French Union) gives us expenditure during World War II, including the 
expenditure of Free France (comité français de la libération nationale), but strictly military expenditure are 
missing in 1940 and 1941. 
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especially after 1945 (see main paper), but we do not rely on Metropolitan budget accounts to 
estimate them. Direct military expenditure of Metropolitan ministries were even more 
important (see main text), and it is important to keep in mind that, after 1939, our figures are 
only rough estimates. 
First-level administrative divisions. We use linear interpolation to fill in gaps in our 
public finance series for first-level administrative divisions: Malagasy provinces between 
1932 and 1937 and between 1960 and 1963, Cochinchinese provinces between 1923 and 
1930, Algerian départements between 1938 and 1948, Moroccan régions between 1940 and 
1944 and between 1946 and 1948. These assumptions are quite innocuous to our final 
aggregates because, except in Madagascar after WW2, these budget accounts never represent 
a large share of total public expenditure and revenue (figures 2 and 3). In Madagascar in 
1952, the budget accounts of the province of Tananarive are missing: we make an educated 
guess using the share of Tananarive in total provincial expenditure and revenue in 1951. We 
extrapolate the revenue and expenditure of Malagasy provinces between 1967 and 1970 by 
assuming that the share of provinces in total revenue and expenditure was the same as in 
1966. We extrapolate the revenue and expenditure of Malian provinces between 1960 and 
1965 by assuming that the share of provinces in total revenue was the same as in 1966. 
For Algerian départements between 1859 and 1889, our source gives us only 
aggregate expenditure and revenue. We infer the fiscal structure and sectoral allocation of 
expenditure using the distribution of 1892. 
In the budget accounts of Malagasy provinces between 1947 and 1951, some items of 
revenue are missing (indirect taxes, revenue of industrial operations and administrative 
services). We infer them using their shares in total revenue in 1952 (1956 for the province of 
Tananarive). 
Post-independence budget accounts. In Tunisia, posts and telegraphs expenditure is 
missing in the Franc Zone reports. We use the figures in Tunisia’s statistical yearbook to fill 
in the gaps (see “list of sources” below). From 1958 to 1960, we extrapolate the expenditure 
of posts and telegraphs assuming that their share in total expenditure was the same than in 
1961. 
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PERSONNEL DATA 
Provisional budget accounts are usually more detailed than definitive accounts, which 
allow us to collect some personnel data, such as total number of employees and total personal 
expenditure per sector. Because counting the total number of employees represents an 
important collection effort, we limited ourselves to 5 dates as close as possible to 1913, 1925, 
1937, 1949, 1955, and 1960.18 In each sector, we computed the average wage by dividing 
total personnel expenditure by the number of employees. We also tried to collect 5 specific 
wages in a systematic way: the governor’s wage, wages of the highest and lowest paid nurse, 
and wages of the highest and lowest paid teacher. 
Provisional budget accounts are very detailed and personnel expenditure can in the 
majority of cases be matched to an exact number of workers, so that the average wage can be 
computed. However, some items of personnel expenditure are not attached to a precise 
number of employees. In that case, we infer the corresponding number of employees by 
dividing the monetary amount by the average wage of the sector, or, when we can infer that 
these are low-paying jobs such as servants or manual workers, by the average of the lowest 
wages in the education and health sectors. Figure 5 and 6 display for each region the number 
of government employees enumerated in the budget accounts and the number of government 
employees according to our computations. The discrepancy between the two series is never 
very important. 
Personnel data was collected for central budgets only (federal and colonial in the case 
of federations), which means that our personnel figure do not include the workers paid for 
public works on auxiliary budgets, nor the employees paid on the budget accounts of first-
level administrative divisions. This is particularly problematic in Indochina and in 
Madagascar. In Indochina, the number of employees of the federal and colonial governments 
decreased after the decentralization reform of 1931 which gave more spending responsibilities 
to provinces. The drop in the number of government employees per 1,000 inhabitants from 
more than 1.7 to less than 1.4 between 1925 and 1937 is therefore misleading (figure 5). In 
Madagascar, the decentralization reform of 1946 considerably increased the share of 
provinces in total public expenditure, explaining the fall in the number of government 
employees between 1938 and 1955 (figure 6).  
 
                                                 
18 Only dates before World War II for Indochina. 
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In West and Central Africa, the number of government employees also falls between 
1955 and 1960 (figure 6 again), after the colonial territories had been granted more autonomy 
by the loi cadre of 1956 and the federation had been dismantled in 1959. The magnitude of 
the decrease cannot be only explained by the departure of French civil servants. We do not 
know whether it corresponds to an actual drop in the number of public employees or to some 
decentralization, like in the case of Madagascar, in a context of rapid administrative 
transformation.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Estimated vs. enumerated number of government employees  
in North Africa and Indochina 
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Aggregation and year substitutions. For Indochina, West and Equatorial Africa, 
figures are aggregated at the level of the federation. As with monetary expenditure, when we 
could not find provisional budget accounts for a particular colony in a given year, we used the 
accounts of a close enough year.19 We could not find the budget account of French Soudan 
                                                 
19 In AOF, affected years and budget accounts are: budget général (1936 instead of 1937), Cote d’Ivoire 
(1926 instead of 1925), Dahomey (1957 instead of 1960), Guinée (1950 insteadof 1949), Mauritania (1958 
instead of 1960), and Niger (1958 instead of 1960). .In AEF: Gabon (1958 instead of 1960), Oubangui-Chari 
(1959 instead of 1960), and Tchad (1958 instead of 1960). In Indochina: budget général (1914 instead of 1913), 
Cochinchina (1915 instead of 1915 and 1924 instead of 1925). 
 
Figure 6: Estimated vs. enumerated number of government employees in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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(present-day Mali) in 1925, 1949 and 1960. In these years in AOF, average wages per sector 
do not take French Soudan/Mali into account. In 1925 and 1949, total employment in AOF is 
computed using the share of Soudan in the total employment of the federation in 1937 and 
1955. In 1960, aggregate figures for AOF are computed without Soudan/Mali, and without 
Guinea — in 1958, the federation of AOF was dissolved, and Guinea gained independence.  
We could not find the budget account of Chad in 1949: average wages per sector in AEF do 
not take Chad into account for this year, and total employment in AEF is computed using the 
share of Chad in the total employment of the federation in 1955. 
Comparison with Metropolitan France.  For the years 1925 and 1955, we compute 
public employment and average wage per sector for the central government of Metropolitan 
France. Public employment by category in 1922 and 1956 is given in INSEE (1966, p. 114). 
The wage bill by sector in 1923 and 1956 is given in André and Delorme (1983, pp. 734 and 
739). The wage bill of posts and telegraphs in 1925 and 1955 is given in the annual reports of 
posts and telegraphs. We use the growth rate of total population to extrapolate the total 
number of employees and the wage bill for the relevant years (1925 and 1955).  
POPULATION, PRICES, AND GDP 
POPULATION 
To produce comparable estimates of expenditure and revenue per capita, we gathered 
data on total population. We also gathered data on European and other ethnic minority 
populations (Jews in North Africa, Chinese in Indochina, Chinese and Indians in 
Madagascar). For a handful of years (1925, 1945, and 1955), we estimated the population 
share of 15-64-year-olds (in order to express public wages in units of GDP per worker). For 
the years 1850, 1925 and 1855, we also estimated urbanization rates. The “Population” 
section of the “List of sources” below gives a more detailed list of all references used and 
where to find them. 
Algeria 
In Algeria, population in 1850 comes from CICRED (1974a). Population figures from 
the censuses of 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, 1936, 1948 and 1954 come from the 1955 statistical 
yearbook of Algeria (Algeria, Sous-direction des statistiques, 1955). Population in 1960 
comes from the 1960 UN demographic yearbook (United Nations, 1960). Population in 1966 
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comes from CICRED (1974a). Population from 1977 comes from The World Bank (2017).20 
European population is defined as non-Muslim population, comprising French citizens 
(including Algerian Jews who were granted French citizenship by the 1870 Crémieux decree) 
and other Europeans. Population figures for non-Muslims are more detailed and come from 
the Algerian statistical yearbooks of 1933, 1948-1949 and 1955 (Algeria, Sous-direction des 
statistiques, 1933, 1948-49, 1955) who present retrospective figures as well as contemporary 
ones. Figures for 1958-1960 come from the 1961 and 1962 French statistical yearbooks 
(INSEE, 1961 & 1962). 1960 non-Muslim population comes from CICRED (1974a). 
Population figures between two dates are estimated by exponential interpolation, except for 1) 
Muslim population before 1850, where we assume a growth rate of 0.5% per year, the rate 
given by CICRED (1974a) between 1850 and 1866; 2) Muslim population between 1866 and 
1911, where our figures reflect a decrease in population between 1866 and 1872 due to 
epidemics and the Kabyle revolt of 1871-187221; 3) Muslim population between 1954 and 
1960, where we take into accounts the temporary departure of Algerian refugees to Tunisia 
and Morocco (UNHCR 2000); 4) non-Muslim population between  1960 and 1966, where our 
figures reflect the departure of 800,000 French settlers in 1962.  
The share of 15-64-year-olds in the non-European population comes from CICRED 
(1974a). The share in 1955 is assumed to be equal to the share of 1954 from CICRED 
(1974a). The share in 1925 is extrapolated using the share in 1936 and the trend between 1936 
and 1948. The share of 15-59-year-olds in the European population is given in the statistical 
yearbooks of Algeria, and we assume that the share of 60-64-year-olds is the same as in 
Metropolitan France.  
Urban population figures come from Eggiman (1999) for 1850, from the population 
census of 1926 for 1925, and from the population census of 1954 for 1955 (46 communes). 
 
Morocco 
During the colonial period starting in 1912, Morocco was divided between a French 
Protectorate and a Spanish Protectorate in the North representing about a tenth of total 
population.22 Morocco gained its independence from France in 1956 and Moroccan control 
over (part of) the Spanish zone was restored in 1958. Our population estimates comprise only 
                                                 
20 To stay consistent with the colonial figures, which never comprise military population, we subtract 
from the WDI figures estimates of military population (representing around 1% of total population). 
21 If we assume again a population growth rate of 0.5% a year between 1872 and the first reliable 
population census of 1911, we find that population decreased by 12% between 1866 and 1872. 
22 The Spanish were also granted a Protectorate in the South, but its population was negligible. 
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the southern (French) zone until 1957, and both zones from 1958 onwards. Population in 1936 
comes from CICRED (1974b). Earlier population figures are extrapolated backwards using 
the population growth rates of Frankema and Jerven (2014). Population in 1952 comes from 
Morocco (1960). Population in 1960 and 1971 comes from CICRED (1974b). Population 
after 1982 comes from The World Bank (2017). European population is French population 
(unlike in Algeria, Moroccan Jews were not granted French citizenship), given by the 
Moroccan statistical yearbook in 1921, 1926, 1931, 1936, 1947, and 1952 (Morocco, various 
dates). Jewish population comes from CICRED (1974b), Morocco (1960) and Moroccan 
statistical Yearbooks (Morocco, various dates). Population figures between two dates are 
estimated by exponential interpolation.  
The shares of 15-64-year-olds in the European and non-European population are 
assumed to be the same as in Tunisia. 
Urban population figures come from Eggiman (1999) for 1850 and for 1925 
(interpolation of 1920 and 1930 figures), and from Eggiman (1999) and The World Bank 
(2017) for 1955 (average of Eggiman’s figure for 1950 and World Bank figure for 1960). 
Tunisia  
In Tunisia, population in 1911 comes from the 1947 statistical yearbook (Tunisia, 
Institut national de la statistique, 1947).23 Earlier population figures are extrapolated 
backwards using a yearly growth rate of 0.7%, fitting the estimates given by CICRED 
(1974c). Population figures in 1921, 1926, 1931, 1936, 1946, 1956, 1966, and 1971-1973 
come from CICRED (1974c). Population after 1971 comes from The World Bank (2017). 
European population is mostly French, Italian, and Maltese (unlike in Algeria, Tunisian Jews 
were not granted French citizenship). It is given by the 1947 Tunisian statistical yearbook for 
1880, 1886, 1891, 1896, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, 1936, and 1946. It is given by the 
1957/58 statistical yearbook for 1956. It is given by CICRED (1974c) for 1961 and 1966. 
Jewish population comes from Tunisian statistical yearbooks. Population figures between two 
dates are estimated by exponential interpolation.  
The share of 15-64 year olds in the Muslim population comes from CICRED (1974c). 
The share in 1955 is assumed to be equal to the share of 1956 from CICRED (1974a). The 
share in 1925 is extrapolated from the share in 1946 using the evolution of the share of 15-64-
year-olds in the Muslim population of Algeria between 1925 and 1946. The share of 15-59-
                                                 
23 Because colonial population figures tend to underestimate population, we multiply the 1911 
population figure by the ratio of the CICRED (1974) figure over the 1947 statistical yearbook figure in 1921, a 
year for which we have both figures. 
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year-olds in the European population is given in the statistical yearbooks of Tunisia, and we 
assume that the share of 60-64-year-olds is the same as in Metropolitan France.  
Urban population figures come from Eggiman (1999) for 1850, from the population 
census of 1921 for 1925, and from the population census of 1956 for 1955 (cities above 
10,000 inhabitants). 
Indochina  
In Indochina, population figures for Vietnam (Cochinchina, Annam, and Tonkin) 
come from Bassino (2000) and Banens (2000). For Cambodia and Laos, we use The World 
Bank (2017) after 1960. Before 1960, population figures are extrapolated backwards using the 
population growth rate of Vietnam. The figures thus obtained are slightly larger than the ones 
provided in the statistical yearbooks of French Indochina (French Indochina, Bureau de la 
statistique générale, various dates). European population and Chinese population are given by 
the statistical yearbooks of French Indochina. European population is composed mostly of 
French, but the figures given by statistical yearbooks also include a small minority of 
Americans and Japanese.  
The share of 15-64-year-olds in the non-European population comes from Banens 
(2000). The share of 15-64-year-olds in the European population comes from the 1921 
population census and the 1948 statistical yearbook of Indochina and is extrapolated to 1925, 
1945 and 1955.  
Urban population figures come from Chandler (1987) for 1850, for 1925 from an 
interpolation of the population censuses of 1921 and 1931, and for 1955 from a backward 
interpolation of the World Development Indicators figure of 1960. 
West and Central Africa 
Population in Afrique Occidentale Française, Afrique Equatoriale Française, Togo 
and Cameroon comes from Frankema and Jerven (2014) between 1850 and 1960 and from 
The World Bank (2017) after 1960. The population given by Frankema and Jerven (2014) for 
Mali and Niger at independence in 1960 is lower than the population given by the World 
Bank. We therefore opted for higher population growth rates from 1948 to 1960 in order to 
make the two series consistent. Frankema and Jerven (2014) give figures for African countries 
in their post-independence borders, but French Cameroon was smaller during the colonial 
period because it was reunited with former British Cameroon in 1961. We adjust colonial 
population figures by removing 15% of French Cameroon’s population, which corresponds to 
the ratio obtained by combining French and British colonial estimations (France, Ministère de 
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la France d’Outre-mer, 1959; Great Britain, Colonial Office, various dates). European 
population comes from the statistical yearbooks of AOF and AEF, and, for Togo and 
Cameroon, from France, Ministère de la France d’Outre-mer (1959).  
The share of 15-64-year-olds in the European population in 1925 and 1955 is obtained 
by averaging the Algerian and Tunisian shares. The share of 15-64-year-olds in the non-
European population in 1925 is supposed to be equal to the Algerian share (Muslim 
population). The share of 15-60-year-olds in the non-European population in 1955 is a 
weighted average (by total population) of the country-level estimates reported by Tabutin & 
Schoumaker (2004) for the year 1950 (Table A.11). The relative share of 60-64-year-olds is 
assumed to be the same as in 1954 Algeria (Muslim population).  
Urban population figures come from Eggiman (1999) for 1850, from an exponential 
interpolation of Africapolis data for 1920 and 1930 for 1925 AOF and Togo24, from Eggiman 
again for 1925 AEF and Cameroon (1930 figures extrapolated backward), and The World 
Bank (2017) for 1955 (1960 figures).  
Madagascar 
In Madagascar, population comes from the statistical yearbooks of Madagascar and 
from The World Bank (2017) after 1970. Population between two dates is estimated by 
exponential interpolation. Before 1906, we extrapolate backwards using the population 
growth rate of 0.3% given by Frankema and Jerven (2014). European population and Asian 
population are given in statistical yearbooks and France, Ministère de la France d’Outre-mer 
(1959). 
The share of 15-64-year-olds in the European population in 1925 and 1955 is obtained 
by averaging the Algerian and Tunisian shares. The share of 15-64-year-olds in the non-
European population in 1925 is supposed to be equal to the Algerian share (Muslim 
population). The share of 15-60-year-olds in the non-European population in 1955 is the 
estimate reported by Tabutin & Schoumaker (2004) for the year 1950. The relative share of 
60-64-year-olds is assumed to be the same as in 1954 Algeria (Muslim population). 
Urban population figures come from Eggiman (1999) for 1850 and for 1925 
(interpolation of 1920 and 1930 figures), and from Eggiman and The World Bank (2017) for 
1955 (average of Eggiman’s figure for 1950 and World Bank figure for 1960). 
                                                 
24 We thank Eric Denis (UMR Géographie-Cités) and the Africapolis project for sharing their 
unpublished data on West African cities for the years before 1950. 
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Metropolitan France 
In Metropolitan France, total population comes from Vallin and Meslé (2001) and 
population censuses. The share of 15-64-year-olds in total population comes from INSEE 
(1966). 
PRICES 
In Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, monetary amounts collected in various budget 
sources are usually given in French francs. Just after World War II, a new currency was 
introduced in the colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa, the CFA franc (“franc des colonies 
françaises d’Afrique”), worth 1.7 Metropolitan francs. It was worth 2 Metropolitan francs 
from 1948 onwards. Our own series show that the official exchange rate roughly compensated 
for the inflation differential between Metropolitan France and French West Africa during 
World War II, but that the CFA franc was likely overvalued in French Equatorial Africa, 
Cameroon and Madagascar. In the French Indochinese Union, the official currency from 1884 
onwards was the piastre, a silver currency similar in weight to the Mexican peso and the 
Trade dollar. The piastre remained on a silver standard until 1920 and was then pegged to the 
franc at a variable rate. In 1930, the exchange rate was fixed at 1 piastre for 10 francs. After 
the Second World War and the Japanese occupation, the exchange rate was fixed at 1 piastre 
for 17 francs, but it was largely overvalued, as evidenced by a black market exchange rate of 
less than 10 francs. Our own series show that inflation was far greater in Indochina than in 
Metropolitan France during the independence war years. 
When considering public finance series, how should we deflate and adjust for 
purchasing power parity? The answer partly depends on the type of questions asked, and 
practical solutions are greatly constrained by the availability of price and wage data for the 
period considered. Under the angle of revenue, it makes sense to use something akin to a GDP 
deflator, especially when considering the share of public revenue in GDP as an indicator of 
fiscal capacity. Because of the limited availability of price data, we deflate and adjust for 
purchasing power using a basket of consumer goods. Under the angle of expenditure, if we 
want to compare across time and across space the quantity of public goods and services 
provided, a specific public spending deflator would be more appropriate, especially for taking 
into account differences in public sector wages. Building such a deflator would require 
detailed information on the skill composition of government sector jobs and corresponding 
salary scales. The lack of such detailed data leads us to deflate public expenditure with the 
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same Consumer Price Index (CPI) deflator we use for public revenue. This has the additional 
advantage of simplicity: because expenditure and revenue are expressed in the same unit of 
account, deficits can be computed by subtracting net expenditure from net revenue. However, 
in our cross country comparisons as well as in our time series, a large share of the variation in 
public expenditure is accounted for by differences in public sector wages, something we 
evidence by also providing series on the number of government employees per capita and on 
average wages. In fact, every possible public expenditure deflator taking into account public 
sector wages will be a weighted average of two extreme scenarios: in the first one (CPI based 
adjustment), we assume that differences in real wages are a perfect indicator of differences in 
labour productivity, in the second one (number of employees per head), we give the same 
value to each government job, regardless of differences in skills and productivity.  
In the end, we adjust all our monetary aggregates using the following method: we use 
local CPIs to express monetary amounts in 1937 local currency (francs and piastres), and then 
use the relative cost of a basket of goods to adjust for purchasing power parity in 1937. Local 
CPIs were found in various statistical abstracts (see the “Prices” section of the “List of 
sources” below). The earliest ones start in 1913, and most of them start in 1938. Before this 
date, we convert monetary amounts in French francs and deflate using a French GDP deflator 
obtained by chaining the INSEE deflator after 1949, Villa (1997) between 1900 and 1948, and 
Toutain (1987) before 1900. The conversion matters only for Indochina, as in all other 
colonies before World War II, the official currency was the French franc. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa (AOF, AEF, Togo, Cameroun and Madagascar), we could not find information on 
price inflation in the second half of the 1950s. We infer price inflation between 1953 and 
1960 by taking the difference between the nominal GDP growth and real GDP growth (see 
section on GDP below).25 After World War II, we rely on local CPIs from The World Bank 
(2017). 
Figure 7 compares the evolution of prices in France and its colonial empire between 
1939 and 1960. The first panel displays the evolution of local consumer price indices in 
France and the North African territories of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. During WW2, 
inflation was higher in North Africa than in Metropolitan France, yet in Algeria prices had 
converged to the level of Metropolitan France in 1954, and were slightly lower afterwards. In 
Tunisia, the CPI converged in 1960 only, that is after independence, and in Morocco, it had 
                                                 
25 Nominal GDP in 1953 is from France, Direction des Affaires économiques et du Plan du ministère de 
la France d’outre-mer (1955), nominal GDP in 1960 is from The World Bank (2017). Real GDP growth in the 
1950s is from the Maddison Project. In Togo, we did not find nominal GDP figures nor prices before 1960. 
Before this date, inflation is assumed to be the same as in AOF. 
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not converged in 1960. 1937-1946 inflation was lower in France’s Sub-Saharan possessions 
(panel 2). Madagascar was an exception, as its CPI was only slightly lower than that of France 
at the end of the war. The introduction of the CFA franc in December 1945, worth 1.7 
Metropolitan francs, and its revaluation in 1948 to 2 Metropolitan francs, compensated 
exactly for the accumulated inflation differential in 1948, for all Sub-Saharan territories 
except Madagascar. Between 1948 and 1960, prices caught up with Metropolitan levels, 
especially in AEF, and it seems that the CFA franc turned strongly overvalued. In Indochina 
(panel 3), the divergence between the 2 price indices is very wide, especially after World War 
2. Despite this inflation differential, the exchange rate was fixed a 1 Indochinese piastre for 
10 francs from 1930 to 1945, and was increased instead of decreased in 1945, at 1 piastre for 
17 francs. The discrepancy between the official exchange rate and the black market rate gave 
rise to the trafficking documented in Despuech (1953). The rate of 1 for 10 was restored in 
1953. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Inflation differential between France and its colonies 
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Once we have expressed all monetary amounts in 1937 local currency using the local CPIs, 
we adjust for purchasing power parity (PPP) in 1937 using the relative cost of a basket of 
good. The products and weights used (displayed in table 4) closely follow those used by the 
French statistical office in the 1950s (INSEE, 1951).26 They match the consumption pattern of 
a European or a member of the colonized elite. Table 5 presents the price of our basket of 
goods relative to Algeria, using the official conversion rate for the piastre.27 In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where the Metropolitan franc was used in 1937, we actually would not be far off to 
assume that one franc had the same purchasing power everywhere. In Indochina, the 
purchasing power of the franc implied by the official exchange rate of 10 francs for a piastre 
is far greater than in the rest of the Empire. 
Table 4: products and weights used to adjust 
for PPP in 1938 
Product Weight 
Starch (flour, rice) 11 
Meat (chicken, beef) 18.4 
Eggs 14.5 
Cooking oil 3.8 
Grocery (sugar, salt) 12.1 
Petroleum 3.4 
Electricity 0.7 
Soap 8.2 
Shoes 12.4 
Haircut 15.5 
Total 100.0 
 
Table 5: Price of the consumer basket 
relative to Algeria in the French Empire 
Algeria 1.00 
Morocco 0.88 
Tunisia 0.95 
Indochina 0.62 
West Africa 0.92 
Equatorial Africa 0.93 
Cameroon 0.83 
Madagascar 0.81 
                                                 
26 Since we always consider relative prices of baskets of goods, there is no need to specify units and 
quantities. 
27 We assume that in 1937, the price level in Algeria was very close to the price level in Metropolitan 
France. 
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GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
Though evidence on historical GDP in Africa is scarce, some measure of GDP is 
needed to put fiscal figures in economic context and express public revenue as a share of 
GDP, a standard and useful measure of fiscal capacity (Besley and Persson, 2014). To obtain 
yearly estimates of real GDP per capita, we combine two main sources: contemporary 
national accounting exercises give us nominal GDP from the 1950s onwards, while historians’ 
estimations of GDP growth in volume give us real GDP growth before 1950. These sources, 
laid out in details in the “Gross domestic product” section of the “List of sources” below, are 
combined with our price deflator, PPP adjustor, and population series to obtain series of real 
GDP per capita in 1937 francs. The deflator and PPP adjustor used to convert nominal GDP in 
1937 PPP francs are the same as those used to deflate our public finance data, making the 
computation of GDP shares straightforward.  
In Algeria, we take yearly nominal GDP between 1950 and 1957 from Algeria, 
Service de statistique générale (1958, p. 54), in 1958 and 1959 from Amin (1966, p. 194-
195), and from 1960 onwards from The World Bank (2017).To obtain real GDP figures 
before 1950, we use real GDP growth estimated by Amin (1966, p.101) between 1880 and 
1950 and by Maddison (2003) between 1820 and 1880. 
In Morocco, we use the nominal GDP series of The World Bank (2017) from 1960 
onwards. We use the growth of real GDP of Amin (1966) between 1920 and 1960, and of 
Maddison (2003) between 1820 and 1920. We do not use the nominal GDP series of Amin 
directly because the figure he gives for 1960 is 25% higher than the one given by The World 
Bank (2017). 
In Tunisia, we take nominal GDP in 1957 and 1960 from Amin (1966, p. 297), and 
nominal GDP after 1965 from The World Bank (2017). Real GDP in other years is computed 
using the real growth rates of Zarka (1964, p. 214) between 1950 and 1960, and the growth 
rate of Maddison between 1960 and 1965. Before 1950, we use the growth rate of real GDP 
given by Amin (1966, p. 35 & p. 101) between 1920 and 1950, and Maddison (2003) between 
1820 and 1920.  
In Indochina, we take the nominal GDP series of Bassino (2000) for Vietnam 
(Cochinchina, Annam, and Tonkin) between 1820 and 1970, that we deflate using our CPI. 
The real GDP per capita of Cambodia and Laos is assumed to be equal to the real GDP per 
capita of Annam. 
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In Sub-Saharan Africa (A.O.F, AEF, Togo, Cameroon, and Madagascar), we rely on 
the nominal GDP series of The World Bank (2017) after 1960. In 1953, we rely on national 
accounts established by the French Overseas Ministry for AOF, A.E.F, Cameroun, and 
Madagascar (France, Direction des Affaires économiques et du Plan du ministère de la 
France d’outre-mer, 1955). Growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1953 and 1960 are 
taken from the Maddison Project. Because we do not have good data on inflation in the 1950s, 
the difference between the growth rate of nominal GDP per capita and the growth rate of 
nominal GDP per capita gives us a measure of price inflation that we use to deflate our public 
finance series.28 Real GDP per capita before 1953 is obtained using the real GDP growth rates 
given in Maddison (2003). 
Finally, in Metropolitan France, we take the GDP at market prices from INSEE 
national accounts between 1949 and 2010, deflated using our GDP deflator. Between 1900 
and 1949, we extrapolate backwards using the annual growth rates of market GDP estimated 
by Villa (1997), taking into account the gradual increase in the share of non-market GDP 
using estimates from Vincent (1972, p. 334) for 1913, 1929, and 1938. Between 1820 and 
1900, we extrapolate backwards using annual growth rates estimated by Toutain (1987). 
Extrapolation of GDP fluctuation from import and export series. Most of our 
sources estimate real GDP growth before 1950 only between a couple of key years.29 We 
extrapolate deviations around an exponential trade using the fluctuations of imports and 
exports, for which we have yearly observations from Marseille (1984). We proceed in the 
following way: in the period 1950-1973 (when we have yearly observations of GDP, exports 
and imports), we estimate the following relationship for each country (or group of countries in 
the case of federations)30: ln(𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑡) = 𝛽 + 𝑎 ln(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡) + ln(𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡) + 𝑐 × 𝑒 + 𝑢𝑡 
Where GDP, exports and imports are deflated in 1937 francs using the same deflator, 
and expressed in per capita terms. By the Frisch-Waugh theorem, this is equivalent to first 
estimating the deviations of GDP, exports and imports around an exponential trend: 
                                                 
28 Because we did not find estimates of nominal GDP in the 1950s in Togo, inflation in the 1950s is 
assumed to be the same as in AOF Nominal GDP in 1960 is deflated in 1937 PPP F using the prices of AOF, and 
real GDP is then computed using the real growth rates of Maddison (2003).  
29 Maddison (2003) gives an estimate of real GDP per capita for “Other countries of Black Africa” in 
1820, 1870, and 1913. Amin (1966) gives estimates of real GDP in 1880, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1955 and 1960 in 
the Maghreb. 
30 We stop in 1973 to avoid the period following the oil shock, which might be very specific. The years 
on which this equation is estimated are 1950-1973 for Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco; 1947 and 1953-1973 for 
AOF, AEF, Cameroon and Madagascar; 1948 and 1950-1973 for Togo. We do not need to extrapolate GDP 
from imports and exports in Indochina as complete series are already given in Bassino (2000). 
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ln(𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑡) = 𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺 × 𝑒 + 𝑒𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑡 ln(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒 + 𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒 × 𝑒 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒,𝑡 ln(𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒 + 𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒 × 𝑒 + 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒,𝑡 
Then estimating 𝑎 and 𝑏 from the residuals: 
?̂?𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑡 = 𝑎 ?̂?𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒,𝑡 + 𝑏 ?̂?𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 
We then use parameters 𝑎 and 𝑏 estimated for each country or group of countries to 
extrapolate the variations of GDP around an exponential trend from yearly series on exports 
and imports. For a given country, we observe GDP in year 𝑒 and year 𝑒 + ℎ. We start by 
detrending the series of imports and exports between 𝑒 and 𝑒 + ℎ by estimating ln(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡+𝑖 ) = 𝛾𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒 × 𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒,𝑡+𝑖 ln(𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡+𝑖 ) = 𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒 + 𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒 × 𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒,𝑡+𝑖 
For 𝑖 between 0 and ℎ. We then compute the deviation of GDP from an exponential 
trend from the residuals: ?̂?𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑡+𝑖 = 𝑎� ?̂?𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒,𝑡+𝑖 + 𝑏� ?̂?𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑒,𝑡+𝑖. Then we can write GDP at 
time 𝑒 + 𝑖 as ln(𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑡+𝑖) = 𝛾𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝑘𝐺𝐺𝐺 × 𝑖 + ?̂?𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑡+𝑖 . Because we know GDP at the two 
endpoints 𝑒 and 𝑒 + ℎ, we can compute parameters 𝛾𝐺𝐺𝐺 and 𝑘𝐺𝐺𝐺 and compute GDP at every 
intermediate point.31 
Our GDP estimations can be seen in figure 8, displaying the evolution of GDP per 
capita in 1937 francs in the 9 regions of our database. 
                                                 
31 In a previous version of the paper, we did not try to estimate GDP fluctuations and assumed constant 
annual growth rates between key years. Our GDP estimates were therefore moving averages missing the yearly 
variations in GDP growth due to, for example, fluctuations in the prices of exported primary products. 
 
Figure 8: Estimation of GDP per head in the nine regions of the French Empire 
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DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES 
Development outcomes (kWh produced, road and railway meters, primary enrolment 
and number of medical staff) come from various statistical yearbooks — see the list of 
sources below. 
VARIABLE DICTIONARY 
PUBLIC FINANCE DATABASE 
Variables in the public finance database are given per head in 1937 PPP Francs. To 
recover nominal amounts as they appear in the budget accounts, one needs to divide by the 
price deflator (deflator) and the purchasing power parity adjustor (PPP_adjustor) and multiply 
by population (pop). 
Region 
One of nine colonies, protectorates, mandates, or federations or colonies: Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Indochina, West Africa, Togo, Equatorial Africa, Cameroon, and 
Madagascar. 
Year 
Net public expenditure (NPE) 
Net public expenditure is total public expenditure net of transfers to reserve funds, 
external loans, subsidies and debt service. It is a consolidated aggregate, meaning that 
it is net of the various financial transfers (loans, subsidies, etc.) between different 
public budgets accounts within the same region (federal, colonial, and auxiliary 
budgets, and budgets of first-level administrative divisions). However, NPE includes 
subsidies and loans to firms and institutions located within the region, as well as 
subsidies and loans to second-level administrative divisions (municipalities). NPE also 
includes the civilian expenditure recorded in the budget accounts of the French 
Ministry of Colonies and Ministry of War. It does not include social security transfers. 
After independence, when Franc Zone reports are used as sources, NPE is computed 
as total expenditure minus debt service as recorded in Franc Zone reports, minus all 
external loans and subsidies received by the country recorded in the Franc Zone report 
(except when we know these emanate from a private source or a non-OECD country), 
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plus net OECD ODA (loans and grants) received by the country (see “Budget accounts 
considered and sources used” above). 
Administration expenditure (exp_administration) 
Administration expenditure comprises personnel and material expenses destined to 
general and territorial administration. It comprises financial transfers to autochthonous 
political authorities, such as the king of Laos, or the sultan of Morocco. 
Security expenditure (exp_security) 
Security expenditure comprises personnel and material expenses of the police and 
prisons.  
Justice expenditure (exp_justice) 
Justice expenditure comprises personnel and material expenses destined to 
Autochthonous and European justice. 
Financial services expenditure (exp_finserv) 
Financial services expenditure comprises personnel and material expenses destined to 
tax collection, the management of the public debt, and the management of government 
monopolies (on salt, opium, etc.) 
Education expenditure (exp_education) 
Education expenditure comprises personnel and material expenses destined to public 
education, subsidies to private schools, and scholarships. School construction expenses 
are classified as infrastructure expenditure. In all French colonies, schools were 
segregated into a European system and a system for the autochthonous population. In 
Algeria between 1904 and 1948, and in Morocco between 1926 and 1930, it is 
possible to identify education expenditure for Autochthons (exp_education_au) and 
for Europeans (exp_education_eu). The two subcategories do not necessarily sum to 
total education expenditure because some expenses were common to both education 
systems. Education expenditure for Autochthons and Europeans are expressed per 
head of the relevant population: expenditure for Europeans are divided by European 
population (pop_eu) and expenditure for Autochthons are divided by autochthonous 
population (pop minus pop_eu). 
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Religion expenditure (exp_religion) 
Religion expenditure is positive only in Algeria, where the government took charge of 
the personnel and material expenses of the 4 monotheist religions (Islam, Judaism, 
Protestantism, and Catholicism). The law of separation of church and state was only 
partially applied in Algeria, where the government continued subsidising religions 
after 1907, and notably continued paying the wages of the Muslim religious personnel 
in an effort to control Islam and avoid political turmoil (Saaidia, 2016). 
Health expenditure (exp_health) 
Health expenditure comprises the personnel and material expenses destined to health, 
sanitation, labor inspection, and welfare. It does not include social security transfers. 
Hospital and health centers construction expenses are classified as infrastructure 
expenditure. 
Infrastructure expenditure (exp_infrast) 
Infrastructure expenditure comprises expenses for public works, both the construction 
of new infrastructure and buildings and the maintenance of existing ones. The 
construction of new railway lines or telegraphic lines falls in this category, but 
subsidies to railway companies are classified as production support expenditure, as 
well as the operating expenses of posts and telecommunications. Infrastructure 
expenditure also comprises the subsidies to second-level administrative divisions 
destined to the maintenance of local roads (in Algeria only). 
Production support expenditure (exp_prodsup) 
Production support expenditure comprises subsidies to private and public or semi-
public entities whose budgets are not already part of the public expenditure aggregate 
(like railway companies). It also includes expenses on public services destined to 
enhance or support production, like posts and telecommunications, power plants, 
printing department, meteorological department, civil aviation, forestry and mining 
departments, agricultural research, merchant navy, etc. 
Other expenditure (exp_other) 
Other expenditure is equal to the difference between net public expenditure (NPE) and 
the sum of all previous items of expenditure: administration, security, justice, financial 
services, education, religion, health, infrastructure, and production support. 
Expenditure remaining from the previous financial year (Dépenses d’exercices 
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antérieurs / d’exercices clos) is allocated between the different items of expenditure in 
proportion of their weight in total expenditure. 
Military expenditure (exp_mili_fr and exp_mili_col) 
Our measure of net public expenditure includes civilian expenditure only. Military 
expenditure is given separately. The bulk of colonial military expenditure appears in 
the budget accounts of the French Ministry of the Colonies and Ministry of War and is 
given by the variable exp_mili_fr. Some items of military expenditure given by the 
Metropolitan budget accounts are civilian in nature and were added to the relevant 
categories of net public expenditure (exp_health, exp_infrastructure, and 
exp_prodsup). On the revenue side, they are considered as subsidies from France. 
Military expenditure appears directly in colonial budget accounts only in Algeria 
between 1830 and 1900 and between 1904 and 1937 (budget accounts of Southern 
Territories only), and in Morocco between 1921 and 1937, and in 1956. It is given by 
the variable exp_mili_col. 
Net public revenue (NPR) 
Net public revenue is public revenue net of transfers from reserve funds, external 
borrowing, subsidies, interests and reimbursements. It is a consolidated aggregate, 
meaning that it is net of various financial transfers (loans, subsidies, etc.) between 
different public budgets accounts within the same region (federal, colonial, and 
auxiliary budgets, and budgets of first-level administrative divisions). However, NPR 
includes transfers (subsidies, loans, and reimbursements) from firms and institutions 
located within the region, as well as transfers from second-level administrative 
divisions (municipalities). NPR does not include social security transfers. 
Tax revenue (taxrevenue) 
Tax revenue is the sum of head taxes, external trade taxes, intermediate taxes, and 
modern taxes 
Head taxes (re_headtax) 
Revenue from the head tax (capitation), in theory a lump-sum tax, in practice a tax 
levied at the village level by local chiefs and roughly proportional to population. This 
category also includes cattle taxes (in Tunisia, Indochina, West and Equatorial Africa, 
Togo, Cameroon, and Madagascar), and labor tax redemptions. 
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External trade taxes (re_trade) 
External trade taxes comprise export taxes (re_trade_exp) and import taxes 
(re_trade_imp), as well as harbor dues not attributable to export or import taxes 
(octroi de mer in Algeria). Taxes on the consumption of imported products are 
considered as import taxes (re_trade_imp).  
Intermediate taxes (re_intermediate) 
Intermediate taxes comprise taxes with an element of proportionality, but which do not 
require the frequently collection of statistical information on firms or individuals. 
They include direct intermediate taxes (re_interm_di), such as land taxes and 
business licenses (patente), and indirect intermediate taxes (re_interm_in), such as 
circulation taxes and taxes on the consumption of specific luxury goods (alcohol, 
sugar, tobacco). 
Modern taxes (re_modern) 
Modern taxes comprise taxes which require the frequent collection or self-declaration 
of detailed economic information on individuals and firms. Direct modern taxes 
(re_modern_di) are personal income taxes (impôt sur le revenu, as well as the 
Moroccan tax on agricultural income called tertib), taxes on benefits, and the tax on 
interests and dividends (impôt sur le revenu des valeurs mobilières). Indirect modern 
taxes (re_modern_in) are broad-based consumption taxes, taxes on sales revenue 
(impôts sur le chiffre d’affaire), and turnover taxes (called taxes sur la production, 
taxe unique à la production in Algeria, and taxe sur les transactions in Tunisia). 
Monopoly revenue (re_monopoly) 
Monopoly revenue includes revenue from any economic activity on which the 
government had a legal monopoly. It comprises revenue from industrial operations 
(including post and telegraph receipts) and administrative services, and revenue from 
the sale of various goods on which the colonial government had a monopoly, such as 
salt (in Tunisia and Indochina), tobacco (in Morocco, Tunisia, Indochina, and 
Madagascar), alcohol (in Madagascar and Indochina), and opium (in Indochina). It 
also includes excess revenue of public railway companies transferred to the 
government’s budget, as well as various registration fees. 
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Other sources of internal revenue (re_other) 
Other sources of internal revenue are the difference between Net public revenue 
(NPR) and the sum of all previous sources of internal revenue: head taxes, monopoly 
revenue, external trade taxes, intermediate taxes, modern taxes. Revenue collected in 
the current fiscal year on account of the previous fiscal year’s budget (Recettes 
d’exercices antérieurs / d’exercices clos) is allocated between the different items of 
revenue in proportion of their weight in total revenue. 
Net surplus/deficit (deficit) 
Net surplus/deficit is the difference between net public revenue and net public 
expenditure (𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒 = 𝑁𝑃𝑁 − 𝑁𝑃𝑁). The net deficit is, by construction, financed by 
net transfers from reserve funds, net borrowing, and net subsidies (another way to put 
it is that the net surplus is composed of net transfers to reserve funds, net loans, and 
net subsidies given out). Unfortunately, net transfers from reserve funds cannot be 
systematically computed, but we provide variables for the other components of the net 
deficit. 
Net subsidies (netsubto) 
Net subsidies are subsidies received from abroad net of subsidies sent abroad. During 
the colonial period, the bulk of net subsidies are net subsidies from metropolitan 
France (netsubfr), equal to subsidies from France to the colony minus subsidies from 
the colony to France. After 1960, net subsidies are aid grants from OECD-DAC aid 
data 
Net borrowing (netborto) 
Net borrowing per capita is equal to loans received minus loans given out, minus 
interests and reimbursements paid out, plus interests and reimbursements paid in. 
After 1960, net borrowing is net loan aid from OECD-DAC aid data. 
NPE of first-level administrative divisions (NPE_adm1) 
First level administrative divisions are départements in Algeria, régions in Morocco, 
and provinces in Indochina and Madagascar. Their expenditure is already taken into 
account in the consolidated aggregate (NPE). 
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NPR of first-level administrative divisions (NPR_adm1) 
First level administrative divisions are départements in Algeria, régions in Morocco, 
and provinces in Indochina and Madagascar. Their revenue is already taken into 
account in the consolidated aggregate (NPR). 
Tax revenue of first-level administrative divisions (tax_adm1) 
First level administrative divisions are départements in Algeria, régions in Morocco, 
and provinces in Indochina and Madagascar. The tax revenue of first level 
administrative divisions is already taken into account in the consolidated aggregate 
(NPR). Tax revenue of the central government only is simply𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑢𝑒 −
𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖1. 
NPE of second-level administrative divisions (NPE_adm2) 
Second-level administrative divisions are municipalities (communes). Their 
expenditure is not taken into account in the consolidated aggregate (NPE), because it 
is often missing. NPE_adm2 is net of all transfers, including subsidies from the central 
government and first-level administrative divisions. 
NPR of second-level administrative divisions (NPR_adm2) 
Second-level administrative divisions are municipalities (communes). Their revenue is 
not taken into account in the consolidated aggregate (NPR), because it is often 
missing. NPR_adm2 is net of all transfers, including subsidies to the central 
government and first-level administrative divisions. 
Net subsidies from central government to municipalities (sub_gcadm2) and from 
municipalities to central government (sub_adm2_gc) 
For years in which NPE_adm2 and NPR_adm2 are not missing, it is possible to 
compute total consolidated public expenditure and revenue. When computing total net 
public expenditure and revenue, one should subtract from net public expenditure the 
subsidies to municipalities (sub_gcadm2), and subtract from net public revenue the 
transfers from municipalities (sub_adm2gc). NPE_adm2 and NPR_adm2, however, 
are already net of transfers to and from the central government and first-level 
administrative divisions. Denoting with a star total consolidated net public expenditure 
and revenue, we have 𝑁𝑃𝑁∗ = 𝑁𝑃𝑁 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑔𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑖2 + 𝑁𝑃𝑁𝑎𝑑𝑖2, and 𝑁𝑃𝑁∗ =
𝑁𝑃𝑁 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑑𝑖2𝑔𝑐 + 𝑁𝑃𝑁𝑎𝑑𝑖2. 
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Social security transfers (re_socsec and exp_socsec) 
Social security transfers are not part of net public expenditure (NPE) and net public 
revenue (NPR). There were no social security transfers in the colonies before World War II. 
In 1945, social security funds were created in the colonies and protectorate of North Africa. 
The variable re_socsec gives social security contributions and the variable exp_socsec social 
security benefits. 
Total population (pop) 
See section “Population, prices, and GDP” above and the “List of sources” below. 
European population (pop_eu) 
See section “Population, prices, and GDP” above and the “List of sources” below. In 
Algeria, European population includes Jews who were given French citizenship by the 
1870 Crémieux decree. In Morocco and Tunisia, Jews were not given French 
citizenship and are included in the non-European minority population (pop_min). In 
Indochina, European population comprises a small number of Japanese and 
Americans. 
Non-European minority population (pop_min) 
See section “Population, prices, and GDP” above and the “List of sources” below. 
Non-European minority population is Jewish population in North Africa (except in 
Algeria where Jews were given French citizenship), Chinese population in Indochina, 
and Asian (Chinese and Indian) population in Madagascar. 
Share of 15-64-year-olds (share1564) 
See section “Population, prices, and GDP” above and the “List of sources” below. The 
population share of 15-64 year-olds is estimated only in 1925, 1945 and 1955. In 
North Africa and Indochina, we estimate the share of 15-64-year-olds in the 
Autochthonous population (share1564_au) and in the European population 
(share1564_eu). 
Price deflator (deflator) 
See section “Population, prices, and GDP” above and the “List of sources” below. The 
price deflator, base 1 in 1937, was used to deflate nominal amounts, along with the 
PPP adjustor. All public finance variables are given per head in 1937 PPP Francs. To 
recover nominal amounts, one needs to divide by deflator and by PPP_adjustor. In 
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West Africa after 1960, doing so will produce a nominal amount in current CFA 
francs (Mali, Mauritania and Guinée went off the CFA franc after 1960, but we 
converted all nominal amounts in CFA francs for these countries before applying the 
regional deflator).  
Purchasing power parity adjustor (PPP_adjustor) 
See section “Population, prices, and GDP” above and the “List of sources” below. The 
PPP adjustor adjusts for purchasing power parity in 1937. All public finance variables 
are given per head in 1937 PPP Francs. To recover nominal amounts, one needs to 
divide by deflator and by PPP_adjustor. In West Africa after 1960, doing so will 
produce a nominal amount in current CFA francs (Mali, Mauritania and Guinée went 
off the CFA franc after 1960, but we converted all nominal amounts in CFA francs for 
these countries before applying the regional deflator). 
GDP per capita in 1937 PPP francs (GDP) 
The many assumptions behind the building of yearly GDP per capita figures are laid 
out in details in the section “Population, prices and GDP” above. We used the same 
deflator to deflate nominal GDP and public finance figures, so that GDP shares can be 
computed directly by dividing the relevant variable by GDP. 
PERSONNEL DATABASE 
Region 
One of nine colonies, protectorates, mandates, or federations or colonies: Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Indochina, West Africa, Togo, Equatorial Africa, Cameroon, and 
Madagascar.  
Year 
Total revenue (re_to) 
Total revenue, not consolidated. This is simply the sum of gross revenue over all the 
budget accounts (federal and colonial) in the region. 
Total expenditure (exp_to) 
Total expenditure, not consolidated. This is simply the sum of gross expenditure over 
all the budget accounts (federal and colonial) in the region. 
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Average wage of government employees (avwage_to) 
Average wage of government employees, all sectors, including bonuses and 
allowances, in 1937 PPP Francs. Computed by dividing total personnel expenditure 
attached to a given number of employees by the number employees. Government is 
only colonial government in colonies, federal and colonial governments in federations 
of colonies, excluding the local governments of first- and second-level administrative 
divisions.  
Total number of government employees per 1,000 inhabitants (nbemppc_to) 
Total number of employees is the sum of total number of enumerated employees and 
estimated number of employees when items of personnel expenditure are not attached 
to a precise number (the monetary amount is divided by the average wage). 
Government is only colonial government in colonies, federal and colonial 
governments in federations of colonies, excluding the local governments of first- and 
second-level administrative divisions. 
Average wage and number of employees by sector 
Average wages are in 1937 PPP francs (divide by deflator and PPP_adjustor to recover 
the nominal wage). Number of employees is given per 1,000 inhabitants (multiply by 
pop to recover the actual number of employees). The definition of each sector 
corresponds exactly to the definition given in the variable dictionary for the public 
finance database. 
Total population (pop), share of 15-64-year-olds (share1564), price deflator (deflator), 
purchasing power parity adjustor (PPP_adjustor), GDP per capita (GDP) 
See definition in the variable dictionary for the public finance database. 
LIST OF SOURCES 
To build our public finances and personnel database, we gathered data from around 
1,700 official publications. These publications were accessed in several libraries and public 
archives: the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BnF) in Paris, the Bibliothèque Universitaire 
des Langues et Civilisations (BULAC) in Paris, the Bibliothèque Cujas (BC) in Paris, the 
Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine (BDIC) in Nanterre, the Centre 
des Archives Economiques et Financières (CAEF) in Savigny-le-Temple, the Bibliothèque 
Universitaire de Grenoble (BUG) in Grenoble, and the Centre des Archives de l’Outre-Mer 
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(CAOM) in Aix-en-Provence. We indicate in brackets the place (or places) where we 
accessed the source and the location number, when relevant. For the Bibliothèque Nationale 
de France, a location number starting with NUMP indicates that the publication was digitized 
and made available on the BnF’s digital library Gallica (www.gallica.bnf.fr). If no location 
number is indicated, the source comes from a private collection. When a series of publication 
was printed by several publishers, we give only the first publisher and place of publication. 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
Metropolitan France 
André, Christine and Delorme, Robert. L’Etat et l’économie. Un essai d’explication de 
l’évolution des dépenses publiques en France (1870-1980). Paris: Seuil, 1983. 
INSEE (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques). Annuaire statistique de 
la France, résumé rétrospectif. Paris, 1966. [BnF: NUMP-10025] 
France, Ministère de la France d’Outre-mer, Service des statistiques. Annuaire statistique de 
l’Union française outre-mer. Paris: Impr. nationale, 1951. [4-LC25-321 (2)]  
France, Ministère des affaires économiques et financières, Secrétariat d’Etat aux postes, 
télégraphes et téléphones. Rapport sur la gestion financière des services pendants l’année 
1955. Paris: Imprimerie des journaux officiels, 1957. [BnF: FOL-LF186-443] 
France, Ministère du commerce et de l’industrie. Rapport sur la gestion financière et la 
marche générale des services des postes, télégraphes et téléphones pendant l’année 1925. 
Paris: Imprimerie des journaux officiels, 1927. [BnF: NUMP-16601] 
Budget accounts of the Ministry of the Navy and Ministry of the Colonies 
France, Ministère de la marine et des colonies. Compte définitif des dépenses de l’exercice… 
Paris : Impr. royale, then Impr. nationale, 1833-1938. [BnF: 4-LF224-7] 
France, Ministère des colonies. Compte définitif des dépenses de l’exercice… Paris, 1884-
1938. [BnF: 4-LF224-119] 
France, Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer (services civils et militaires). Compte définitif des 
dépenses de l’exercice… Paris : Impr. nationale, 1953-1954, 1955-1959 [BnF : FOL-LF156-
184, CAEF]  
Budget accounts of the Ministry of Defense 
France, Ministère de la guerre. Comptes généraux présentés par le ministre de la guerre pour 
l’exercice… Paris: Impr. royale, then Impr. nationale, 1819, 1821-1937. [BnF: NUMP-3685 & 
4-LF194-10, CAEF] 
France. Ministère de la Défense. Compte définitif des dépenses. Paris, 1946, 1955. [CAEF] 
Budget accounts of the Ministry of the Sahara 
France, Ministère du Sahara. Loi de finance, compte définitif. 1958-1962. [BnF: FOL-LF156-
184] 
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Algeria 
Statistical abstracts 
Algeria, Gouvernement général civil. Statistique générale de l’Algérie. Algiers: Impr. de 
l’Association ouvrière, various dates between 1867 and 1925. [BnF: LK8-1043]. (The second 
volume for the year 1900 contains retrospective data from 1830, as well as communal and 
departmental data.) 
Algeria, Sous-direction des statistiques. Annuaire statistique de l’Algérie. Algiers: Impr. 
Administrative Emile Pfister, various dates between 1926 and 1960. [BnF: 4-O3W-583] 
Algeria. Statistique financière de l’Algérie. Algérie du Nord et territoires du Sud. Algiers: 
Impr. agricole et commerciale, 1900-1902, 1904-1905, 1909-1932, 1934-1935, 1937. [BnF: 
NUMP-3485] 
Algeria, Service de statistique générale. Statistique générale de l’Algérie. Tableau de 
l’économie Algérienne. Algiers: Impr. Baconnier, 1958. [BnF: 16-LC32-174] 
Definitive budget accounts 
Algeria. Compte définitif des dépenses de l’exercice… Paris: Impr. Impériale, then Nationale, 
1858-1880. [BnF : 4-LF269-3] 
Algeria. Compte définitif des recettes du budget de l’Algérie pour l’exercice… Algiers: Impr. 
Algérienne, various dates between 1914 and 1957. [BnF: NUMP-4918, CAEF] 
Algeria. Budget de l’Algérie. Compte définitif des dépenses de l’exercice… Algiers: Impr. 
Algérienne, various dates between 1914 and 1957. [BnF : NUMP-3572, CAEF] 
Provisional budget accounts 
Algeria. Projet de budget… - Gouvernement général de l'Algérie. Algiers: Impr. de V. Heintz, 
1925, 1937, 1955-1956. [BnF: FOL-LK19-400 & NUMP-3535] 
Algeria. Délégation générale en Algérie. Services civils en Algérie. Budget voté de 1960. 
Algiers: Impr. officielle, 1960. [BnF: 4-LF156-200] 
Auxiliary budget accounts 
Algeria, Gouvernement général de l’Algérie. Budget annexe des postes, télégraphes et 
téléphone de l’Algérie : Compte définitif des résultats de l’exercice… Algiers: J. Carbonel, 
1927-1939. [BnF: FOL-LK19-609 & NUMP-4652] 
Algeria, Gouvernement général de l’Algérie. Budget annexe des postes, télégraphes et 
téléphone des territoires du Sud : Compte définitif des résultats de l’exercice… Algiers: J. 
Carbonel, 1927-1939. [BnF: FOL-LK19-609 & NUMP-4652] 
Morocco 
Statistical Abstracts 
Morocco. Annuaire économique et financier. Casablanca: Impr. G. Mercié, various dates 
between 1917 and 1929. [BULAC: BIULO PER.5552]  
Morocco, Direction générale de l’agriculture, du commerce et de la colonisation. Annuaire de 
statistique générale du Maroc. Casablanca: Impr. réunies de la Vigie Marocaine et du Petit 
Marocain, various dates between 1925 and 1936. [BULAC: BIULO PER.6096]  
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Morocco, Direction de l’industrie. Annuaire de statistique générale de la zone française du 
Maroc. Casablanca: Impr. réunies de la Vigie Marocaine et du Petit Marocain, various dates 
between 1937 and 1953. [BDIC: Q6400] 
Morocco, Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de l’Economie Nationale, Division de la 
Coordination Economique et du Plan, Service Central des Statistiques. Tableaux économiques 
du Maroc, 1915-1959. Rabat, 1960. 
Provisional budget accounts 
Morocco. Empire Chérifien. Protectorat français. Budget de l’exercice… Various dates 
between 1925 and 1955. [CAEF: F4120] 
Tunisia 
Statistical abstracts 
Tunisia. Statistique générale de la Tunisie. Tunis, various dates between 1881 and 1939. 
[BnF: NUMP-7491 & MFILM 8-O3I-371] 
Tunisia, Institut national de la statistique. Annuaire statistique de la Tunisie. Tunis: Institut 
national de la statistique, various dates between 1940 and 1999. [BnF: 4-O3W-35, 8-SG PER 
U-160 & MICROFICHE M-25451] 
Provisional budget accounts 
Tunisia. Budget Général de la Tunisie. Various dates between 1931 and 1952. [CAEF] 
Tunisia. Régence de Tunis. Protectorat français. Budget de l'Etat et des Etablissements 
publics annexes pour l'exercice… Various dates between 1912 and 1955-56. [CAEF: 4329] 
Tunisia. Régence de Tunis. Protectorat français. Projet de budget de l'Etat pour l'exercice 
1924. [CAEF: F4473] 
Other 
Tunisia. Rapport au Président de la République sur la situation de la Tunisie. Paris: 
Imprimerie nationale, 1890-1916, 1918-1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1934. [BnF: NUMP-11318] 
Tunisia. Rapport au Président de la République sur la situation de la Tunisie. Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1938. [CAEF] 
Indochina 
Statistical abstracts 
Indochine française, Bureau de la statistique générale. Annuaire Statistique de L'Indochine …. 
Hanoï: Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, various dates between 1927 and 1949. [BnF: MICROFILM 
M-14883] 
Annuaire statistique du Laos. Troisième volume. 1951-1952. Saigon: Vo-Van-Van, 1954. 
[BDIC: Q15925] 
Federal budget accounts — definitive 
Indochine, Gouvernement général. Compte Administratif du Budget Général. Saïgon: Impr. 
Colonial, various dates between 1900 and 1913. [BC: 9.915-2] 
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Indochine, Gouvernement général. Compte Administratif du Budget Général de l'Indochine 
pour l'exercice … Hanoï-Haïphong: Impr. d’Extrême Orient, 1911-1943, 1946-1949. [BnF: 
NUMP-3483 & FOL-LK19-547] 
Federal budget accounts — provisional 
Indochine, Gouvernement général. Budget Général pour l'exercice… Hanoï: F.-H. Schneider, 
various dates between 1904 and 1913.  [BC: 9.915-5] 
Indochine française, Haut-commissariat. Budget général : exercice… Hanoï, then Haïphong: 
Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 1914, 1925. [BnF:  FOL-LK19-482] 
Indochine française. Projet de budget général : exercice 1937. Hanoï: Impr. d’Extrême-
Orient, 1937. [BnF: NUMP-4948] 
Colonial budget accounts: Annam (Centre Vietnam) — definitive 
Annam. Compte administratif du budget local de l'Annam pour l'exercice… Various places: 
Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 1894, 1896, 1899, 1904, 1905, 1910-1943. [BnF: MFILM LK19-
478] 
Colonial budget accounts: Annam (Centre Vietnam) — provisional 
Annam. Budget local de l’Annam pour l’exercice… Various places, 1887-1893, 1897, 1899-
1945. [BnF: MFILM FOL-LK19-479]. (Contains the provisional budget accounts of Tonkin 
for the years 1887-1890 and 1897.) 
Vietnam. Budget Régional du Centre Vietnam pour l'exercice 1953. [BnF: FOL-O2W-19] 
Colonial budget accounts: Cochinchina (South Vietnam) — definitive 
Cochinchina. Compte administratif du budget local de la Cochinchine pour l'exercice… 
Saïgon, 1871-1891, 1893-1906, 1915-1941, 1943. [BnF: NUMP-3524 & FOL-LK19-633] 
Colonial budget accounts: Cochinchina (South Vietnam) — provisional 
Cochinchina. Budget local de la Cochinchine pour l'exercice… Saïgon: Impr. du 
Gouvernement, 1876, 1878-1901, 1921-1922, 1924, 1927-1942, 1944. [BnF: NUMP-3149 & 
LK19-124, BC: 9.899]   
Colonial budget accounts: Tonkin (North Vietnam) — definitive 
Tonkin. Compte administratif du budget local du Tonkin pour l'exercice… Hanoï : Impr. 
Tonkinoise, 1900-1923, 1925-1943. [BnF: NUMP-3451 & 4-LK19-539]  
Colonial budget accounts: Tonkin (North Vietnam) — provisional 
Tonkin. Budget local du Tonkin pour l'exercice… Hanoï-Haïphong, various dates between 
1898 and 1944. [BnF: MFILM FOL-LK19-480] 
Vietnam. Budget Régional du Nord Vietnam pour l'exercice 1953. Impr. nationale du Viêt-
Nam, 1952. [BnF: GR FOL-O2W-1] 
Colonial budget accounts: Vietnam (after 1945) 
Vietnam. Budget National de l'Etat du Vietnam pour l'exercice 1953. Saïgon: Impr. française 
d’Outre-mer, 1952. [BnF: 4-O2W-40] 
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Colonial budget accounts: Cambodia — definitive 
Cambodia. Compte administratif du budget local du Cambodge pour l'exercice… Pnomh-
Penh: Impr. A. Portail, 1904-1907, 1910-1943. [BnF: MFILM LK19-476] 
Colonial budget accounts: Cambodia — provisional 
Cambodia. Budget local du Cambodge pour l'exercice… Various places, 1883, 1884, 1888-
1945. [FOL-LK19-311] 
Cambodia. Budget National du Cambodge pour l'exercice… 1950, 1952-1954. [BnF: FOL-
O2W-16] 
Colonial budget accounts: Laos — definitive 
Laos. Compte administratif du budget local du Laos pour l'exercice… Various places and 
publishers, 1904-1907, 1910-1921, 1923-1942. [BnF: NUMP-3514 & FOL-LK19-594] 
Colonial budget accounts: Laos — provisional 
Laos. Budget local du Laos pour l'exercice… Hanoï: Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 1897-1943. 
[BnF: NUMP-3481 & FOL-LK19-528] 
Laos. Budget National du Laos pour l'exercice… Hanoï: Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 1950, 1952-
54. [BnF: FOL-O2W-17]  
Auxiliary budget accounts 
Indochine française. Budget de l'emprunt de 53 millions pour l'exercice 1915. [BC: 9.915-6a] 
France, Inspection générale des Travaux publics. Budget de l'emprunt de 90 millions pour 
l'exercice… Hanoï-Haïphong: Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 1913, 1914. [BC: 9.915-7] 
Indochine française. Budget de l'emprunt de 90 millions pour l'exercice…  Hanoï-Haïphong: 
Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 1917, 1922-1929. [BnF: NUMP-3463 &  4-LK19-534] 
Indochine française. Compte administratif du budget de l'emprunt de 90 millions pour 
l'exercice… Hanoï-Haïphong: Impr. d’Extrême-Orient. 1922, 1923, 1925-1929. [BnF: 
NUMP-3869 & FOL-LK19-550] 
Indochine française. Compte administratif du budget de l'emprunt de 6 180 000 piastres pour 
l'exercice… Hanoï: Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 1922-1927. [BnF: FOL-LK19-540 (BIS)] 
Indochine française. Budget spécial sur fonds d'emprunt des grands travaux et dépenses 
sanitaires pour l'exercice… Hanoï: Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 1931-1942, 1945. [NUMP-4136 
& FOL-LK19-642] 
Indochine française. Compte administratif du budget spécial sur fonds d'emprunt des grands 
travaux et dépenses sanitaires pour l'exercice… Hanoï: Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 1913-1943. 
[BnF: NUMP-4822 & FOL-LK19-697]  
Indochine française. Compte Administratif du Budget spécial pour la reconstruction et le 
rééquipement de l'Indochine pour l'exercice 1946. Hanoï-Haïphong: Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 
1946. [BnF: FOL-LK19-547]  
Other (notably for provincial and municipal budget accounts) 
Spooner, Andrew. Situation financière en Cochinchine. Unknown place, 1874. [BnF: 
NUMM-5842883 & 4-LK10-90] 
47 
 
Indochine française. Rapports au Conseil Supérieur (Gouverment général de l'Indochine). 
Hanoï-Haïphong: Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 1910-1939. [BnF: NUMP-3209 & 4-LK19-463] 
Indochine française. Rapport sur la situation administrative, économique et financière au 
Laos durant la période… Hanoï: Impr. d’Extrême-Orient, 1929-1939. [BnF: NUMP-3424 & 
4-LK19-611] 
Ville de Hanoï : bulletin municipal. Hanoï: unknown publisher, 1916, 1922-1924. [BnF: 
NUMP-4440 & 8-LK19-565] 
Afrique Occidentale Française 
Federal budget accounts — definitive 
Afrique occidentale française. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget général de 
l'Afrique occidentale française pour l'exercice… Gorée, then Rufisque: Impr. du 
Gouvernement general, 1905-1939, 1941-1957. [BnF: NUMP-3506 & FOL-LK19-398] 
Federal budget accounts — provisional 
Afrique Occidentale Française. Budget général de l’Afrique occidentale française… Various 
places: Impr. du Gouvernement général, 1913, 1925, 1936, 1949, 1955. [BnF: FOL-LK19-
372 & NUMP-3509] 
Colonial budget accounts: Côte d’Ivoire — definitive 
Côte d’Ivoire. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget local de la Côte d'Ivoire 
pour l'exercice… Bingerville, then Abidjan: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1901-1904, 1906-1915, 
1917-1921, 1923-1924, 1928-1940, 1942-1943, 1945-1954. [BnF: FOL-LK19-404] 
Colonial budget accounts: Côte d’Ivoire — provisional 
Côte d’Ivoire. Budget du service local de la Côte d'Ivoire pour l'exercice… Various places 
and publishers, various dates between 1893 and1960. [BnF: FOL-LK19-407 & NUMP-3512, 
BC: 9.882-1] 
Colonial budget accounts: Dahomey — definitive 
Dahomey. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget local du Dahomey pour 
l'exercice… Porto-Novo: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1897-1902, 1904, 1906, 1908-1938, 1940-
1942, 1944-1955. [BnF: NUMP-3480 & FOL-LK19-412] 
Colonial budget accounts: Dahomey — provisional 
Dahomey. Budget local du Dahomey pour l'exercice… Porto-Novo: Impr. du Gouvernement, 
1895-1898, 1900-1945, 1947-1957. [BnF: NUMP-3288 & 4-LK19-409] 
Colonial budget accounts: Guinea — definitive 
Guinea. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget local de la Guinée pour 
l'exercice… Conakry: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1890-1902, 1904-1940, 1942-1943, 1946-
1954. [BnF: NUMP-3543 & FOL-LK19-390] 
Colonial budget accounts: Guinea — provisional 
Guinea. Budget local de la Guinée française pour l’exercice… Conakry: Impr. du 
Gouvernement, 1892, 1894-1955, 1958. [BnF: NUMP-3409 & FOL-LK19-269] 
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Colonial budget accounts: Haute-Volta — definitive 
Haute-Volta. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget local de la Haute-Volta pour 
l'exercice… Koulouba: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1920-1922, 1929-1932, 1948-1954, 1956. 
[BnF: NUMP-3534 & FOL-LK19-515] 
Colonial budget accounts: Haute-Volta — provisional 
Haute-Volta. Budget local de la Haute-Volta pour l'exercice… Koulouba: Impr. du 
Gouvernement, 1920-1928, 1931-1932, 1938-1956. [BnF: NUMP-3387 & FOL-LK19-501] 
Colonial budget accounts: Mauritania — definitive 
Mauritania. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget local de la Mauritanie pour 
l'exercice… Gorée, then Rufisque: Impr. du Gouvernement general, 1906-1955. [BnF: 
NUMP-3127 & 4-LK19-419] 
Colonial budget accounts: Mauritania — provisional 
Mauritania. Budget local de la Mauritanie pour l'exercice… Gorée, then Rufisque: Impr. du 
Gouvernement general, 1908-1914, 1915-1940, 1942, 1946-1958. [BnF: FOL-LK19-447] 
Colonial budget accounts: Niger — definitive 
Niger. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses de la colonie du Niger pour l'exercice… 
Gorée, then Koulouba: Impr. du gouvernement (général), various dates between 1921 and 
1955. [BnF: FOL-LK19-569] 
Colonial budget accounts: Niger — provisional 
Niger. Budget local du Territoire militaire du Niger pour l'exercice… (title varies). Various 
places and publishers, 1913-1958. [BnF: FOL-LK19-408 (BIS)] 
Colonial budget accounts: Senegal — definitive 
Senegal. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget local du Sénégal Pays de 
Protectorat pour l'exercice… Saint-Louis: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1905-1914, 1916-1936. 
[BnF: NUMP-3098 & FOL-LK19-441] 
Senegal. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget local du Sénégal pour 
l'exercice… Saint-Louis: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1873, 1875-1890, 1892-1893, 1895-1896, 
1898, 1900-1901, 1905-1959. [BnF: NUMP-3403, NUMP-3134, FOL-LK19-142, FOL-
LK19-440 & FOL-LK19-441] 
Colonial budget accounts: Senegal — provisional 
Senegal. Budget local de la colonie du Sénégal pour l'exercice… Saint-Louis: Impr. du 
Gouvernement, 1905-1920, 1922-1943, 1945-1946, 1948-1958. [BnF: NUMP-3407 & FOL-
LK19-405] 
Colonial budget accounts: Soudan and predecessors — definitive 
Haut-Sénégal-Niger. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget local du Haut-
Sénégal et Moyen-Niger pour l'exercice… Bamako: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1902, 1908-
1914, 1916-1919. [BnF: NUMP-11411 & FOL-LK19-373] 
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Soudan français. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget local du Soudan français 
pour l’exercice… Koulouba: Impr. du gouvernement, various dates between 1945 and 1951. 
[BnF: FOL-LK19-530] 
Colonial budget accounts: Soudan and predecessors — provisional 
Afrique occidentale française. Budget local du Haut-Sénégal et Niger : exercice… Bamako, 
1901, 1902. [BC: 9.955-2] 
Haut-Sénégal-Niger. Budget local du Haut-Sénégal et Niger (title varies). Various places: 
Impr. du Gouvernement (général), 1903-1920. [BnF: NUMP-3306, 4-LK19-363 & 4-LK19-
408] 
Soudan français. Soudan français, budget du service local, exercice… Saint-Louis: 
Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1898-1899. [BnF: NUMP-3445 & FOL-LK19-507]  
Afrique occidentale française. Budget du service local. Soudan français : exercice… Saint-
Louis: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1898-1899. [BC: 9.955-1] 
Soudan français. Budget local du Soudan français pour l'exercice… Bamako, then Koulouba: 
Impr. du Gouvernement, 1921-1941, 1943-1960. [BnF: NUMP-3445 & FOL-LK19-507] 
Auxiliary budget accounts 
Afrique occidentale française. Gouvernement général de l’Afrique occidentale française. 
Budget des fonds d’emprunt… Emprunt de 65 millions. Gorée: Impr. du Gouvernement 
general, 1909-1912. [BnF: NUMP-7005 & 4-LK19-451] 
Afrique occidentale française. Gouvernement général de l’Afrique occidentale française. 
Budget des fonds d’emprunt… Emprunt de 14 millions… chemin de fer de Thiès vers Kayes. 
Gorée: Impr. du Gouvernement general, 1910-1917. [BnF: NUMP-3467 & FOL-LK19-423] 
Afrique occidentale française. Gouvernement général de l’Afrique occidentale française. 
Budget des fonds d’emprunt… Emprunt de 167 millions. Gorée: Impr. du Gouvernement 
general, 1914-1926. [BnF: NUMP-8145 & 4-LK19-452] 
Afrique occidentale française. Gouvernement général de l’Afrique occidentale française. 
Budget spécial des grands travaux et dépenses sanitaires sur fonds d’emprunt, annexe au 
budget général. Exercice… Gorée, Rufisque: Impr. du gouvernement general, 1932-1941, 
1946. [BnF: NUMP-3530 & FOL-LK19-636] 
Afrique occidentale française. Gouvernement général de l’Afrique occidentale française. 
Compte définitif des recettes et des dépenses du budget des fonds des emprunts de 65 et 100 
millions. Gorée: Impr. du Gouvernement general, 1906-1923. [BnF: FOL-LK19-455] 
Afrique occidentale française. Gouvernement général de l’Afrique occidentale française. 
Compte définitif des recettes et des dépenses du budget des fonds de l’emprunt de 100 
millions. Various places, 1908-1912. [BnF: FOL-LK19-456] 
Afrique occidentale française. Gouvernement général de l’Afrique occidentale française. 
Compte définitif des recettes et des dépenses du budget des fonds de l’emprunt de 14 millions. 
Various places, 1910-1917. [BnF: FOL-LK19-467] 
Afrique occidentale française. Gouvernement général de l’Afrique occidentale française. 
Compte définitif des recettes et des dépenses du budget des fonds de l’emprunt de 14 et 167 
millions. Various places, 1914-1926. [BnF: FOL-LK19-492] 
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Afrique occidentale française. Compte définitif des recettes et des dépenses du budget spécial 
des grands travaux et dépenses sanitaires sur fonds d’emprunt : annexe au budget général : 
exercice… Rufisque: Impr. du Gouvernement general, 1931-1937, 1939-1941, 1944-1946. 
[BnF: NUMPR-7653 & FOL-LK19-684] 
Other 
Dakar (Circonscription). Budget de la circonscription de Dakar et dépendances (annexe au 
bidget général). Exercice… Gorée, then Rufisque: Impr. Du Gouvernement general, 1925-
1944, 1946-1947. [NUMP-3533 & FOL-LK19-535]  
Togo 
Colonial budget accounts — definitive 
Togo. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget local du Togo pour l'exercice… 
1923-1938, 1947, 1950, 1952. [BnF: FOL-LK19-857] 
Colonial budget accounts — provisional 
Togo. Budget local du Togo pour l'exercice… Gorée: Impr. du Gouvernement général. 1920-
1922, 1924-1944, 1947-1950, 1952-1954, 1956. [BnF: NUMP-3562 & FOL-LK19-504] 
Afrique Equatoriale Française 
Statistical abstracts 
Afrique Equatoriale Française, Service de la statistique générale. Annuaire statistique de 
l'Afrique équatoriale française. Volume 1936-1950. 1952. [BnF: 4-LC32-158] 
Oubangui-Chari, Bureau de la Statistique générale. Annuaire statistique de l'Oubangui-Chari. 
Années 1940 à 1955. Vol. 1. Bangui: Impr. Notre-Dame, 1957. [BnF: 4-LC32-182] 
Federal budget accounts — definitive 
Congo Français. Compte définitif des recettes et des dépenses. Libreville : Imprimerie du 
Gouvernement, 1899-1908. [BnF : FOL-LK19-387]  
Afrique Equatoriale Française. Compte définitif des recettes et des dépenses. Brazzaville : 
Imprimerie du Gouvernement Général, 1912-1958. [BnF : NUMP-3385 & 4-LK19-434]. 
(This location number also covers colonial budget accounts for some dates). 
Federal budget accounts — provisional 
Afrique Equatoriale Française. Projets de budgets exercice… (title varies). Brazzaville: Impr. 
du Gouvernement general, 1912, 1915, 1917. [BnF: FOL-LK19-469 & NUMP-3508]. (This 
location number also covers colonial budget accounts for some dates). 
Afrique Equatoriale Française. Budget général… Brazzaville: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 
various dates between 1911 and 1958. [BnF: FOL-LK19-778 & NUMP-3428]. (This location 
number also covers colonial budget accounts for some dates). 
Colonial budget accounts: Moyen-Congo — definitive 
Afrique Equatoriale Française. Budget local du territoire du Moyen-Congo : compte définitif 
des recettes et des dépenses. Exercice… Brazzaville: Impr. Officielle du gouvernement 
general, 1927-1956. [BnF: NUMP-3520 & FOL-LK19-579] 
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Colonial budget accounts: Moyen-Congo — provisional 
Congo. Budget local: exercice… / Gouvernement général de l’Afrique équatoriale française, 
Territoire du Moyen-Congo. Brazzaville: Impr. du Gouvernement général, various dates 
between 1947 and 1960. [BnF: FOL-LK19-773] 
Colonial budget accounts : Gabon — definitive 
Afrique Equatoriale Française. Comptes définitifs des recettes et des dépenses : budget local 
du Gabon : exercice… Paris, then Brazzaville: E. Larose, then Impr. Du Gouvernement, 
1920-1921, 1925-1926, 1933, 1952-53. [BnF : NUMP-3546 & FOL-LK19-578] 
Colonial budget accounts : Gabon — provisional 
Gabon. Budget local : exercice… / Afrique équatoriale française, Territoire du Gabon. 
Various places and publishers, various dates between 1890 and 1958. [BnF: FOL-LK19-371, 
FOL-LK19-778 & FOL-LK19-796]  
Colonial budget accounts : Oubangui-Chari — definitive 
Afrique Equatoriale Française. Oubangui-Chari. Compte définitif des recettes et des 
dépenses : budget local : exercice… . Paris : E. Larose, 1925, 1926, 1951. [BnF: NUMP-3526 
& FOL-LK19-576]  
Colonial budget accounts : Oubangui-Chari — provisional 
Oubangui-Chari. Budget local : exercice… / Afrique équatoriale française, Oubangui-Chari. 
Various places and publishers, various dates between 1900 and 1959. [BnF: FOL-LK19-371, 
FLO-LK19-778, FOL-LK19-802] 
Colonial budget accounts : Chad — definitive 
Chad. Compte définitif des recettes et des dépenses. Exercice… Paris, then Brazzaville: E. 
Larose, then Impr. officielle, 1925, 1926, 1947, 1949-1954. [BnF : FOL-LK19-580] 
Colonial budget accounts : Chad — provisional 
Chad. Afrique équatoriale française. Territoire du Tchad. Budget local. Exercice… Various 
places and publishers, 1951-1958. [FOL-LK19-858] 
Cameroon 
Definitive budget accounts 
Cameroon. Compte définitif des recettes et dépenses du budget des territoires du Cameroun 
pour l'exercice… Paris : E. Larose, 1922-1925, 1929-1931, 1933-1936, 1945-1952. [BnF: 
NUMP-3573 & FOL-LK19-536] 
Provisional budget accounts 
Cameroon. Budget du Cameroun : exercice… Yaounde: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1920, 1922, 
1924-1926, 1929-1939, 1943, 1945-1957. [BnF: NUMP-3511 & FOL-LK19-506] 
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Auxiliary budget accounts 
Cameroon. Budget annexe de la construction du Port de Douala et du chemin de fer du centre 
du Cameroun pour l’exercice… Yaounde: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1925,1926. [BnF : 
NUMP-3511 & FOL-LK19-506] 
Cameroon. Budget annexe de la santé publique et de l’assistance médicale indigène pour 
l’exercice… Yaounde: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1925, 1926, 1929, 1932. [BnF : NUMP-3511 
& FOL-LK19-506] 
Cameroon. Budget annexe de la santé publique. Compte définitif des recettes et des dépenses. 
Exercice…. Paris: Imprimerie-Librairie Militaire Universelle L. Fournier, 1924, 1931. [BnF: 
NUMP-3573 & FOL-LK19-536] 
Cameroon. Budget spécial des grands travaux et dépenses sanitaires sur fonds d’emprunt: 
exercice… Yaounde: Impr. du Gouvernement, 1931-1939. [BnF: NUMP 5167 & FOL-LK19-
861] 
Madagascar 
Statistical abstracts 
Madagascar, Institut national de la statistique. Annuaire statistique de Madagascar 1938-
1951. Antananarivo: Impr. officielle, 1953. [BnF: LC32-167]. (Contains information on the 
budget accounts of the provinces in 1931 and from 1938 to 1951). 
Budget accounts of Madagascar — definitive 
Madagascar. Compte définitif du budget des recettes et des dépenses du service local de 
Madagascar et Dépendances pour l'exercice… Antananarivo, 1898-1900. [BC: 9.912-2] 
Madagascar. Territoire de Madagascar. Budget général. Compte définitif des recettes et des 
dépenses. Exercice… Antananarivo: Impr. officielle, 1901-1917, 1920, 1922-1923, 1925-
1928, 1930-1938, 1940-1945, 1956. [BnF: FOL-LK19-446] 
Budget accounts of Madagascar — provisional 
Madagascar. Budget des recettes et des dépenses du Service local… Madagascar et 
dépendances. Antananarivo: Gouvernement général de Madagascar et dépendances, 1900-
1905, 1909-1941, 1943-1946, 1948-1953, 1956-1957. [BnF: NUMP-4474 & FOL-LK19-428] 
Budget accounts of Mayotte and dependencies 
Mayotte (Colonie). Comptes définitifs des recettes et des dépenses des services locaux de la 
Colonie de Mayotte et des protectorats des Comores. Exercice… Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 
1898-1906, 1911-1914. [BnF : NUMP-3382 & FOL-LK19-356]  
Mayotte (Colonie). Budget des recettes et des dépenses… Colonie de Mayotte, Service local. 
Saint-Denis (Reunion Island), then Hell-Ville, then Paris, then Antananarivo, 1881-1898, 
1900-1912. [BnF: FOL-LK19-271] 
Budget accounts of provinces 
Province de Fianarantsoa. Compte définitif du budget provincial de Fianarantsoa. 
Fianarantsoa, 1949-1952, 1945-1956. [BnF: FOL-LK19-953] 
Mahajanga (Province). Province de Majunga. Compte définitif des recettes et des dépenses. 
Exercice… 1949, 1951-1956. [BnF: FOL-LK19-95] 
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Province de Tamatave. Province de Tamatave. Compte définitif. Tamatave. 1949-1956. [BnF: 
FOL-LK19-951] 
Province de Tananarive. Compte définitif du budget provincial de Tananarive. Exercice 1956. 
[BnF: FOL-LK19-950] 
Province de Tuléar. Province de Tuléar. Budget provincial. Compte définitif. Tuléar, 1949, 
1951-1956. [BnF: FOL-LK19-949] 
Auxiliary accounts 
Madagascar. Compte définitif du budget spécial des grands travaux et dépenses sanitaires sur 
fonds d'emprunt : exercice… Madagascar et dépendances. Antananarivo: Impr. officielle, 
1931, 1935-1942. [BnF: FOL-LK19-863] 
Madagascar. Budget spécial des grands travaux et dépenses sanitaires sur fonds d'emprunt. 
Exercice… Antananarivo: Gouvernement général de Madagascar et dépendances, 1931-1942. 
[BnF: NUMP 5038 & FOL-LK19-685] 
FIDES 
Institut d’Etude du Développement Economique et Social (IEDES). Les investissements 
publics d’origine locale et d’origine extérieure dans les pays francophones d’Afrique 
tropicale. 1946-1960. Volume II : Tableaux Statistiques. [BUG: D0342608839]    
Post colonial 
Amin, Samir. L’Afrique de l’Ouest bloquée: l’économie politique de la colonisation, 1880-
1970. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1971. 
Comité monétaire de la zone franc. La Zone Franc en … : Rapport publié par le Secrétariat 
du Comité monétaire de la zone franc. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1953-1995. [BnF: NUMP-
10930] 
Haute-Volta, Direction du plan et des études de développement. Bilan du plan cadre, 1967-
1970. Ouagadougou, 1971. [BnF: MICROFICHE M-15031]  
Madagascar, Commissariat général au plan. Rapport sur l’exécution du plan quinquennal 
1964-1968. Antananarivo: 1965-1969. [BnF: MICR M-25337] 
OECD. OECD development co-operation directorate development assistance committee 
(DCD-DAC) official development assistance (ODA) data. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/ 
(accessed 08/24/2017). 
Senegal, Secrétariat d’Etat au plan. Rapport d’évaluation du 3e plan quadriennal de 
développement économique et social, année 1969-1970. Dakar, 1972. [BnF: 4-O3W-553] 
Tunisia, Secrétariat d’Etat au plan et aux finances. Annuaire statistique de la Tunisie. Tunis: 
Institut national de la statistique, 1964-65. [BnF: 4-O3W-35] 
POPULATION 
Africapolis. http://www.africapolis.org/ 
Algeria, Sous-direction des statistiques. Annuaire statistique de l’Algérie. Algiers: Impr. 
Administrative Emile Pfister, various dates between 1926 and 1960. [BnF: 4-O3W-583] 
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Banens, Maks. “Vietnam: a reconstitution of its 20th century population history.” In Vietnam 
Economic History, edited by Jean-Pascal Bassino, Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke 
Odaka, 1-45. Tokyo: Hitotsubashi University, 2000. 
Bassino, Jean-Pascal. “Preliminary estimates of Vietnam GDP 1800-1970: North-South 
economic divide in historical perspective”. International research workshop on Asian 
historical statistics database, 7-8 January 2000. 
Chandler, Tertius, 1987. Four Thousand Years of Urban Growth: An Historical Census. 
Lewiston, NY: St. David's University Press. 
CICRED (Comité International de Coordination des Recherches Nationales en Démographie). 
La Population de l’Algérie. Paris: CICRED, 1974a. 
CICRED (Comité International de Coordination des Recherches Nationales en Démographie). 
La Population du Maroc. Paris: CICRED, 1974b. 
CICRED (Comité International de Coordination des Recherches Nationales en Démographie). 
La Population de la Tunisie. Paris: CICRED, 1974c. 
Eggiman, Gilbert. La population des villes des tiers mondes, 1500 - 1950 : Afrique, Asie, 
Amérique latine. Genève : Droz, 1999. 
Frankema, Ewout and Morten Jerven. “Writing History backwards or sideways: towards a 
consensus on African population, 1850-2010”. The Economic History Review, 67, no. 
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